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 Introduction: 
 
 
The point of departure of this thesis is the Ganges water disputes between India and 
Bangladesh. The dispute mainly evolved when India constructed the Farakka dam on the 
Ganges river. The dam badly affects on various entities of the region, which includes 
nonhuman natural entities, the entire natural environment, socio-economic factors and so on.  
The case study is described in chapter 1. The information stems mainly from books written 
about this issue and local magazine- and newspaper- articles concerning the case. 
 
The Ganges water conflict is an immense object of discussion. The conflict has various 
perspectives and can be discussed from the viewpoints of several disciplines, for instance, 
socio-economic perspectives, political, legal, etc. In the following I discuss only specific 
aspects of the conflict. One of them being the conflict of interests between the two countries, 
as each country estimates their interests from their respective points of view. A second aspect 
of the conflict concerns its effects on non-human entities as well as the entire natural 
environment. The third element of the conflict concerns the agreement between Bangladesh 
and India, based on what is claimed to be a just distribution of the Ganges water. This conflict 
evolves when Bangladesh point out that the country does not receive its due share of the 
water. I will identify these three aspects of the water conflict in the case study. 
 
The thesis primarily focuses on these three forms of the water conflict as an object of 
philosophical discussion. I discuss the conflict from the viewpoints of western normative 
ethics or moral philosophy. Normative ethics primarily study an object of its discussion in 
two senses. One is known as consequentialism or teleological theories and the other is 
deontological theories. I discuss the basic line of difference between these approaches in 
chapter 2. In chapter 2 and chapter 3, I consider consequentialism as the main normative 
theory in the discussion, although it is possible to discuss these issues from a deontological 
point of view as well. In the discussion of consequentialism, we observe that it proposes 
different ways to attain the value or good and the characterization of value in relation to an 
object. One form of this is particularistic consequentialism which primarily consider that one 
should promote only his/her own good or interests. I discuss this approach in chapter 2. 
Another form of consequentialism is primarily concerned with promoting or attaining the 
value for all parties/members involved in a situation. This conception is also known as the 
universal account of consequentialism or utilitarianism. Within the discussion of teleological 
ethics, there is a holistic kind of teleological ethic or holistic ethic. This holistic ethic regards 
that the ultimate aim of an action is to attain the total good of a society or an object. I discuss 
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the corresponding relationship between utilitarianism and holistic ethic. The relationship 
provides a direction to characterize the holistic ethic as a wider sense of utilitarianism. There 
are different views in characterization of the utilitarian value, but it primarily depends on the 
identification of the object of value. I discuss this in chapter 3. I further discuss critical 
aspects of utilitarianism and I consider this in chapter 4. Utilitarianism primarily assesses a 
situation only from a single value account and it disregards other moral values in 
consideration of the right action and consequent state. This problem specially arises from the 
assessment of determining properly the distributive justice of some arrangement. This 
requires consideration of other moral value or values and utilitarianism does not provide such 
scope. With this shortcoming, I discuss beyond utilitarianism in the assessment of distributive 
justice. I discuss a consequent sensitive, but deontological account of moral pluralism 
concerned for the distributive justice of some arrangement. Moral pluralism estimates various 
aspects of determining properly the distributive justice of some arrangement. I illustrate this 
in chapter 4. These are the moral perspectives I use for the discussion of the Ganges water 
disputes. With these moral accounts, the main objective of this thesis is to examine closely the 
aspects of the water conflict and to consider a plausible solution of it. The discussion is 
reflected in the chapters of the thesis in the following manner: 
 
Chapter1:  In this chapter I discuss the water policy of India and Bangladesh based on the 
Ganges water from the viewpoint of each country’s interests. The Indian interest evolves from 
construction and subsequently running the Farakka dam, which affects the interests of 
Bangladesh. Thereafter, I discuss the conflict of interests between the two countries and their 
certain attempts to find a solution of it in short term negotiations. Finally, the discussion 
evolves from the consideration that both countries accept a long term and just distributive 
agreement of the Ganges water, but without having any binding obligation. This non-
obligatory situation evolves when Bangladesh complains that he/she does not get its due 
water share as per the agreement. Complain of improper implementation of the distributive 
agreement has made uncertainty regarding the solution of the water conflict. 
 
Chapter 2: This chapter primarily discusses the maximization sense of interest or rationality 
of India and Bangladesh in relation to the Ganges water. The discussion follows the 
particularistic consequentialism of Hobbes. The justification of each party’s rationality is 
required to meet the normative criteria, following from the viewpoints of individual’s 
rationality. It is found that both countries do not meet the normative requirement of the choice 
situation. Further, I discuss each country’s decision model with the normative requirement of 
risk-cost-benefit analysis (R.C.B.A). It appears in the discussion that this normative criterion 
is unable to identify correctly the risk involved with both countries’ decision. This chapter 
identifies it as an inadequacy involved with the notion of risk-cost-benefit analysis. Finally, I 
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discuss the contract theory of Hobbes as a part of particularistic consequentialism. The 
discussion finds that the Hobbesian contract theory based on the maximization sense of 
individual rationality or interests is not a reliable view for finding a stable solution to the 
conflict between the two countries. 
 
Chapter 3:  In this chapter I illustrate the affect of the dam which brings serious problems for 
non-human entities as well as unexpected changes in the entire natural environment. I discuss 
the problem by using the non-anthropocentric account of the utilitarian moral argument, 
although my objective is not to defend the non-anthropocentric sense of environmental ethic. 
This utilitarian account of the non-anthropocentric discussion follows from moral status value 
and norm in view with the moral protection of the non-human individual entity as well as the 
entire natural environment or ecosystem. The discussion begins with Singer’s sentient version 
of utilitarianism which offers only moral status value and norm in protection of non-human 
individual animals in the region. In discussion of the whole natural environment, I illustrate 
Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold’s informal account of the ecological view and its ethical 
aspects. Callicott interprets the moral aspects of Leopold’ discussion with consideration of the 
feeling based ethical notion of Hume and Darwin which includes the whole environment into 
moral status value. Further I discuss the Aristotlian teleological ethic of holistic kind in a 
wider sense of utilitarianism with certain account of Norton. This wider sense of utilitarianism 
considers a moral norm consistent with the feeling based ethical value discussion of Callicott. 
This chapter considers that the moral norm offers an alternative general preservation policy 
for the entire natural environment or an alternative environmental policy. 
 
Chapter 4: This chapter primarily addresses the problem which arises from improper 
implementation of the distributive justice of the Ganges water. In view of this problem, I 
discuss a combined notion of the capability approach and the functioning view in estimation 
of the individual’s state related to the distributive justice of some arrangement. The combined 
notion follows Sen’s account of informational based moral pluralism. This moral pluralism 
regards that morals values and norms are fundamentally important to determine the right 
assessment of distributive justice. In the discussion of value accounts, this moral pluralism 
goes beyond utilitarianism and focuses on other relevant values to determine properly the 
distributive justice of some arrangement. In poverty discussion it evolves that the nutritional 
characteristic of the river’s water morally values the individual capability to function. I 
discuss the nutritional characteristic of water in determination of whether injustice lies in the 
distributive justice of the Ganges water. I further address the notion of freedom. In the 
discussion of the freedom account of individual’s functioning, it evolves that deprivation of 
the equal aspect of freedom lies in the distributive justice. Finally, this chapter considers that 
injustice is involved in the right assessment of distributive justice following from the Ganges 
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water. This chapter urge to consideration for the normative principle of ‘individual capability 
to function’ and ‘equal sense of freedom’ in determining the morally defensible distributive 
justice of some arrangement. 
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Chapter 1: A case study of the water disputes between India and Bangladesh 
 
 
       “A river does not know any   
       boundaries. What happens at its sources   
       will reverberate all through its run until it  
       reaches the ocean”. 1
 
 
Introduction: 
 
Water is an essential resource for human life, as it is for any life. Accordingly, ancient 
civilizations grew up along the water ways in the near-east, in India, and in China. With 
scarcity of water comes also competition for it. Present population growth and various kinds 
of water based development projects are making this scarcity of paramount importance, and it 
lead to major conflicts. A number of water disputes have arisen in recent times between 
nations. These nations are making competing claims on the same river in order to fulfil their 
nation's requirement; for fresh water, for hydro-electric power, for irrigation, for waste 
processing, etc. Some examples are: conflicts over the water of the Nile between the countries 
of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. There are conflicts between Iraq, Syria and Turkey regarding 
the waters of the river Euphrates and of the river Tigris. There are disputes regarding the 
Danube's water between Austria, Slovakia and Hungary. There are disputes regarding the 
Ganges water between India and Bangladesh.2 In this thesis, I shall consider the Ganges water 
dispute between India and Bangladesh. I shall use it as a case study and as a point of departure 
for a study of the moral aspects of this dispute. 
 
Since time immemorial the Ganges water has played an important role for the people of its 
basin area. They have used it for their socio-cultural purposes, daily house-keeping and non-
economic or small-scale economic activities. Over the past centuries, the people of this area 
have hardly felt to use the Ganges water for any large scale activities, due to the low density 
of the population, and to their simple life style. So, there was enough water for all, and no 
conflicts arose on that account. This was the case until recent times. Now, two factors have 
changed. Firstly, the number of people has risen sharply in the riparian countries along the 
Ganges, particularly in India and Bangladesh. And secondly, due to modern technology in 
                                                 
1 Ohlsson, (ed.), 1992, p. 5 
 
2 Ohlsson, (ed.), 1996, p. 21 
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industry and in agriculture, the average demand for water, per person, has also risen. Due to 
these two determining factors, more water is needed now than ever before. The Ganges’ flow 
is subject to great seasonal fluctuations. During its monsoon flow, June to October, there is 
enough water to meet the needs of the both riparian. However, during its dry season, January 
to May, its flow is insufficient to do so. Hence any major harnessing of the Ganges' water 
during the dry season upsets its natural equilibrium, which brings about a whole chain of 
interrelated repercussions. 
 
Moreover, each country follows its own strategy for the use of the Ganges water, 
independently and unilaterally. As a result, each country determines and promotes its own 
interests, by drawing the maximum amount possible during the dry season flow in order to 
meet the requirements of their present and future purposes. The inevitable result of this is a 
conflict of interests between the two riparians of the Ganges. With this as a background, this 
chapter will chart the main events surrounding this conflict, until the recent negotiation which 
has taken place regarding the long-term sharing of the Ganges water between the two 
countries as a part of solving the conflict.3 More concretely, I shall concentrate mainly on the 
following issues: How did this dispute arise? What is the main root of this conflict? How has 
it persisted for more than four decades? And finally: Why has confusion arisen in the 
implementing of this agreement? Before touching on these issues, let me first give a territorial 
picture of the Ganges. 
 
- The territorial picture of the Ganges: 
 
The Ganges river is about 2,510 km long, and flows through both India and Bangladesh. It 
rises in Gangotri, on the southern slopes of the Himalayan range in India, and moves through 
Indian territory in a south-easterly direction towards Bangladesh. In India, the Ganges 
receives its waters from many tributaries. Of these tributaries, the Karnali, the Gandak and the 
Kosi are the most important. Together they contribute about 40% of the total flow and 70% of 
the dry season flow of the Ganges4. Before entering Bangladesh, the mainstream of the 
Ganges bifurcates into two channels. One is the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, which is the name of the 
Ganges in West Bengal, and the other is the Podda or Padma, as the Ganges is called in 
Bangladesh. The Padma, starting at the border between India and Bangladesh, flows for about 
112 km, and then moves towards the south-east to join the Brahmaputra River in the heart of 
Bangladesh. The combined flow of these two rivers runs southwards to empty into the Bay of 
Bengal. In Bangladesh, the river receives one tributary, called the Mahnanda. All of the other 
                                                 
3 The information I have assembled in this chapter is limited. It relates up to the period of June, 1997. 
 
4 Jansen, Dolman, Jerve, Rahman, 1989, p. 40 and Ohlsson (ed.) 1996, p. 127-128 
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rivers of the Ganges are distributaries, taking off mostly from the right bank. The three 
principal distributaries are the Bhairab, the Borai-Madhumati, and the Arial Khan. These 
rivers, and their branches, form a mage of rivers - the Gangetic delta, which covers a vast area 
of the south-western part of Bangladesh. This geographical layout of the Ganges makes India 
an upper riparian country, while Bangladesh is situated as the lower riparian country.5
 
Throughout the Ganges basin area, it is assumed that there are currently about 260 million 
people who are directly dependent on the water from the Ganges. From this number, nearly 40 
million people live in Bangladesh, while more than 200 million people live in India.6 In 
addition, there are a significant number of people in Nepal who are also riparians of the 
Ganges, and they consider the Ganges to be their main source of water. 
 
- Background of the conflict: 
 
The historical and cultural events of the Indian-subcontinent are important to the 
understanding of the Ganges water dispute. In 1947, Great Britain gave up its colonial rule 
after supervising the division of India into two independent countries. The division was made 
on the basis of religious identity. Pakistan emerged as a country dominated by Muslims while 
India became a Hindu dominated area. The new state of Pakistan consisted of two parts being 
geographically separated. Its eastern part was called East Bengal/East Pakistan; while it’s 
western part was called West Pakistan. These two parts were separated by a thousand miles of 
Indian territory. The partitioning of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan followed largely 
as a sequel to two important factors. One was the distrust between the Hindu and Muslim 
leaderships, which prevented them from reaching a consensus over the political future of the 
independent India. Eventually, the leadership became antagonistic to each other. The second 
was the communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims, involving over the centuries 
horrible atrocities, which had taken place frequently in different parts of India. Ultimately it 
was proven that the Hindus and the Muslims were unable to live together. Thus, the way to 
the creation of Pakistan and India was paved. The hostility which had grown in the pre-
independent period gradually eased, but it was not completely obliterated from the minds of 
the two communities, India and Pakistan. Therefore, the relations between the two 
communities remained strained. This new geo-political set-up and the mood of the two 
communities gave a new turn to the Ganges issue, in the days after independence. 
                                                 
5 Jensen, Dolman, Jerve and Rahman, 1989, p. 40 and Weekly Dhaka Courier, 26.5.95. vol. 11, Issue 43, “The 
River of Sorrows “. 
 
6 The number is changeable, as the number of people is increasing rapidly in this part of the world. This number 
has been taken from: Begum, 1987, p. 1, and the Weekly Dhaka Courier, 26.5.95. Vol.11. issue 43, “The River 
of Sorrows “. 
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 - India's plan to build the Farakka dam: 
 
The making of the new geo-political boundary between India and Pakistan actually disturbed 
the existing integrated system of water use. Hence, a new strategy for water policy began in 
the sub-continent immediately after its partition. India undertook a systematic water 
development scheme, calculated on the optimal utilization of its water resources throughout 
the country. One of the main purposes of this plan was to expand the irrigation system to 
include not only normally cultivated land, but also the drought-affected areas. India had found 
that the expansion of its irrigation facilities would greatly contribute to the reaching of self-
sufficiency in its food grain production, in spite of its overwhelming population growth. 
Along with the irrigation project, India also approved a large scale water development project 
in order to quickly improve the basic infrastructure of the country.7 Thus India constituted a 
systematic water policy, with the main purpose being to promote its own interests. Given the 
framework of India’s post-independent water strategy, the country now needed an adequate 
supply of water. Accordingly, it began to investigate extensively its available water resources, 
in order to meet its objectives. India found that the Ganges water was its main source of 
surplus water and could be used for the maximal determination of its interests.  
 
Accordingly, in the early 1950s, the Indian government undertook a plan to build a dam 
across the Ganges river. This decision was initially made due to India’s need to solve 
navigational problems at the port of Calcutta by diverting the silt-free Ganges downstream 
towards the Baghirathi-Hooghly River, on which the port of Calcutta is situated. The port of 
Calcutta has been considered to be one of the busiest ports in India, providing access for a 
significant amount of international trade. Any deterioration of this port would have had 
serious consequences on the economy of India. The port had been experiencing a build-up of 
silt in the Hooghly river, which caused difficulties for the ships attempting to enter the port. In 
order to solve the problem, the Indian Government appointed an expert committee. The 
committee systematically investigated the problem, and made the decision to construct a dam 
on the Ganges as the only remedy for improving the Hooghly. It appears later that the dam 
contributed to its irrigation project as well.8 It is relevant to ask whether the committee made 
its decision on the basis of only this one option. The evidence suggests that the committee 
also touched on other options; however, there are some indications that these other options 
were not considered seriously.9 One option which was examined by the committee was called 
                                                 
7 Ohlsson, (ed.), 1996, “Hydropolitics”, p. 124-126 and Begum, 1987, p, 230 
 
8 Crow, Lindquist, and Wilson, 1996, p. 16- 19 
 
9 Ibid. p.39-41 
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“A ship canal”, which would allow ships to avoid the most difficult reaches of the Hooghly. 
But the committee found that the ship canal scheme did not solve the siltation problem of the 
Hooghly. Therefore, it proposed that additional silt -free fresh water, diverted from the 
Ganges into the Hooghly, would not only “flush out” the siltation, but would also solve the 
navigation problem. This could only be achieved by constructing a dam. Moreover, the 
committee, after conducting scientific studies, came forward to assure that the dam project 
would not cause adverse effects in East Bengal.10 The arguments convinced the Indian 
government. In the mid 1950s the Indian Government accepted the plan. The building of a 
dam on the Ganges was accepted without any further opposition, and the dam project became 
the preferable alternative for India. In January 1961, the government of India officially 
announced that it was looking forward to the building of a dam across the Ganges River at 
Farakka. The dam was to be situated about 17 km upstream from the western borders of East 
Bengal, within India. The purpose of the dam suggests that it would not only accumulate 
water, but would also redirect a major portion of the water away from its traditional basin in 
East Bengal. The water was now to be led to Calcutta instead. Further on I shall describe what 
the consequence of the Farakka diversions for areas became further down the Ganges in East 
Bengal, despite India's assurance that the dam would cause no adverse effects. However, at 
first I will give an account of Pakistan’s worries and objections regarding the effects of the 
project.    
 
- Pakistan’s reaction: 
 
When Pakistan officially received the information about the Farakka dam, it wanted to discuss 
the building of the dam with India. Pakistan had worries concerning the effects of the project. 
In 1961, a high level meeting took place between the countries, where India proposed a close 
co-operation between the countries with regard to the matter. Accordingly, from 1961 to 
1970, several talks were held to work out a solution to the dispute, but without result. 
Pakistan, in these exchanges of views, raised its opposition against the construction of the 
Farakka project based on what it claimed would be serious adverse socio-economic 
consequences for East Bengal. It appears that India gave little consideration to these 
objections.11 And finally, in 1963 India unilaterally decided to start the construction of the 
dam. The dam was completed in 1970. Only the feeder canal of the dam was left, which was 
finished in 1974.  
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. p.56 and p.62-63 
 
11 Crow, Lindqist and Wilson, 1997, p. 60 
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The Farakka dam was constructed at a cost of approximately 240 million US dollars, and the 
dam with its associated works is 2,245 metres long. Another dam with a cross regulator was 
constructed across the Hooghly river at Jangipur, above the outfall of the feeder canal of the 
Farakka dam, to prevent the flood water from the Farakka dam from flowing into the 
Hooghly. A 42.5 kilometres long feeder canal was built at Halida and Farakka, taking off 
water upstream from the Farakka dam on the right bank, and falling into the Hooghly 
downstream of the Jangipur dam ( See, fig. 1). The feeder canal was designed for a discharge 
of 40,000 cusecs (Cusec= one cubic foot per second) at its highest capacity.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Farakka dam and the river system of the region.12
 
- Bangladesh and the Ganges water dispute: 
 
In 1971, the war of liberation broke out in East Bengal, and it ended in the creation of 
Bangladesh in mid-December. The secession of East Bengal/ East Pakistan as a consequence 
of the war, removed this conflict between India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, as an independent 
country, experienced the Ganges conflict in various ways. 
                                                 
12 This figure has been taken from the book of Ohlsson, (ed.), 1996, p. 128. I have taken the description of the 
Farakka dam from the following: Islam, 1987, p. 3. And, the Weakly Dhaka Courier, 26.5.1995, vol.11, issue 43, 
“Farakka Barrage Fact Sheet”. 
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The independent Bangladesh immediately made close ties with India, due to India’s 
invaluable assistance during the war of liberation. After independence, the new Awami 
League government came to power in Bangladesh. Their gratitude towards India was at an 
unprecedented high level because of India’s service during the liberation war. Hence, the 
Ganges water conflict entered a new dimension because of the warm and friendly relationship 
which had developed. Bangladesh accepted the existence of the Farakka dam and began to 
constitute its water policy on the basis of this. In return, India conceded in principle, that 
Bangladesh was a co-user of the Ganges. This friendly atmosphere pushed them into taking 
further steps in order to make a settlement of the dispute. In 1972, Bangladesh and India 
agreed to establish a Joint River Commission (JRC). The main purpose of this commission 
was to insure that the water resources of the region would be utilized on an equitable basis, 
for mutual benefit of the two countries.13 In 1974 and 1975, two significant agreements were 
made between India and Bangladesh. By virtue of the 1974 agreement, the Indian government 
agreed not to commission the Farakka dam without the consent of Bangladesh. And, by the 
agreement of 1975, the two countries agreed upon a provisional operation of the dam for only 
a period of 41 days, from the 21st of April to the 31st of May 1975. The agreement was to be 
terminated at the end of May, 1975, and so was called an interim agreement. Agreement on 
final commission and on continuous operation of the dam was in fact contingent upon their 
“arrival at a mutually acceptable solution”. However, India could not manage to adhere to the 
terms and conditions that took place in the agreements of 1974 and 1975. 
 
- Reasons for the conflict:  
 
India did not stop, but rather continued the running of the dam after the dateline 31st May, 
1975 without any consultation with or concurrence by Bangladesh. Despite this, it appears 
that the two governments were capable of finding a mutual understanding at that time, due to 
the friendly relationship between them. But this relationship and co-operation was suddenly 
interrupted. On 15th August, 1975 a military coup took place in Bangladesh and the President, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated. The change of regime in Bangladesh reflected 
immediately on the relation between the two countries. The event brought on a breakdown of 
trust between them and it influenced the Ganges conflict greatly for a long time. 
 
After the death of Sk. Mujib, Bangladesh fell into serious political turmoil which continued 
throughout the last months of 1975. At this point the Farakka issue was not so important to 
the people of Bangladesh. On the other hand, India continued its diversion of the Ganges 
                                                 
13 Crow, Lindquist and Wilson, 1997, p. 97-98, and Begum,1987, p.231 
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through the dam in its full capacity. It is presumed that India’s with-drawl of the Ganges 
water was continued in this measure until the dry season of 1976. As a result of the 
functioning of the dam, the water flow of the Ganges towards Bangladesh was significantly 
reduced for the dry season of those years. This reduction in flow caused wide spread and 
grave damage on agricultural, industry, navigation and ecology in Bangladesh.14 At the end of 
1976 Bangladesh publicly objected to the Indian action in order to safeguard his own interest, 
and a conflict of interests developed between the two countries. 
 
- The effects of the Farakka dam: 
 
Bangladesh is a land of rivers. The waters of these rivers are considered as essential natural 
resources on which several important sectors of the country greatly depend, and the country is 
benefited by its water resources in a number of ways. The rivers have great contribution to 
increasing the country’s agricultural production in order to meet the requirement of food for 
its increasing population. They play an important role in water development projects, and in 
maintaining balance in the country’s ecological process. Unfortunately, the origin of many of 
its biggest rivers is situated outside of its border; mainly in India. The river Ganges is one of 
them, whose waterways occupy about thirty seven per cent of the total area of Bangladesh.15 
Accordingly, the liveliness of this vast area significantly depends on the Ganges water. Given 
the immense role of the Ganges water, one can easily understand that the interests of 
Bangladesh would be affected as result of the Farakka diversion. A document called “White 
Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute” was published in Bangladesh where this issue is 
explained clearly.16 In this document the effect of the dam was estimated on the basis of the 
natural characteristics of a river system.  
 
It was indicated that the most immediate consequence of the dam was that the water flow 
throughout the Ganges system was drastically reduced during the dry season period. This 
occurred especially in the south-western part of the country. The reduction of the Ganges 
water flow led the sea water (from the Bay of Bengal) to penetrate into the far inside water 
ways of the country. As a result of this the water quality was seriously declined by the 
increased salinity in the fresh water. An increasing of salinity and reduction of water flow to 
this extent are generally considered as very negative for a normal river system. So, the 
functioning of the dam not only caused harm for the agricultural and the industrial sectors or 
water projects, but it also disrupted adversely in the area of fishery, forestry, as well as to a 
                                                 
14 Crow, Linquist and Wilson, 1997, p. 124-125 
 
15 Abbas A.T, 1984, p. 10, and Jansen, Dolman, Jerve, Rahman, 1989, p. 42-43 
 
16 Crow, Lindquist and Wilson, 1997, p. 128 
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great extent the total eco-system of the region. Bangladesh claimed that the considered sectors 
were not capable of tolerating such increased amount of salinity. In addition to this, the mere 
existence of some of these sectors was seriously under threat due to the shortage of water. In 
connection to the ecological issue, Bangladesh gave major emphasis on the Sundarbans, an 
area located in the seriously affected south-western part of Bangladesh, which are the world’s 
largest single tract of mangrove forest. The forest is famous for its rich tree, birds and animal 
life. Some of the wild life of the Sundarbans was already considered as endangered species, 
the Royal Bengal tiger can be cited as an example. Most of the forest species were not capable 
to adapt with this high salinity. Similarly, Bangladesh pointed out the reduction of a 
significant number of fish in the Ganges water ways due to the inability of the fish to tolerate 
shallow depths and the high level of salinity in the water. The fish “Hilsha” can be mentioned 
in this regard, as one of the spices that have reduced in number. Bangladesh claimed that each 
of these elements is significant for balancing the whole eco-system of the country, and so the 
reduction of the Ganges water flow was to be blamed for the disruption of the normal 
ecological process of the country. 
 
- Short term negotiations and stalement: 
 
As mentioned previously, in order to safe-guard the country’s own interests, Bangladesh 
publicly objected to the withdrawal of water by India. It was argued that the diverting of water 
after the end of the 41- days of provisional operation constituted a breach of agreement, and a 
conflict of interests arose between the two countries, Bangladesh and India. During the period 
of 1976, Bangladesh protested frequently in several forums. Simultaneously, Bangladesh tried 
to find a solution to the problem through bilateral negotiation, but all of these efforts turned 
out in vain. Finally, Bangladesh raised the issue within the United Nations. Lacking of 
enough support from the member states to deal with this conflict effectively in this 
international forum, Bangladesh returned again into bilateral negotiation with India.17 The 
result of this led to an agreement between the two countries for a five years period (1977-82). 
This settled the issue of sharing the existing Ganges flow, but it did not resolve the other 
important question of how the dry season’s flows should be augmented. 
 
Although both countries admitted that augmentation would offer a better solution to the 
shortage of water for the lean period, the two parties disagreed about the manner of 
augmentation. They came up with two different proposals, each mainly estimated from their 
own perspective of interests. Bangladesh proposed that the solution could be found within the 
basin of the Ganges by building reservoirs in the river’s headwaters, primarily in Nepal. India 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p.110-111 
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rejected the idea, as the country did not like to involve any third party into the issue. India 
rather wanted to solve the problem according to the framework of its own water policy. As we 
have already pointed out earlier (see, p.4), India’s post independent water strategy appeals to 
transfer surplus water into the location of deficit areas in order to meet the requirements of 
irrigation. Following this policy, the Indian government was concerned about the water 
shortages not only within the Ganges basin but also for other parts in India, and so wanted to 
meet the shortage in the Ganges by transferring water from the Brahmaputra River through a 
link with the Ganges. Accordingly, the Farakka dam would be used for harnessing the 
combined flow of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra for distribution and utilization in other 
parts of the country. It appeared gradually that the purpose of the Farakka dam was not only 
limited to the functioning of the Calcutta port, but also to use it in order to meet the demand 
of the overall Indian irrigation plan.18 In other words, India constructed the Farakka dam for 
multi purposes. Moreover, this became clearer when the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti 
Bashu, expressed his scepticism about the scientific feasibility of the dam. He considered that 
the dam did not solve the problem to which it was originally intended for.19 Thus it was found 
that the primary objective of the Farakka dam was to serve water for irrigation. However, 
Bangladesh rejected the Indian proposal of transferring water from the Brahmaputra to the 
Ganges, as this would give India control over the other major rivers of the country as well.  
 
Nevertheless, in this dead-lock situation the two countries managed to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on sharing the Ganges water for two more periods, from 1982 until 
1988, without further extension. These were, for certain conditions, less beneficial to 
Bangladesh compared to the treaty of 1977. Since then, that is after 1988 and in the absence 
of any agreement; India was diverting water through the feeder canal in its full capacity. This 
increased the damage to the environment of the entire south-western Bangladesh drastically. 
In order to be relieved from this situation, Bangladesh continued its efforts to bring India into 
the negotiation table. 
 
- Long-term agreement and its implication: 
 
In 1996, the political situation changed inside both countries. Deve Gowda, as the prime 
minister of a coalition government took office in India, while Sheik Hasina as the prime 
minister of the Awami League government came into power in Bangladesh. The change of 
regime in both countries made a new opportunity for solving the conflict. After taking office, 
Gowda considered the Ganges issue sincerly. Moreover, Awami League’s historic friendly 
                                                 
18 Begum, 1987, p. 62-70 
 
19 Crow, Lindquist and Wilson, 1997, p. 228 
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relation with India, combined with the Awami League government’s great efforts to use the 
current positive mood of the Indian government, made it possible to solve the conflict in short 
time. As a result of this, on the 12th  December 1996 the prime ministers of the both countries 
signed an historic treaty on sharing the Ganges water in its dry season flow (January 1 to May 
31). The treaty entered immediately into force with its signing, and will be renewable on the 
basis of mutual agreement at the expiry of the 30 year period.  
 
The treaty was acknowledged by both countries to the extent that it ensures equality in sharing 
of the Ganges’ dry season flow. The main elements of the treaty says that Bangladesh will 
either get a guarantee flow of 35, 000 cusecs or 50 per cent of the water, if its availability is 
70, 000 cusecs or less at the Farakka point. That is; the considered quantity of water will be 
released for Bangladesh from the Farakka dam. The treaty further says that if the availability 
is 75, 000 cusecs or more, India will get 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh the rest. If the flow 
falls below 50,000 cusecs at Farakka in any 10 day period of the dry season, the two 
governments will enter into immediate consultation in order to make adjustments on an 
emergency basis. This formula for sharing the water was worked out after taking into account 
the average water availability at the Farakka point over a 40 year period from 1949 to 1988.20  
 
Like any other international agreement, the effectiveness of the Ganges water-sharing 
agreement also depends on how it works out when applied. In the first year after completing 
the agreement, that is, in the dry season of 1997, Bangladesh appeared with a protest claiming 
that the country was not getting its due share of water as per the agreement. Bangladesh asked 
the Indian Government for information regarding the cause for the drop in the Ganges water 
flow at the Farakka point.21 The Indian government replied that due to natural causes (that is; 
slow melting of ice in the Himalayas and less rainfall) and withdrawal at the upstream of 
Farakka, it was hampered to supply adequate flow of water at the considered area.22 
Bangladesh was not convinced by the intangible explanation offered by India, and pointed out 
that the water availability was calculated from the average of a 40-year period. Bangladesh 
further indicated that it was clearly mentioned in the treaty that India would make every effort 
to protect the flow of water at Farakka so as to stay in the 40-years average availability23. 
                                                 
20 I have taken the information regarding the treaty of the Ganges water sharing from two newspapers: The Daily 
Star, December 13.12. 96, “30-year historic water Treaty” and The Bangladesh Observer, December 13.12.96, 
“30-yr water treaty with India signed”. 
 
21 The Daily Star, 06.04.97, “Dhaka to seek explanation for in Ganges flow”. 
 
22 Ibid, 07.04.97, “Low flow at Farakka, says Indian team”. 
 
23 The Daily Star, 28.04.97.,”Non-implementation of Water-Sharing”. And, The Daily Janakantha- a daily 
Bengali newspaper, 11.04.97., English translation of the headline; “Bangladesh urges India to maintain normal 
flow of the Ganges” 
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However, this "effort" does not bind India to any obligation in order to supply the water as per 
the agreement. This is why uncertainty remains, currently and in the future, as to whether 
Bangladesh will receive its due share of water or not. 
 
 20
Chapter 2: A consequentialist analysis (Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis) from a 
particularistic point of view pertaining to India and Bangladesh 
 
 
. . . each must view all other persons as in at least potential 
competition for the good(s) that she needs for survival or 
for greater well-being. But this creates in each person . . .  
struggle for scare good(s). In this way potential conflict is 
converted into actual hostility, leading to the war of every 
man against every man, . . . . 
- Thomas Hobbes24
 
 
Introduction: 
 
What should be the main objective of human’s action? How should the action be estimated? 
And finally, what should be the principle criterion for defining the rightness and wrongness of 
the action in a situation? These issues are highlighted in the discussion of normative 
philosophy. Normative philosophy however, focuses primarily on two distinct types of 
notions in defining the proper aspect of an action. One is known as the consequentialist 
approach and the other as deontological approach.25 In the consequentialist tradition, the 
goodness or the positive aspect of the consequent assessment, addresses to the normative 
justification or the rightness of an action, while the deontological approach is primarily 
concerned with the right action itself in the first place, rather than estimating the outcome of it 
in a situation. 
 
I shall examine the concerned issue regarding the Ganges water conflict between India and 
Bangladesh, according to the framework of the consequentialist view. The main reason for 
choosing this approach lies in the following. As we have seen in the case study, the water 
affects the well-being of each country in an essential manner, so the question is of central 
interest to both. The choice of each party’s to promote their self interest or national interest, 
which has led to a conflict of interests between the two countries. Although the parties have 
attempted to find a solution to the conflict within the viewpoint of the maximizing version of 
                                                 
24 See, Gauthier, 1986, p. 114 – 115 and, Tuch (ed.), 1991, Hobbes: Leviathan, chap. 13, p. 88 - 90 
 
25 The word “Deontological” is derived from the Greek word “Deon” for “duty” or “obligation”, and its current 
term first appeared in the discussion of Broad, C.D. “Five types of ethical theory”, published in 1930. See, 
Beauchamp, 1991, p. 171. 
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interests, this did not produce a conclusive or stable solution to the conflict. Is this really a 
justifiable decision? Can it be accepted? What would be the normative justification for it? 
How could it be explained? I find that these issues are significantly relevant to the discussion 
of the consequentialist approach, which provides adequate space for accounting the interest 
based or the goal oriented individual rationality.26 In this sense, I shall attempt to analyse the 
conflict from two alternative points of view. In the present chapter, I shall focus separately on 
the rationality of each country in relation to the Ganges water. Thereafter, I shall examine 
closely a possible solution to the conflict within the given nature of individual’s rationality. 
This will be considered as a particularistic consequentialist analysis. In the next chapter, I 
shall analyse the second aspect of the conflict concerning the environmental impacts of the 
dam which will be considered from the view point of universal account of consequentialism 
or utilitarian ethics.   
 
A consequentialist approach is traditionally concerned with finding a purposeful factor or 
corresponding relationship between an action and its effect on a situation. A considerable 
number of philosophers take this relativist view as a key element in the discussion of 
normative philosophy. Nevertheless they explain it in various dimensions. Aristotle, for 
instance, considers that the main purpose of an action must be estimated in an objective sense 
and he insists not to take the situation into subjective consideration.27 The Aristotelian view, 
however, do not correspond to the self-interested version of the individual’s rationality, which 
we are concerned with here. Therefore, I am required to throw light on the view of other 
philosophers, who might be relevant for understanding the main text of this chapter. 
Accordingly, I consider the view of the modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), who has discussed comprehensively on interest based individual’s rationality. His view 
suggests that the purpose of the individual’s action or rationality is to promote self interest in 
response to a situation. I shall interpret this view in terms of particularistic conseqentialism. In 
this way, I find that it is suitable to examine the respective interests of India and Bangladesh 
or their rationality in relation to the Ganges water.28  
 
The justification for each party’s rationality will be regarded from the normative assessment 
of individual’s rationality. In this regard, I understand this view as looking at whether each 
party properly meets the fundamental requirements of rationality in every step of pursuing the 
                                                 
26 It is useful to mention here that the interest based individual’s rationality can be considered in the 
deontological approach. 
 
27 Ross, 1998, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, p. 1-6, and Annas, 1993, p. 28- 29. 
 
28 It is essential to mention here that I shall closely examine the Hobbesian arguments. I shall also allow the 
views of other philosophers in this respect. 
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goal or the rationality.29 We shall find that India neither satisfies the condition of consistency 
between the options in following the choice of preferring the Farakka dam, nor identifies the 
acceptable environmental risk in making a decision for implementing the project. In this 
respect, his personal quantitative assessment appear as controversial in relation to the 
characterization of risk, and biased in favour of implementing the decision, which do not 
satisfy the rational or normative standard of risk-cost-benefit analysis (R.C.B.A.). In this way, 
we shall find that the Indian rationality cannot be accepted according to the given standard. 
Bangladesh, in response to the Indian choice, initially considers a quantitative version of 
strategic choice, or equilibrium choice. We shall find that this consideration not only neglects 
the criterion of choosing freely, but also the preference of determining an exact quantity of 
water in sequences of situations. We shall further find that he fails to identify the acceptable 
risk by considering past risk objectively. His personal account of past risk, in this respect, 
appears not to correspond accurately to the identification of risk following from various 
events of the river’s water, but is serving only his own purpose of decision for implementing 
the strategic choice, which is contrary to the rational criterion or normative standard of the 
R.C.B.A. Thus we shall find that Bangladesh does not satisfy the requirements of rationality, 
and therefore we are not sure that he will achieve the goal either. We shall finally find that the 
parties actually cannot achieve a possibility for a stable solution to the conflict according to 
the contract theory of Hobbes, as portrayed in the particularistic consequentialism. In this 
chapter I shall focus mainly on these given elements which can be arranged in the following 
manner: 1. I shall illustrate the view of the particularistic consequentialism. 2. I shall look 
separately at the interest of India and Bangladesh from their respective point of view. 3. I 
shall inquire into the possibility of attaining a durable solution to the conflict, in view of 
particularistic consequentialism. 
 
A. What is particularistic consequentialism? 
  
How to account for an individual’s behaviour in a situation? Some philosophers in the English 
tradition take this issue as a prime factor and have attempted to explain individual’s behaviour 
within the subjective assessment to the extent that a person itself is a centre for independent 
activity. Accordingly, the person can exercise behaviour freely according to his own 
judgement of whatever is in favour of his life. In other words, the philosophers actually value 
the person’s independent behaviour, also identified as individualism. Individualism thus 
becomes a central factor in their discussion of understanding the behaviour of a person. On 
this account, the individual’s behaviour poses some essential questions in response to an 
                                                 
29 I borrow the conceptual aspect of the normative assessment of individual’s rationality from the viewpoints of 
two philosophers. One is John C. Harsanyi who addresses this in Sen and Williams (eds.), 1991, p. 42 - 43. The 
other is Jon Elster and he discusses this in Elster (ed.), 1986, Introductory chap. p. 1- 2.  
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accountable situation: To what extent could the person examine the situation with reference to 
the state of his life? How shall he constitute the behaviour? What would be the main objective 
of the behaviour? What would then be the nature of the behaviour in order to achieve the 
objective? Among the English philosophers, we find that Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) can be 
regarded as the first theorist who examines adequately the behaviour of an individual in the 
consideration of these issues30. He discusses this in his famous book, called “Leviathan” 
published in 1651.  
 
In explaining human’s behaviour, Hobbes firstly point out a natural state in which he finds 
that a psychological feature initially govern the behaviour or action in a situation. He further 
indicates that the human’s desire, as an expression of the psychological nature, urges a person 
to take initiative for an action, and the purpose of such act is directed straightforwardly to 
achieve his own good. As Hobbes expresses it:  
. . . of all Voluntary Acts; the object is to every man his own Good; . . . . 31  
According to the above statement, Hobbes indicates that a person estimates action in the 
assessment of his own desire, and so then the achievement of his own good implies the 
satisfaction of the desire. Thus Hobbes points out that the psychological state of a person 
plays a great role in considering behaviour pertaining to achieve the good in a situation. The 
person estimates the achievement in a way that has great impact on the state of his personal 
life. Therefore he assigns subjective value to the action for having an instrumental role 
towards the state of his life. Accordingly, he considers that it is rational to behave in the 
manner which main objective is to enhance his own good or the good life. Hence the notion of 
the maximizing version of rationality is accommodated in the Hobbesian understanding of 
individual’s behaviour measured by the psychological state. However, the contemporary 
successors of the Hobbesian idea attempt to give less importance on the psychological state. 
Rather they emphasize estimating individual’s behaviour by focusing on the logical 
relationship between behaviour and the corresponding effect on the good. As a part of this 
assumption, they subsequently end up with interpreting the Hobbesian notion of the 
individual’s behaviour in a sense that the main purpose of every individual’s act is to 
maximize his self interest or his own good.32 In other words, the individual rationality is being 
referred to as the maximization of self interest.  
 
Hobbes, however, did not confine his discussion regarding the individual’s behaviour simply 
by defining it in the purpose of achieving the goal or promoting interest. He further attempts 
                                                 
30 Gauthier, 1990, p.2-3 (Moral Dealing) 
 
31 Tuck, 1991, ch. 15, p. 105 
 
32 See, Minogue, 1987, ”Hobbes Leviathan”, Introduction; p. x, and Gauthier, 1990, p. 12 
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to explain it by stating that a person can identify precisely an object or objects in relation to 
his own good. He defines this in the following way:  
. . . whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or  Desire;  that is it, which  
he for his part Calleth Good.33
What we actually understand from the above view is that a self-interested individual tries to 
find a state of affair or an object in relation to his action which contributes significantly to 
achieve the good. Accordingly, a rational individual looks for such an object (or objects) 
which is fundamentally relevant for reaching the objective. The rational individual estimates 
the object as instrumentally valuable for the purpose of calculating his action. Thus, a rational 
individual calculates the action in an instrumental sense, pertaining to achieve his own good 
or self interest. A rational individual, however, values the term “good” in a manner which can 
equally be evaluated in various ways in order to define the goal of his action. They are, for 
instance; utility, benefit, interests, well-being, welfare, happiness and the like. Nevertheless, 
the attribution of these values depends on how a rational individual interprets each of them in 
response to a situation.34 In this way Hobbes and the exponents of his view understand the 
fundamental elements of the individual’s behaviour, suggesting that a rational individual 
considers an object in the constitution of his act and thereby he advances his interests. Hence, 
I consider the interpretation of the Hobbesian arguments based on the assessment of 
individual behaviour, as largely relevant for calculating the interests of India and Bangladesh, 
or their respective rationality in relation to the Ganges water. As we understand the self-
interests of each country from their respective point of view, it is then conceptually not a 
mistake to pronounce it in more a colloquial term as “particularistic” instead of saying 
individualistic. Thus, I use the term particularistic consequentialism in the following 
discussion of the chapter. Moreover, I understand the term individual, person, agent, or party, 
in a collective sense such as a social group, company, a nation or the like.35  
 
 B. An analysis of the Indian interests with regard to the Ganges water: 
 
It has widely been believed that the recent technological innovation and its various 
manifestations have a tremendous role in improving the life-style or the well-being of the 
modern society. This idea might have encouraged India to intensify new efforts to estimate 
the Ganges water, not only in relation to the needs for a traditional or simple life-style, but in 
                                                 
33 Tuck, 1991, “Hobbes Leviathan” chap. 6, p. 39 
 
34 Gauthier, 1986, p. 6 - 7. 
 
35 In most cases of this chapter I will avoid mentioning the name of a country. I shall instead refer to the country 
in terms of individual or person. However, in some cases I may consider to mention the name of the respective 
country, if the context of the writing claims me to do so. 
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order to pursue the well-being of its own, by a combination of modern technology and the 
natural water resource. This new assessment ultimately becomes a fundamental cause for re-
examining the value of the Ganges water in accordance with the new design towards the 
satisfaction of the proposed goal. This is how India’s national interest or rationality in 
connection with the Ganges water is shaped. Accordingly, India makes up his mind to 
constitute an act to the extent that it can substantially materialize the given expectation. 
Nevertheless he confronts a genuine problem in this regard. India is confirmed that using huge 
amount of the Ganges water will increase the national interests as much as possible, but he 
has not complete information regarding how to adjust the given notion into the framework of 
his action? Hence he faces a significant problem, or uncertainty in carrying out the rationality 
further. The course of uncertainty, however, lead him to a choice situation, through which he 
can find room for making a choice or choose an act for achieving the rationality. What would 
then be the possible action or choice? How can he choose it? I shall first try to answer the 
question of how the rational individual chooses the possible action. In a way it will provide us 
the answer of the second question, as well. 
  
- A closer look at the Indian choice: 
 
In a choice situation, the main purpose of a rational individual is to try to choose an action in 
a manner which ensures the right kind of corresponding relation in order to achieve precisely 
the expected goal.36 In our considered case, I shall take this view into account as an essential 
standard of rationality, or the normative standard, in respect of defining how a rational 
individual should choose an action whose expected outcome actually promotes the well-being 
aspect of his rationality. In this respect, I shall mainly focus on the discussion of the 
contemporary philosopher and economist Amartya Sen, who has made extensive efforts to 
examine closely regarding a choice situation within the viewpoint of the well-being aspect of 
individual’s rationality, or the well-being aspect of self interest maximization. As a part of 
such assumption, he points out three distinct features associated with the view of the 
individual’s rationality.37 One of these features suggests that a rational individual chooses an 
                                                 
36 Elster (ed.) 1986, p. 1-2  
 
37 Sen examines the well-being aspect of self interest maximization or individual rationality in three distinct 
features: 1. Self-centred welfare 2. Self-welfare goal and 3. Self-goal choice. My main purpose here is to describe 
the three features according to the context of our current discussion, while bringing no fundamental change into 
the essence of each concept. Accordingly: 1. Self centred welfare, suggests that a person or an individual 
consider his welfare on the basis of his or her own consumption only (and in particular he/she does not like to 
involve any sympathy or antipathy towards others). 2. Self-welfare goal, implies that an  individual’s main target 
is to maximize his or her own welfare, given the notion of the uncertain situation in which  he maximizes his 
expected goal pertaining to the welfare, after assessing the probabilities of his chosen action (and in particular 
does not involve directly attaching importance to the welfare of others). 3. Self-goal choice; suggests that each 
act of choice of an individual is guided immediately by the pursuit of his/her own goal (and in particular, it is not 
restrained or adapted by the recognition of mutual interdependence of respective successes, given other people’s 
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action by estimating the consequence of it in a way which maximise exclusively his own self-
welfare goal or self well-being goal, in a situation. On this score, I shall try to explain the 
Indian choice model pertaining to the Ganges water. Accordingly, the self well-being goal 
suggests that a rational actor is only concerned with the calculation of his own interests, and 
he thus disregards the others in order to promote his expected goal.38 According to this 
assumption, he tries to follow the necessary means in order to choose an action, and the result 
of such choice leads to the achievement of the expected goal. Following this, I shall focus on 
how the person chooses the action from the viewpoint of the given perspective. Sen, in this 
regard, has made a great contribution in one of his most influential articles “Behaviour and 
the Concept of Preference”.39 In this article, Sen examines comprehensively how an actor, in a 
choice situation, chooses an action by virtue of weighing a pair of options designed to satisfy 
his objective.40 Why does the actor limit the choice within the criterion of two options? In 
which way does he choose one of them in order to satisfy his expected objective?  And 
finally, does the choice really qualify to the requirement of the rationality? The first of these 
questions can be explained by the following three points.41
1. The rational individual or the actor is not inspired to search for several options, since it 
might create an intractable situation for him, having to compare effectively the consistent 
relationship between the various types of options. On this ground, his main purpose is rather 
as far as possible to be restrictive in selecting the number of options.  
2. The rational actor will try to concentrate on the options which are easily accessible through 
the available information around him, and he thus qualifies the information by calculating its 
relevance for determining the expected goal. 
3. The fundamental criterion for choosing an option is determined by the utility assessment of 
it. That is to say; the actor estimates the value of the options on the basis of their effective role 
and accordingly he considers that the utility is the only reliable standard in order to measure 
the rationality with regard to the object (i.e. the water resource).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
pursuit of their goals or strategy or choice of others). I adopt the considered view of Sen by following: Westskog, 
1996.1, p. 5, Sen in Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 75 and Sen, 1987, p. 80-88.  
 
38 It is useful to point out that the contemporary translator of the Hobbesian version of individual’s rationality 
David Gauthier, understands the view of the considered choice model similarly and he describes it in the notion 
of the Parametric choice. Therefore, conceptually, the view of self-welfare goal is not significantly different 
from the view of parametric choice. See, Gauthier, 1986, p. 21. 
 
39 The article is actually published in the book “Rational Choice”, edited by Elster, 1986, p. 60-81. I shall also 
follow the arguments of other thinkers where it is needed. 
 
40 Ibid., p. 60-65 
 
41 I have tried to formulate the three visions after considering Arrow, 1984, p. 55- 61 & Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 62-
63. 
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The consideration of the above factors significantly influence the rational actor in delimiting 
the range of his options, but it does not necessarily imply that he reduces the number of 
options into a single one in his estimation of the choice situation. With only one option, there 
is no question of considering a choice situation. In this consideration for fixing the options, at 
least he comes close to estimate a pair of options, and then his main target is to choose the 
best one thereof, i.e., the one that can produce the greater expected utility. This is how we try 
to understand the way the rational actor is tempted to choose an action, from the viewpoint of 
two options. I shall now investigate the next issue regarding how a rational individual actually 
choose one of them.  
 
In explaining a choice situation only from the viewpoint of two options, Sen considers a 
particular approach. This approach primarily considers a choice situation with reference to a 
condition of consistency between the two options. In a way, it suggests that a rational 
individual first chooses one of the two options, and then he attributes his preference on it. As 
an example this assumption indicates: If an individual chooses x when y is available. It 
implies that he first point out his choice over x and afterwards he comes on to adjudicate his 
preference for it. Sen describes that he reveals his preference for x over y. This implies that 
the individual reveals his preference pattern in the process of choosing one from the two 
options. This view is known as the theory of revealed preference.42 This notion further 
indicates that when an individual chooses x rather than y, then he must not reveal a preference 
for y over x. If he chooses x when y is available, then he will not choose y in a situation in 
which x is obtainable, no matter in which sense y is counted for. This can be formulated in the 
following form: 
If x is to be chosen then y is not to be chosen 
y is not to be chosen 
Therefore x is to be chosen. 
The crucial question emerges from the above argument; why is x to be chosen or preferred by 
the rational actor, but not y? The answer is normally reflected from the viewpoint of his 
                                                 
42 There is an important issue that generally appears in the application of revealed preference related to different 
situations. I find that it is essential to explain the issue in connection with the current context. Accordingly, it is 
customary to assume that the approach of revealed preference is only applicable to the market behaviour, and not 
necessary for choices in other situations. In relation to market behaviour, we find that the consumer can apply his 
choice on an unlimited number of options within his budget. And he can only purchase the goods which are 
observed in the market place. Thus we find that the basic elements of the consumer’s choice is revealed in the 
market place, and called the economist’s account of revealed preference. On the other hand, the individual’s 
choice situation in our considered case, is only open in terms of the limited options as designed by the situation. 
Moreover, here his choice is only relevant to a particular object associated with the natural environment, and so 
the choice situation differs completely from the behaviour of the consumer associated with the market place. In 
addition to this, the essential factor is that the normative assessment plays a limited role in the market’s choice, 
while the individual’s choice in relation to the considered situation is essentially based in normative justification. 
Therefore, there is a clear distinction between studying the choice situation in terms of market and non-market 
behaviour, following from the notion of revealed preference. For further explanation in this regard, see Sen in 
Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 60- 66 and Gauthier, 1986, p.26-27. 
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rationality, which indicates that he estimates x in a way which guarantees that he obtains the 
greater utility needed in order to furnish the requirement of the possible expectation. Thus 
utility plays a key role in choosing x from the two options. In spite of this justification, how 
can he really be confirmed that x can satisfy the expected goal, or that it can produce the 
expected utility? In an effort to find an answer to this crucial question, it is essential for me to 
examine carefully the way he estimates his connected with the water resource, and then how 
he integrates the needs into a utility assessment for x. In other words, we find that the 
calculation of needs plays a vital role in estimating the utility of x.  
 
- The role of needs in estimating the choice:  
 
Given the background of choosing x, in which it is found that the utility assessment of x is 
implicitly contingent upon an estimation of the individual’s needs, to what extent does the 
individual measure needs in connection with rationality? Does this make any difference from 
the traditional way of estimating needs? As a part of finding the answer of these issues, it is 
useful to follow certain arguments of Max-Neef (1991) given in his seminal book called 
“Human Scale Development”. Here he describes two types of needs. One is individual’s basic 
needs, or the traditional account of the individual’s needs. The other is the well-being account 
of individual’s needs.43 In classifying the key distinction between the two aspects of need, he 
points out that every individual normally considers some needs in a manner of securing 
survival issues, as well as related to the fundamental activities in daily or social life. On this 
criterion, he characterizes them as basic needs or traditional needs. However, a person can 
change his estimation of needs in response to the requirements of a new situation. On this 
occasion, he re-examines needs in a way that goes beyond the range of traditional estimation, 
while calculating needs in relation to further opportunities pertaining to the development of 
activities which the well-being aspect of the rationality fundamentally rely on. Thus, the well-
being aspect of individual’s needs differs significantly from the traditional one. 
 
Given the essence of the well-being account of the needs, the rational actor eventually find 
that there are valuable opportunities lying in the water resource, and therefore it is 
significantly important to redefine the needs in a way that is compatible with the well-being 
account of rationality. Thus it becomes an essential issue for the actor to choose or prefer the 
act whose utility assessment as far as possible satisfies the requirement of the well-being 
account of needs, and so for rationality as well. Hence, the considered account of needs plays 
a significant role in calculating the utility assessment. This is why the actor finds that he has a 
                                                 
43 Max-Neef, 1991, p. 13 - 18. In this book Max-Neef primarily discuss the needs from the viewpoint of well-
being or quality of life. However, in the flow of this discussion he also considers the basic needs. Thus, we find 
that he discusses the notion of needs in two different dimensions. 
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genuine reason for choosing x. In other words, the process of his preference order is primarily 
calculated on the basis of utility assessment, in which he finds that x is preferable. In this 
sense, we find the main reason behind India choosing the act of x, reflected finally in 
constructing the Farakka dam - a production of modern technology. Accordingly he regard the 
technological manoeuvre of the dam as significantly effective in order to pursue his 
expectation, or the achievement of the expected utility, from the Ganges water.  
 
- The framework of rationality and the Farakka dam: 
 
In the above discussion, I have tried to explain the background of the Indian choice of 
constructing the Farakka dam. I shall now inquire into the central issue: How can the choice 
be qualified according to the normative standard of rationality? In this process, I shall first 
look at the logical framework of revealed preference, whereby the choice has finally been 
composed. Accordingly, it indicates that the condition of consistency or the comparative 
relationship between the two options (i.e., x and y), must be followed carefully in evaluating 
the framework of revealed preference. Then a chooser can choose one of them.44 I shall try to 
show that the considered requirement have not exactly been met when India prefers x from 
two options, or when an act is finally reflected by constructing the Farakka dam. For the sake 
of my claim, I shall once again state the relevant lines of the revealed preference, according to 
the requirement of the current context. One account suggests that the notion of revealed 
preference advocates a pair of options in a choice situation through which a choice has to be 
made on the basis of x. It further suggests that the individual rationality is primarily oriented 
towards choosing only x. Despite this fact, the key element of revealed preference is that the 
condition of the comparative assessment between the two options must be satisfied. 
Thereafter, one option finally has to be chosen. Hence, the most controversial question arises: 
Did India meet this criterion in making the choice of x, i.e. the dam? Before finding the 
answer to this question, it is useful to first look at a more basic and relevant issue in this 
respect: What does the condition of consistency actually suggest in the schema of revealed 
preference? The answer to this will pave the way to touch the former question. 
 
The criterion of consistency or logical relationship between the two options has been 
calculated in the framework of revealed preference in the following sense: x is to be regarded 
at least as good as y. Once a person is setting the preference model upon it, then it appears: 
Either he can prefer x to y, or he can prefer y to x. Otherwise, he is indifferent to them.45 In 
other words, the condition actually rules out allowing the relationship between the two 
                                                 
44 See, Sen in Elster (ed.), 1986, p.62-63 
 
45 Ibid. 
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options to be non-comparable or unequal. Why then has the Indian choice of x turned into a 
controversial issue? For the sake of the current context, we can agree with the claim of the 
chooser that he gives preference to x because of holding a greater scale of utility.46 This 
perception actually implies that he measures the utility assessment only for x, but not for y. 
One can reasonably argue according to the condition of the logical relationship between the 
two options, that if there is no place for estimating the utility for y, then it is equally not 
necessary to consider the assessment of the utility for x, neither. This sort of argument is 
genuinely persuasive, and so is justifiable in the given situation. Therefore, this argument 
cannot be ignored in a choice situation involving the criterion of the binary relationship, in 
which the viability of one is largely dependent on the other.47 On the basis of such logical 
relationship, it appears that India has not exactly met the criterion of rationality in forming the 
choice of x, i. e. the dam, and therefore we cannot accept the choice according to the 
qualification of rationality, or the fundamental criterion of revealed preference. Thus, the 
Indian choice of constructing the Farakka dam turns into a contentious issue from the 
normative standard of rationality, or rational choice. 
 
In the preceding section, I have been primarily concerned with the issue of the Indian choice, 
reflected in the establishment of the dam. I have pointed out why the choice cannot be 
acknowledged according to the standpoint of rationality. I shall now focus on the other 
essential factor in regard to the choice. This matter appears after constructing the dam project, 
but before launching it into further action. In this stage, the chooser considers that it is an 
important task to calculate the effectiveness of the dam, something which the expected utility 
largely rely on. A calculation of the functional activities of the dam is a crucial issue for 
finally determining the expected utility. 
 
- An inquiry into the effectiveness of the dam: 
 
India regards that the effective assessment of the dam largely depends on its possible good or 
bad affects on the water resource - an essential element of the natural environment. In other 
words, the chooser gives major emphasis on this information, because the activities of the 
dam will go against the natural flow of the river, which might lead to adverse effects on the 
environment. So the impact can somehow lead to become a factor of trouble for the safetyness 
                                                 
46 In order to get information about India’s choice situation related to the Farakka dam, see the relevant section 
of the case study. 
 
47 Arne Næss - a renowned Norwegian philosopher - considers a similar notion when he examines the 
comparative relationship between the two terms. I adopt certain parts of his argument in order to examine closely 
the logical aspect of the two terms consistency in relation to our considered case. For an extensive discussion in 
this regard, see, Carnap, 1950, p. 7-10.  
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of his current and future interests, resting in the same object. He faces, however, the problem 
that he has not sufficient knowledge to be able to measure the impact. What would happen if 
the dam is allowed to perform? On this consideration, he attempts to accommodate the 
information of the consequential aspects of the dam, as an inescapable part of the rationality. 
Accordingly, in searching out the effectiveness, he classifies this information into some 
factors which might be relevant for the realization of the project. What can actually go wrong 
as a result of the activities of the project? Does it really create an adverse affect on the 
delicate balance between the elements of the natural environment? How likely are they? How 
can they accurately be known? And, what should be the ultimate criterion in the calculation of 
implementing the project? In the light of the given facts, I shall attempt to examine closely the 
other feature of the Indian choice, or the effectiveness of the dam.  
 
- Risk-Cost- Benefit Analysis (R. C. B. A) of the dam project: 
 
As we have noticed in the above discussion, the actor actually does not know all the 
consequential facts of the project. Accordingly, the event of implementing the project 
becomes a risk taking situation. This realization further pushes him to estimate it in terms of 
the environmental risk, since the dam might have potentially dangerous effects on the natural 
environment. Moreover, this perception he even finds relevant for obtaining the expected 
utility or benefit, as well. It is then useful to regard the risk in a potential sense. Thus, this 
perception becomes a genuine issue for him in order to calculate scientifically the costly or 
risky events, so that it finally does not jeopardize or deprive him in attaining the expected 
benefit when setting the project in function. The indication urges him to collect the 
information that exactly characterizes the risk, and define whether the risk is on an acceptable 
level or not. The information will eventually approve him to go ahead with the project in the 
next step. Hence, a decision procedure truly emerges in connection with executing the project, 
as another crucial part of the proposed choice situation. In other words, he considers that a 
risky decision clearly emerge in attaining the possible benefit out of driving the project. Thus, 
he makes a trade-off between the analysis of the risk and the benefit of the situation. The 
gesture clearly corresponds to the approach which in the recent decades is known as Risk-
Cost-Benefit Analysis (R.C.B.A).48 This approach equally define that the risk associated with 
a project run by technological force, and its impact on the natural environment, can be a 
source of cost in estimating the beneficial aspect of it, unless the risk is being accurately 
                                                 
48 Shrader-Frechette, 1985a, p.15. Some philosophers prefer to state simply “Cost-Benefit Analysis” (C.B.A) or 
“Risk-Benefit-Analysis” (R.B.A) instead of R.C.B.A. For such case, I find that the risk of disutility, or no 
benefit, is itself regarded as a cost. A reduction of risk/cost is similarly to be considered as benefit. This implies 
that risk and cost is to be evaluated in equal weight. On this consideration, we therefore find that R.B.A or C.B.A 
is conceptually an equal representation of the R.C.B.A. 
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calculated. The suggestion is therefore to examine carefully the events of risk, cost and 
benefit, before making a final decision to implement the project.  
  
As we have perceived it, the main objective of R.C.B.A is to calculate systematically the 
information of risk or cost involved with the project, and find whether or not it actually 
outweighs the benefit of a situation. R.C.B.A attempts to provide potential information or aid 
to a decision maker in order to find a better decision for executing the project.49 This account 
corresponds to the decision model of India, related to the dam. Therefore we allow the model 
of R.C.B.A as a normative standard in response to examine whether the Indian decision 
procedure has met the criterion in the consideration of performing the project. The problem 
nevertheless arises that the decision maker cannot estimate directly the risk, due to the fact 
that the considered information rests on the possible world. Accordingly, the decision maker 
is led to estimate them in consideration of a probability judgement. Thus the concept of 
probability assessment is inevitably integrated within the process of the R.C.B.A. This 
assumption, however, address a number of crucial factors which are related to each other, and 
therefore pushes the decision maker to count them in favour of making a safety decision: 
What would be the correct procedure to characterizes the probabilities of risk ? How can it be 
known exactly? To what extent does it influence on making the judgement of a decision? I 
shall closely examine the answers to this, through which I shall find that the decision maker 
cannot accurately count the probabilities of risk, and so he is not able to make a safe decision 
in relation to perform the project.  
 
- The process of calculating the probabilities of risk: 
 
In the process of characterizing the probabilities of risk, the main target of the decision maker 
is to estimate it so that he can determine accurately whether the considered assessment of risk 
lies on an acceptable level or not. He finds accordingly that he at least can assume a level of 
information whereby it is possible to quantify the probabilities, and finally he can come up to 
estimate accurately the risk. If he point outs, in the procedure, that there exists probabilities of 
unwelcome events, then the quantitative assessment of the relative likelihoods of these 
unwelcome events will eventually pursue him to determine the risk so. Accordingly, if he 
further notices that the result of the quantitative assessment of the probabilities exhibits that 
the risk is acceptable, or at least exists at a minimal level and so not being a source of 
significant concern, then he considers acknowledging it into the account of the expected 
benefit. In other words, if he estimates that the considered benefit is higher than the risk, the 
assessment will finally recommend him to adopt the decision of implementing the project. 
                                                 
49 Shrader-Frechette, 1985b, p.29 - 34 
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The estimation can be formulated in this way: b > r (“b” indicates here the benefit and “r” 
indicates the risk associated with the project). In this way the decision analyst constitutes the 
main part of his decision model in order to estimate precisely the probabilities of risk. 
 
- Knowledge about the probabilities: 
 
In the above paragraph, I have mainly been concentrated with the way the decision maker 
estimates the probabilities of risk as a fundamental part of his decision model. I shall now 
focus on the central element portrayed in the discussion of risk assessment, that is, how he can 
know exactly the probabilities of risk.50 The word probabilities actually exhibits a plural 
sense of probability, which main task is to produce a degree of certainty or conformity 
regarding a particular event or a particular concept, after removing as much as possible the 
vagueness around it. The task is chiefly constituted by calculating a logical relation between a 
hypothesis or predictions of a particular event, and the result of the numerical estimation of 
some relative elements connected to that hypothetical event. In a way the process finally 
comes up with a result by claiming that it has reached a degree of conformity regarding the 
prediction or the hypothetical event. The numerical assessment plays an important role in the 
process, by providing a reliable basis for quantifying the probabilities accurately, since 
quantitative assessment is regarded in many cases as the most effective instrument for 
delivering a scientific basis for accepting an event or a thing without doubting it further. Thus 
probability assessment allows numerical estimation in order to identify the risky event 
accurately. I shall now attempt to focus on how the decision maker can know the 
probabilities. In this respect, we find that there are two ways through which it can be known: 
A. Frequency analysis, and B. Scientific theory. 
 
- i. Frequency analysis: 
 
Frequency analysis states that if a situation repeats itself with one out of a fixed number of 
states arising on each repetition, then the probability of the given state equals its relative 
frequency. Let me try to give one example in order to explain this clearly. Considering a case 
in which one tosses a coin consecutively and it comes heads half of the time. Estimating the 
event in this criterion finally forms a belief that the heads and the tails are equally probable. 
                                                 
50 I follow primarily various aspects of the probabilities assessment of risk according to the discussion of 
Malnes. In this regard, he examines closely the effects of the interest-based criterion of human action on the 
natural environment and various sorts of uncertainties lying in such calculation. This assumption therefore 
permits me to consider his discussion in this respect.  However, it is useful to state that I have no intention to be 
biased for or against any of his arguments in the context of this discussion. For my purpose, I consider his book 
“Valuing the environment”, 1995, chap. 3, p. 54 - 64.  
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The tossing of the coin then indicates the occurrence of the two states in which each state 
numerically represents a known probability of 0,5. The frequency analysis is a common 
method for estimating the probabilities of a particular risky situation or event (for example; 
certain kind of illness in different population groups, other countable affected groups of 
individuals, and so on).  
 
- ii. Scientific theory: 
 
Probabilities can also be estimated by following a scientific theory. This is usually done by 
scientists. They mainly collect information from frequency analysis or the events of the 
frequency analysis in order to constitute a theory. This theory can, however, be used in the 
estimation of probabilities of other events as well. But it cannot tell definitely anything about 
the probability of that event happening. The geologists, for instance, on the basis of a theory 
based calculation estimate the chance of whether a major earth-quake or an unusual natural 
catastrophe will occur in a particular place during the next five years. The probability of such 
an event happening is so small that it might be estimated in terms of a non-zero chance, or it 
might never occur in that place at all, since the place does not have the relevant relation to the 
event. This is why we find that a person, by virtue of the theory based calculation, may yield 
the estimation of probability of an event, but the event is unlikely to happen, or it may never 
occurred at all. The event may nevertheless be nomologically possible, given the viewpoint of 
the relevant theories or laws.  
 
- Numerical estimates of probabilities and the characterization of risk: 
 
Given the view of probability judgement in terms of frequency analysis, and the notion of the 
dependable scientific theories, it has been claimed that the decision maker can systematically 
quantify the likelihoods of relevant event or events, and with this knowledge he can finally 
determine the risk accurately. Despite the given fact, we shall find that there are many events 
or cases in the possible states of the risky world, where the risk assessor cannot assign 
numerical probabilities to them, and so is not capable of determining the risk accurately. As a 
part of this claim, I shall focus here on two forms of uncertainty in the quantitative probability 
assessment in order to evaluate the risk.  
 
- The first form: 
 
This is a type of uncertainty in which finding the probabilities of the states are feasible in 
terms of how likely they are. One may for instance know enough about one’s colleague’s 
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habits by telling that the colleague is more likely to be in the office than at the pub at certain 
hour. Nevertheless, this probability judgement is not enough for him to fix either state of his 
colleague’s habits in numerical assessment. The reason is that he knows something about the 
differences between the two states of habit, but not enough to arrive at numerical estimates. It 
does not provide him with an exact picture or a critical standard in order to compare 
accurately one state with the other, which is regarded as an essential factor in order to put the 
event into the frame of quantitative assessment. Lacking the essence of such comparative 
relation between the considered states, he is not provided with accuracy regarding the 
probabilities of happening the states or the events following from the habits of that person. He 
may merely be confirmed that there exists differences between them, but he cannot fix these 
differences accurately. This is why he is not capable of determining the probabilities of the 
different states of his colleague’s habits in quantitative assessment. With this example, we can 
equally say that the decision maker can know the probabilities of the different states of an 
incident, but he cannot exactly compare them and so he is not capable of assigning numerical 
estimation on them. 
 
- The second form:  
 
In the second form of uncertainty, one stands completely in a dark situation and is totally 
incapable of estimating the probabilities of a risky state or states. It implies that the range of 
possible states of the world is unknown. Given uncertainty in this form, the decision maker 
cannot undertake a relative frequency analysis, or he cannot use scientific theories in the 
purpose of measuring predictability or probability, since he has no knowledge of the nature of 
an event. Accordingly, there is no question of estimating the probability numerically. One 
example can be followed in this regard. A person finds a mushroom that he has never before 
tasted nor seen. So he cannot identify its taste in any respect, and has no inkling as to which 
condition is the more likely one to be. Therefore, there is no room for estimating any sort of 
relative likelihood, and so for applying a quantitative or comparative judgement regarding the 
event. With this example, we have tried to show that the decision maker cannot make any 
probability judgement in relation to a complete unknown event, or an unusual event in 
relation to the natural environment. He simply has information about possible uncertainty or 
an unknown event to go by, but he cannot infer anything recognizable from it, in the purpose 
of making a probability judgement on it. 
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- Subjective probabilities assessment of risk and the decision of performing the dam:  
 
From the above, we have seen that there is no reliable way of quantifying the probabilities 
deriving from the viewpoint of frequency analysis or theory based knowledge, and so for 
characterizing the risk. The state of a complete uncertainty thus emerges before the decision 
maker. In other words, the decision maker could not manage to identify the probabilities of 
risk by the objective criteria of the R.C.B.A, so far. This does not necessarily mean that he 
cannot follow any other method in response to identify the probability as far as possible. What 
would then be a persuasive way to estimate the probabilities of risk in the decision model? In 
this situation, he attempts to find a favourable equation between the expected goal of his 
rationality and the uncertainty regarding identification of the probabilities. Accordingly, he 
comes forward to consider the probability assessment in the subjective assessment.51 Hence, 
he takes the assessment of risk and benefit associated with the project into the said account. 
The subjective assessment does not make any further barrier against finding a suitable 
relationship between the maximization version of his rationality and implementing the 
project. Thus he accommodates the subjective assessment of the probability judgement in the 
decision model. The credibility of subjective assessment is, however, a moot question. But 
before going to touch this issue, I shall first look at how the decision maker estimates the 
probabilities according to his own point of view.  
 
Amid the consideration of the subjective assessment, the decision maker somehow finds a 
reliable basis for estimating the probabilities in numerical terms. The main purpose of such a 
process is to draw a critical level whereby he can accurately distinguish the probabilities of 
risk associated with the project in terms of being at an acceptable level or not. The process 
further suggests that if the probabilities of being deprived of the expected benefit manifest 
itself over the critical level, then it is not to be regarded as acceptable. While, if it manifests 
itself under the critical level, then it is not a source of concern for risk. The decision maker 
then defines the critical level in the sense that the probabilities of 10% (ten percent) or more 
than that, is not to be considered as an acceptable level of risk. In this process, he finally finds 
that the probabilities attached with the dam are below the given level of risk, and so it is not a 
potential source for risky effects on the natural environment. The perception equally provides 
him with certainty in obtaining the expected benefit as well. Thus the decision maker 
completes successfully the trade-off between risk and benefit, which favours the achievement 
of rationality or the expected national interests. Thus he eventually arrives at the decision of 
implementing the dam for achieving the goal of which it is built for.  
 
                                                 
51 It is essential to point out that subjective account of risk-cont-benefit analysis is not a part of normative 
assessment of individual’s rationality. 
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However, an objection has been raised against the decision maker’s view regarding the 
acceptance of 10% as a critical or acceptable level, because there is no persuasive way he can 
prove that the given level of 10% is the proper cut-off point. Does it endanger people or 
individual lives and health by deeming risks below this level insignificant? And, does it show 
insufficient sensitivity to desires by tolerating no risk above 10%? No one can answer 
positively to both these questions. Once we consider examining precisely the considered 
assessment, it implies that a 10% probability of one person’s death is worse than 9% 
probability of 100 deaths. This is clearly controversial, and so is not acknowledgeable. The 
assumption further suggests that the main objective of the decision maker, in the considered 
process, is to distinguish between the acceptable and not acceptable level of risk by drawing 
the percentage, but he cannot do so accurately unless the assessment exactly corresponds to 
the number of individuals whose lives are at stake. The assessment, however, is not adjusted 
in this way. This is why there is a significant objection against the given assessment which 
cannot be ignored. Moreover, when we examine the decision maker’s subjective assessment 
of risk and benefit analysis, it actually suggests that there is either risk or no risk of being 
deprived of the expected benefit. The reason is that the acceptance of the considered quantity 
assessment displays the decision analyst’s own belief about the rationality, but is not 
addressing the characterization of the risky elements, which should be concerned. This has 
been significantly ignored. Therefore it permits us to insist that the subjective probabilities 
estimates cannot serve as a premise for rational decision making. However, the Indian 
decisions of implementing the project have raised some specific questions in relation to the 
Ganges water. Who will consequently bear the cost or the risk of such a decision? And, how 
will it affect on Bangladesh, whose interests largely lies in the same object? In finding the 
answer of these practical issues, it is also essential for us to shed light on the interests of 
Bangladesh with regard to the Ganges Water. 
 
C. A closer account of the interests of Bangladesh situated in the water of the Ganges: 
 
Before the functioning of the Farakka dam of India, Bangladesh would unrestrainedly be 
benefited by the Ganges water in various ways. It was not only limited to the individual 
consumption of human beings, but also for the purpose of cultivation, nourishment to the 
elements of the natural world, and different types of development projects, as well. This 
normal situation is no longer tangible, due to the dam project making a barrier on the natural 
flow of the water essentially required for those things. Bangladesh thus point out that the dam 
has severely affected his interests or the national interests relying on the water resource. The 
matter consequently has left him in an uncertain situation, in relation to the satisfaction of 
these interests. Hence a conflict of interests between the two countries or parties emerges over 
the issue of the Ganges water. In response to this situation, Bangladesh regards that the 
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fundamental task will be to find the way, so that he can pursue his own interests in the given 
situation. Accordingly, he too can successfully promote his possible well-being aspect of 
rationality.  
 
- The Main objective: 
 
In the assessment of his uncertain situation, Bangladesh eventually learn that achievement of 
the expected well-being version of rationality lies in the consideration of the other party’s 
choice, through which he might pursue his own interests as well. Accordingly, a vital piece of 
information to him is how to accommodate the Indian choice or interests, in the framework of 
his own possible rationality or choice. In other words, Bangladesh finds that he has no other 
way but to interact with the other party in order to materialize the expected goal. Hence 
Bangladesh initially draws a strategy in response to the Indian choice, which is compatible 
with the expectation of his rationality. This assumption can be characterized as strategic 
rationality - the rationality is estimated by each party following the interaction of interests 
involved in a strategic situation.52 In other words, we find that the calculation of strategic 
rationality, or the strategic choice of Bangladesh, is significantly close to the view of the Self- 
goal choice version of well-being.53 However, some key issues appear before the rational 
individual in relation to constitute the strategic rationality. How to coordinate or arrange the 
mode of interaction between his strategy or strategies with the other involved in the 
considered situation? What expectation should he rationally form from such coordination? To 
what extent should he constitute a possible strategic choice or action? Before touching this, it 
is worthwhile for me to illustrate some basic elements of the strategic rationality in order to 
understand the given issues. 
 
- What is strategic rationality? 
 
The strategic rationality is generally characterized by a situation in which two or more 
individuals interact or cooperate with their respective interests in a design where each 
individual can promote his own interests as a result of the cooperation.54 In this process, the 
interests of each party are specified by the estimation of his own utility. The process then 
                                                 
52 Gauthier, 1986, p. 60-61 
 
53 Sen classifies the well being aspect of self interest or rationality in three senses. The Self -goal choice is one of 
them. The primary feature of this suggests that there is no restriction on a rational individual to accommodate the 
choice of other individual’s in the formation of his/her own action or choice, if it permits him to pursue his own 
goal in a situation. For this purpose, see, note: 37 of p. 26, in this chapter. 
 
54 In general strategic choice might not be egoistic, but in this particular case egoistic. 
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allows forming a set of possible strategies or choices in which the party considers his strategy 
from his respective point of view. Thus the individual can constitute a possible strategic 
choice or an action subject to obtain his own expected utility within the combination of the 
other individual’s choice, while the choice of the other individual can be regarded as constant 
in response to a situation.55 Once we interpret this assumption alongside the strategic 
rationality of Bangladesh, it suggests that Bangladesh will first focus on his own expectation, 
measured by the utility function. Then he puts this information into making a possible choice 
or strategy in response to the Indian choice, i.e. the dam project, while the project itself is 
regarded as responsive to the satisfaction of the Indian expectation, or the Indian strategy, and 
so to be kept constant. This will characterize the possible strategy of Bangladesh in reference 
to the given strategic situation. But nonetheless, how can he successfully coordinate this 
strategy so that he can really promote the expected goal as far as possible? The answer of this 
question has adequately been discussed in game theory - an essential notion associated with 
the framework of the strategic rationality. I shall therefore address some of its relevant 
elements in the following discussion. 
 
- Strategic rationality and the game-theoretic situation: 
 
Game theory actually studies the various aspects following from a strategic situation, or 
strategic rationality, in purpose to find a possible strategic solution to the conflict of interests 
between the parties.56 Accordingly, it describes the events of strategic rationality in two 
perspectives. One is cooperative game and the other is non-cooperative game. The 
cooperative game is a situation in which two or more individuals are involved, and it is 
primarily concerned with an agreement reached as a strategic solution to the game or conflict. 
I find that this assumption has no relevance to the current context of discussion, as we are 
mainly concerned with strategic rationality from the viewpoint of an individual’s rationality 
which is not concerned with a strategic solution of the game. I will therefore go no further 
into this assumption. In contrast, the non-cooperative game considers strategic rationality 
from the viewpoint of a rational individual, and so only a self-enforcing agreement has any 
real chance to be implemented in the situation. I suppose that this assumption can be followed 
in dealing with the current issue.   
 
Non-cooperative game theory can further be divided in two senses on a basis of the facts 
associated with the strategic situation. They are constant sum (also called zero sum) and 
                                                 
55 Gauthier, 1986, p. 60-61 
 
56 I primarily follow the discussion of game theory from the viewpoints of two sources. They are: Elster (ed.), 
1986, p. 8-10, and Harsanyi, 1980, p. 145- 146. 
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variable sum (or non-zero sum) games. The constant sum game is known as a game for pure 
conflict. The event can lead to a worse situation for all parties or players than any other 
outcome involved in the strategic situation. So this is unlikely to provide a strategic solution 
to the conflict.57 Therefore we are not inclined to take the considered conflict into the given 
account, because each party involved in the case at least have no disagreement in respect to 
promote their interests. But nevertheless, they have the conflict on how to go about in 
accordance with their respective point of view. However, the variable-sum game is a game of 
pure co-operation or a game of mixed conflict and cooperation. The game of a mixed conflict 
and cooperation arises in a situation where each individual can consider the choice between a 
set of strategies that can either be characterized as cooperation or defection, depending on the 
attitude of the individual involved in the situation. Thus the variable-sum game provides at 
least a direction whereby a rational individual can make his own strategic choice in 
cooperation with the other, in a way that can lead to achieving the possible goal, and so is a 
strategic solution to the conflict. For this qualification, the event can be characterized as an 
internal rationality of cooperation, whereby a rational individual can promote his own goal 
with the cooperation of the other individual involved in the strategic situation. In other words, 
it appears that the given perception of non-cooperative game provide an account consistent 
with the notion of the strategic rationality. Accordingly, the considered version of non-
cooperative game can be stated as an essential element in the discussion of strategic 
rationality.58 This assumption then permits me to examine the strategic rationality of 
Bangladesh in view of the non-cooperative game or the assumption of the game theoretic 
situation. 
 
As we understand from the above discussion, the main task of the game theoretic situation or 
the strategic rationality, is not only limited to account for the strategic situation in a manner of 
conflict of interests, but it simultaneously look for a rational cooperation between the parties. 
What then should be the main objective of this nature of cooperation? Its central property 
suggests reaching at a state of equilibrium point, or equilibrium choice.59 Accordingly, each 
individual combines or coordinate the strategy with the other and finally it leads to the 
achievement of the equilibrium state. In other words, the parties involved in the game manage 
to coordinate their strategies in a manner of reaching the equilibrium point in which each 
party’s strategic choice is regarded as optimal against the others. Once we put this assumption 
                                                 
57 “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” can be regarded here as a classic example which shows that the mutual defection 
produces a worse situation for both prisoners. For further reading in this regard, see Sen in Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 
69-72. 
 
58 For such qualification, the variable-sum version of the non-cooperative game has been understood as a central 
part of the applied game theory. Therefore, in the following discussion I will consider this in the sense of the 
non- cooperative game or the game theory. In this regard, see Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 8-9. 
 
59 Ibid., p. 7 
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in relation to the strategic rationality or the strategic choice of Bangladesh, we find that 
according to this estimation, the equilibrium account of his strategic choice actually provide 
the expected utility maximally. So, he assumes that the choice corresponds to the best reply in 
relation to the other party’s choice, or the Indian strategy. In this way, he regards the choice as 
in consistence with the equilibrium choice, or the expectation of the equilibrium outcome. 
The criterion further suggests that no one involved in the interaction can unilaterally increase 
his utility by acting differently. The gesture therefore indicate that the successful 
coordination, or the strategic rationality rests on the achievement of a possible equilibrium 
outcome, and that such outcome is to be regarded as stable. Thus Bangladesh initially shapes 
the strategic choice in response to the equilibrium choice. In other words, Bangladesh adopts 
the view to the extent that his strategic choice - a product of the internal rationality of 
cooperation between the two parties - virtually rationalizes the achievement of the expected 
rationality or the expected utility pertaining to the Ganges water. 
 
Each party formally agreed to the objective of the strategic rationality suggested in the 
achievement of the possible equilibrium outcome - a rational solution to the game between the 
strategies of the two players or parties. In this regard, this can be asked: How can it actually 
be verified that the strategic choice of Bangladesh is itself rational? Or, can Bangladesh really 
achieve the expected equilibrium outcome as a result of the strategic choice? The answer to 
these questions cannot be known unless we have a closer estimation regarding the way he 
constitutes the framework of the strategic choice. I shall first cast light on the structure of the 
choice and thereby we shall find how to estimate whether he can achieve the goal. The 
normative justification of the choice lies in the following criterion of rationality. The choice 
must be accurately consistent with the expectation of the utility function or the expected 
utility of the party. I shall, however, find that the strategic choice of Bangladesh does not 
precisely correspond to the given status. Before reaching to this point, let me now try to look 
at how he actually arrange the relevant elements in constructing the strategic choice. 
 
- An investigation into the strategic choice: 
 
Although the parties have agreed to act upon the consideration of the equilibrium choice, this 
does not necessarily provide a definite situation for Bangladesh in order to achieve the main 
objective of the strategic choice. According to the framework of the strategic situation, he is 
not fully confirmed regarding the manner of co-operation with the other party, something 
which the achievement of the expected goal largely rely on. Therefore he assumes that 
uncertainty still exist in this regard. This impression seems further to induce him to account 
his choice on the basis of two corresponding elements: 
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1. The utility assessment or the utility function must be consistent with the requirement of 
various situations. 
2. The assessment of utility must be conducted sufficiently by a precise standard, so that the 
utility of one situation can be measured correctly in comparison with the other. 
 
Given the magnitude of the above two elements, the rational individual finds that it is not 
possible to calculate or adjust these elements within the limitation of a particular situation, or 
one situation responding in reference to the other party’s behaviour. The choice situation then 
must be calculated in response to a sequence of situations, or in the consideration of various 
situations. This incentive accordingly urges him to take not only one situation, but more than 
one into account of the choice. It is therefore not sufficient for him to confine the choice 
model to the requirement of consistency only over a pair of options, and further preferring one 
of them by ranking them from greater to lower utility. Accordingly, the rational individual 
notes that the choice actually gives a partial or incomplete assessment regarding the state of 
affairs. The fundamental inadequacy lies in the fact that it does not allow other essential 
information exceeding the two options, or the one situation, which is a vital requirement for a 
complete assessment of the choice situation. It is therefore essential for him to allow this 
requirement which regards to take such essential information, or more than two options, into 
the account. Accordingly, the rational individual considers a choice situation in the sense that 
it must be at least consistent with the requirement of three situations in terms of utility 
assessment. He then realizes that it is reasonably useful to give value on that requirement. 
Thus, he accommodates it as a fundamental element in the assessment of his choice. In other 
words, the realization leads him to consider the choice situation in a broader perspective, so 
that he can adequately examine the essential options in respect to more than one situation or 
one case. A state of choice in accordance with this criterion is being known as transitivity in 
the discussion of the individual’s rationality or the rational choice. This permits me to 
examine closely the choice situation of Bangladesh, in the light of the given criterion. What is 
then the criterion of transitivity? And, how can it be explained in accordance with given 
choice situation? 
 
Transitivity is a condition which provides a scope for estimating a relationship between three 
options or objects in the realization for a choice situation. The three options can be stated by 
following a simple example in terms of x, y, and z. Then the criterion of the transitivity can be 
explained in the following sense. In the case of choice: If the relationship between the options 
is observed by the criterion of consistency, it appears they are indifferent. The event 
accordingly state: It regards x as at least as good as y, and y as at least as good as z, then x is 
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also regarded as at least as good as z. In the case of preference: The relationship implies that if 
x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then it is also regarded that x is preferred to z.60  
  
Let me now try to put the above information regarding the preference model of transitivity 
into our considered case. Accordingly, the rational individual considers the manner of 
preference in the sense of x to y to z. A transitive relationship appears between them in two 
sets, or two cases of preferences: x to y and y to z. A complexity then arises in this regard: 
Which one should he actually choose? And, how could he specify it? The main problem is 
that his preference ordering does not yield an accurate answer, since it is only limited to the 
two options and so does not reveal the strength of his preference for x to y in comparison with 
y to z. In other words, his preference order is actually not able to infer whether his preference 
for x to y is stronger than his preference for y to z. In order to reduce the difficulty, the 
rational individual regards that it is significantly important to allow an interval measure of 
preferences, in estimating the respective strength between them. This perception will not only 
give him an opportunity to measure the utility assessment for each case or situation by virtue 
of ordering the preference over the options, but also for determining the respective strengths 
of the preferences in reference to one situation compared with the other. Accordingly, he finds 
that the notion of the interval measure of the preferences bring forth a persuadable answer in 
response to the problems, as it has been raised in determining the relative strength of the 
preferences between the two cases. Thus he considers assigning value on the given notion of 
preference and so locates it in the chart of the strategic choice. Gauthier insists, after realizing 
the merit of the interval measure of preference, that the rational individual must allow this 
ideal assumption in the treatment of the strategic rationality.61
 
Once the vital role of the interval measure of preferences is acknowledged in realization of the 
transitive account of the choice, one immediate problem arises: How to figure out accurately 
the utility estimation for each situation or option? What should be a decisive factor? And, in 
which manner can finally the choice be made-up on the basis of that factor? In resolving this 
problem, the given criterion of choice is tempted to allow a precise standard, so that no one 
would be able to cast further doubt on its accuracy. Accordingly, it employs a quantitative 
assessment on each situation or option through which the utility can accurately be counted. 
Having considered the magnitude of the accurate assessment, the transitivity account then 
recommends that quantitative estimation can only ensure such estimation in response to the 
interval measure of preferences. And, so it is perfectly coherent with respect to the given 
event. Therefore it must be allowed in estimating precisely the utilities of those situations. 
The choice will accordingly be determined in a manner where a larger number echoes to 
                                                 
60 I have primarily borrowed the conceptual aspect regarding the criterion of transitivity from the viewpoints of 
Sen in Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 63-65, and Gauthier,1986, p.40- 42. 
61 For more information regarding the view, see Gauthier, 1986, p. 60- 61. 
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maximal utility, and so the larger quantity will always be preferred compared to a smaller one, 
while equal numbers between the options or situations will be treated as indifferent.62 In other 
words, the utility is, for instance, determined by real numbers, in the way that if x is assigned 
to a greater number than y in a situation, x is preferred to y. And, if x and y are assigned to the 
same number; they are indifferent. This assumption will equally be followed for the cases of y 
to z and x to z. Thus the quantitative aspect of utility assessment contributes a precise 
standard in order to measure accurately the said preferences. The rational individual 
accordingly finds that this has a substantial role in measuring the given choice situation in the 
following way. The quantitative dimension will not only provide him with a reliable standard 
or unit in order to determine the accurate utility assessment for each situation or option, but 
also give a transparent calculation of the differences between the options, and so for 
comparing them as well. In other words, the consideration of the quantitative assessment 
serves as a unique solution to the problem, as it has been presented at the outset of this part of 
the discussion. Hence the rational individual assigns value on the quantitative aspect of 
transitivity, in the purpose of calculating accurately the utility in the interval measure of 
preferences.63 He further pronounce the fact that the quantitative aspect of transitivity 
eventually will correspond to the exact figure of the utility assessment or utility function for 
each individual, and so is significantly consistent with the strategic situation as well. 
Bangladesh thus refer that his strategic choice has been consolidated accurately in response to 
the other party’s choice, or the equilibrium choice, as it is highlighted by the interpretation of 
transitivity. In other words, we find that the conceptual aspect of transitivity is implicitly 
consistent with the ground work of the strategic choice of Bangladesh, whereby he is 
enlightened to prefer the option with the highest number, or the highest quantity of water in 
determination of the expected utility. 
 
- Demerits of the strategic choice: 
 
Given the credibility of transitivity in determining the choice, whereby the rational individual 
chooses or prefers a larger quantity compared to a smaller one, what happens if the rational 
individual finds that there is no noticeable quantitative difference between the options? In 
another sense, is it possible to apply quantitative assessment to all situations? In response to 
this question, we shall find that the quantitative version of transitivity cannot determine 
accurately the choice or preference in all situations, and that the event consequently can affect 
                                                 
 
62 Ibid., p. 40 
63 I suppose here it is worthwhile to state that these numbers have only interval significance. In addition, we 
must remember that a measurement of the interval comparisons of the preference is only calculated between 
utilities for the same individual. Therefore, the given measurement gives no further basis for interpersonal 
comparison. For this purpose, see Gauthier, 1986, p. 63.  
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negatively in reaching the equilibrium point. This can further disrupt entirely the transitive 
relationship of the preferences, which then cannot even be acknowledged in the fundamental 
discussion of rationality. Before touching these issues, it is useful for us to know how the 
rational individual considers preferring an option where the options appear with indifferent 
numbers. In facing with this event, the rational individual finds that there is no apparent scale 
where one option differs from the other option (or options), or apparently there is no 
significant differences between them, due to having the same number. Hence, the quantitative 
version of transitivity simply fails to compare the options in determining the choice. Despite 
this fact, it does not necessarily imply that the event completely refrain him from preferring 
one option or number. As he follows the requirement of transitivity, he is incited to prefer the 
x. No matter whether it is a case of two options or a set of three options, he must prefer x. 
Otherwise, he regards that he actually violates the manner of preferring the x, according to the 
said requirement.64 Therefore he always prefers the x, even though there are no quantitative 
differences between this and the other options, in every case or situation. Accordingly, each 
successive situation is evaluated similar to the other. Then he finds for instance indifference 
between the two situations X1 and X2, between the X2 and X3 - - - between the X9 and X10, 
and so forth. Even though there is no doubt here regarding the manner of considering his 
transitive preference for the X1 to the X10, there will, however, always exist a small 
difference between the successive x’s, and once these small differences are summed up 
together there obviously emerges a greater number, for example; counted as 10,000 cusec 
water. And this greater number or huge quantity of water cannot be ignored. The number 
clearly indicates that the rational individual is genuinely a loser for preferring the x. 
Moreover, this is not only a problem that creates a worse situation for the chooser, but there 
are other fundamental problems, too. That is the similarity among the preferences or numbers 
which is actually not a concern for the transitive relationship. Instead, the fundamental 
objective of the transitive relationship is concerned with figuring out the comparative 
relationship between the numbers, in order to determine correctly the preferable option. As we 
have seen, this is actually not the case in the situation of the same number. Thus the 
quantitative version of the transitive preference fails itself in relation to the criterion of the 
comparative relationship in dealing with a situation of the same number. Therefore it cannot 
determine exactly the option preferred for achieving the expected utility in every situation. 
 
Once the quantitative version of utility assessment fails to maintain the criterion of the 
transitive relationship, the options then can no longer be regulated in the manner of the 
relationship. Consequently, the objects of the preferences are led to break up into an 
intransitive or a cyclic relationship.65 The relationship accordingly appears in the following 
                                                 
64 For more information regarding why a rational person must choose x, but not other; see Sen in Elster (ed.), 
1986, p. 64 - 65. 
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forms: x to y, y to z, and z to x. We can, for instance, examine: What happens if the rational 
individual considers making the choice on the basis of such a relationship? In response to this 
question, we shall find that the choice over the options of the cyclic relationship will violate 
the individual’s rationality to such an extent that it cannot be acknowledged as sensible in the 
discussion of rationality. On this account, I shall draw the options of the said relationship into 
numerical estimation, so that this claim can be brought out clearly. Accordingly, suppose that 
the rational individual has x. Before he takes it into the account, the other party offers him z; 
he prefers the z instead of x. If he prefers z to x, it is then presumed that he is offered more 
than the x in return for the z. Supposed he is offered 1000 cusec water for z and so trades. 
And similarly, suppose he has the z, but he is offered 1000 cu. for the y. He prefers the y and 
so trades. But before he takes the y into the account, 1000 cu. is offered for the original x. He 
prefers the x and so trades. After serving the three events of preferences, in each of which the 
rational individual expects that the event betters his situation in terms of his preferences. 
Nevertheless, he himself ends up with the original x, but appears a loser of 3000 cu. water out 
of summing the three preferences. Clearly the events provide opportunity for a tactic in 
making for further advantage to the other party who can even continuously be a gainer as 
result of using the unending round of such preferences, while the chooser can become ever 
less well-off, because of being engaged with the choice over such relationship. Thus we find 
that the choice over the cyclic relationship of preferences eventually goes contrary to the main 
objective of the individual’s rationality. In other words, we can argue regarding the 
quantitative account of the strategic choice, following from the viewpoints of the transitive 
and the intransitive relationship of preferences, that the former relationship cannot genuinely 
reach the equilibrium point in the situations, nor can even the consideration of the later 
relationship have any sensible role in the discussion of the individual’s rationality. 
 
- Limiting the freedom: 
 
In the preceding section of the discussion regarding the strategic choice of Bangladesh, we 
note the remarkable defects associated with the quantitative form of preferences in response to 
various situations. The event makes it significantly difficult to quantify an exact preferable 
option and eventually it appears contrary to the fundamental objective of the individual 
rationality on which the choice is made. In addition, we notice that the individual’s freedom 
comes under questions in the location of the quantitative account of strategic rationality. 
Could he choose whatever he wants to satisfy the rationality? Does he sufficiently enjoy 
freedom in the situation? Elster, one of the renowned interpreters of the individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
65 I consider it useful to give a brief account of the intransitive relationship among the options. The main purpose 
of it is to get a full account of the quantitative version of the strategic choice. 
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rationality in a choice situation, examines the individual’s freedom in reference to the 
quantitative version of the strategic situation. He accordingly notice that individual’s choice 
indeed enter as part-determinant of the constraints that shape the choice.66 I shall equally find 
that the quantitative assessment can be regarded as a precise indication of such event which 
virtually undermines freedom in the given situation. As we have already seen in beginning of 
this chapter, freedom has been regarded a basic factor in order to pursue the rationality for an 
individual.67 Accordingly, the assumption further suggests that a rational individual enjoys 
freedom in a choice situation whereby he chooses freely one from the available options, in 
order to obtain the expected goal. In other words, the rational individual can choose freely 
whatever he finds relevant for achieving the aim designed for. However, freedom has not 
been considered (in similar manner) in the location of the strategic rationality in which the 
choice of one party must be adjusted with the other, and so for freedom as well. A certain 
degree of restriction is imposed on the nature of individual’s freedom in shaping the strategic 
rationality. Moreover, the rational individual further estimates that the achievement of the 
strategic goal greatly depend on the cooperative movement of the other party. This perception 
makes even an additional burden on the free movement of the individual towards persuasion 
of the goal. Thus, he is not able to move sufficiently free according to the manner of 
cooperation in the strategic situation. Then the strategic rationality itself emerges as somehow 
imposing a certain kind of unpleasant limitation on the free activity of the rational individual. 
The limitation is further exposed in more specific sense, when the choice or the preference is 
regulated by the numerical norm. Suppose he is offered to prefer 10,000 cusec waters as a 
product of the strategy. This perception clearly indicates that the freedom of choice is 
eventually confined by the given figure. Why will he not be freely permitted to prefer a 
normal flow of the river, or something which is not to be qualified in number? We actually 
fail to find such freedom in the quantitative version of the strategic choice. Thus we find that 
the rational individual prefers to maximize the quantitative assessment, which leads nowhere, 
but is something subject to impose constraint on the rationality. In other words, we insist that 
the lack of sufficient freedom can be regarded as a remarkable drawback in the strategic 
framework of Bangladesh, and it puts forward a considerable uncertainty in order to reach at 
the expected equilibrium point, or the utility. 
 
- Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis (R. C. B. A) and the strategic choice: 
 
Up to now I have tried to detect some specific defects following from the quantitative aspect 
of the strategic choice. This is a sensible ground for suspecting whether the strategy can really 
                                                 
66 For further information about the given issue, see Elster (ed.), 1986, p. 7. 
 
67 See, p. 23, in this chapter. 
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achieve the expected goal. Before making a final remark, it is significantly important for us to 
pay attention to one other relevant issue before implementing the strategy in reality. This is 
primarily concerned with how the actor calculates the effectiveness of the choice. Will the 
choice be regarded as leading to gain or a loss in the performance? Does it adequately insure 
the safety requirement of the natural environment? In which way can the gain and loss of the 
choice be estimated or be balanced? These are some fundamental issues involved in finding 
the effectiveness of the choice. A decision procedure emerges in the judgement of it. Thus, 
the rational individual allows the decision model in the process of performing the given 
choice.  
 
The answer to the above questions, however, has been systematically addressed in the 
discussion of the risk-cost-benefit analysis (R.C.B.A). Therefore this permits me to 
accommodate R.C.B.A as a normative standard for measuring the gains and losses attached 
with the strategic choice of Bangladesh. In other words, the main target of the decision maker 
is to analyze carefully the risk associated with the strategy. The risk must not outweigh its 
contribution to the expected benefit, or the utility. If the R.C.B.A analysis designates that the 
risk is considerable, then performing the strategic choice will be characterized as a highly 
costly event. In other words, a risky decision eventually corresponds to disutility, or the non-
benefit product of the given choice. Thus the gain and loss of the strategy are to be addressed 
in accordance with the standard of the R. C. B. A. The decision maker accordingly gives 
value on this standard and thus allows it in the process of his decision model. In the analysis, 
the main task will be to characterize exactly the risk, so that he can further define it in the 
sense of acceptability. For this purpose, the decision maker or the risk analyst primarily 
emphasizes the assessment of historical records, or the tolerance of past risks, in order to 
identify probabilities of present and future risk. I shall eventually find that the decision maker 
cannot determine exactly the probabilities on the basis of the said source, and so he is faced 
with problem in order to determine the acceptable level of risk for the mentioned period. I 
shall, however, at first highlight on the issue of why he emphasizes the historical records in 
the process of understanding the probabilities of risk.  
 
As it has been indicated in the above discussion, we allow R.C.B.A in the purpose of 
estimating the risk and benefit attached with the choice of Bangladesh. The main objective is 
to consider whether the decision maker can obtain the relevant information related to 
characterize the level of risk. On this account, he estimates risk not in the usual sense, but in 
the sense of potential dangers. The magnitude of this cannot be analyzed adequately in any 
short period of time. Accordingly, the event requires a broader perspective, and so the 
calculation of the probabilities of risk must allow, not only the present period, but the future 
world, too. As a part of obtaining this information, he notes that the probabilities may be 
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recognized, but it is not possible to identify them in the relevant frequency model. It is 
therefore not possible to measure the probabilities in any exact figure of quantitative 
assessment. Suppose a case of flood happens as result of the fluctuation of the river’s flow. 
Even though the probabilities of the flood occurring in a given year with a given impact of life 
and property can somehow be known, the precise realization of the probabilities of risk (e.g., 
when, where, to whom, and how severe the actual damages) would still be random or 
completely unknown. The quantitative assessment of those events can merely mislead in 
understanding the fundamental problem that drives those hazards. The decision maker thus 
finds that the probability assessment on those events requires other processes, rather than 
quantitative analysis, or he assumes that qualitative analysis may be a relevant feature.68 On 
this account, it appears that he considers focusing on the historical records or the past risks, 
which he considers significantly relevant for identifying the probabilities of risk. 
 
- Past risk and evaluation of the probabilities of risk: 
 
As a part of obtaining this information, the decision maker carefully review the past records 
of the river’s water connected with various events such as floods, drought, quality of water 
and others. He considers accordingly that the average or annual probabilities of fatality 
appearing from these events can be regarded as a standpoint in order to identify the 
probabilities for present and future risk. In this process, he finally develop a form of order, 
whereby it is possible to determine the probabilities of higher and lower or acceptable risk 
associated with the events of the river’s water.69 He thus insists that he can characterize the 
probabilities by following the given estimation. Nevertheless, he is confronted with some 
tough issues in this respect. How can the probability assessment be related to the events of the 
river’s water? To what extent can it be made sure that the past records accurately correspond 
to the probabilities assessment of risk? I suppose it is useful here to focus again on the case of 
the river’s flood. The event will give me opportunity to look at how the decision maker 
explains these issues. Accordingly, he can estimate the probability of such an event happening 
on the basis of recent or historical stream flow records. But those records may be of limited 
duration or completeness, and thus it may not accurately represent the longer historical record, 
or the overall information. In addition, the underlying statistical model for floods described in 
the past records can be suspected, especially if the statistical properties of the water flow in 
the river are non-stationary, for example, because of continuing land-use changes in river 
basin, or long term climate change.70 Accordingly, the consideration of the past records 
                                                 
68 We are thus being acquainted with two types of risk analysis; quantitative and qualitative. For further 
information regarding these, see Stern and Fineberg, 1996, p. 97-98. 
 
69 See, Shrader-Frechette, “Risk Analysis and Scientific Method”, 1985b, p. 34-36.  
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whereby the risk analyst defines the annual probability of fatality is not enough to provide 
correct information and equally estimating the average fatality. In addition, he further 
perceives that the characterization or the acceptability of the probabilities of risk appears as a 
factor of numerous circumstances which were not adequately informed in the past records. 
One of them is that the non-stationary fact of the river’s flow has direct implication on the 
quality of the natural environment, as well. However, the information about this was not 
adequately known in the past record. Due to the lack of such knowledge, he finds that he even 
cannot estimate precisely regarding the probabilities of the environmental risk - a valuable 
fact which should be accommodated in the decision model. In other words, we notice that he 
meets significant difficulty in characterizing the probabilities in response to the various 
circumstances on the basis of the past records.   
 
- The probability assessment in view of the subjective assessment: 
 
Although the decision maker faces uncertainty in regard to characterize precisely the 
probabilities of risk according to the objective assessment of past records, this does not 
necessarily imply that he is prevented from calculating it in another direction.71 Accordingly, 
he considers calculating past records in the consideration of subjective assessment. In a way, 
he can overcome the uncertainty he is facing in order to determine the probabilities of risk. 
This will further pave the way to implement the choice. Hence, he takes the analysis of the 
risk - benefit relationship into the personal assessment. He accordingly prepares to estimate 
the events of the past records in order to define the probabilities for the given period. He notes 
in this regard that his strategic choice contains a larger scale of benefit in proportion to the 
probabilities of the risk, or the acceptable risk. This assumption can be specified in the 
following sense. The acceptable risk, for instance, is proportional to 1,5 the power of the 
possible benefit. In other words, he regards this figure as a cut-off point between the 
acceptable and the not acceptable level of risk. In this way, he claims that he has managed to 
identify accurately the acceptable risk, in reference to the personal account of the past records. 
Moreover, he implicitly insists that he is willing to adapt himself to such level of risk, because 
he acknowledges that it as a voluntary risk. Voluntary risk is always more acceptable than risk 
that is involuntarily imposed. He therefore considers that the given characterization in a way 
actually reduces the risk of the expected benefit.72 In other words, he finds that the strategy 
sufficiently insures the achievement of the possible benefit, or reaching the equilibrium point. 
                                                                                                                                                        
70 I have considered certain facts on the event of the flood from Stern and Fineberg (eds.), 1996, p. 106 - 108. 
 
71 I have already mentioned, but once again points out in the current context that the subjective account of risk-
cost-benefit analysis is not considered as normative assessment of the individual rationality. 
 
72 See, Shrader-Frechette, 1985b, p. 36. 
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The assumption therefore strengthens his decision model and so Bangladesh finally decides to 
implement the strategy.  
 
Suspicion has been raised along two dimensions in respect of accepting the voluntary risk in 
view of the personal account. Voluntary risk implies that the decision maker understands and 
accepts the probability of risk. But nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean he voluntarily 
accept it. If he feels that he cannot say “no”, by following the nature of the strategic 
rationality, is his decision truly voluntary? How much should a volunteer be allowed to 
sacrifice risk in response to save the possible benefit, or the strategy? These are genuine 
questions one can easily ask, in reference to the view of accepting the voluntary risk. The 
other issue is that the decision maker allows the rate of 1.5 risk as acceptable or adjustable, 
without estimating accurately its corresponding effect on the life and property associated with 
the events of the river’s water. Thus question has been raised about accepting the subjecting 
assessment of risk in most cases, because it is somehow based on a vague estimation in regard 
to where the cut-off should be.73 What the decision maker decides is that if the risk 
assessment is somehow appropriate to serve his purpose then let it do. In other words, 
disagreement has risen over the acceptable risk and the proposed benefit, because they are 
inequitably distributed in the personal assessment of the risk-benefit relationship. Therefore 
the subjective assessment of such relationship cannot be accepted according to the normative 
criteria of the R.C.B.A. I therefore consider that the permission to implement this strategy 
represents a risky decision in relation to achieving the goal. 
 
D. Particularistic consequentialism and a possible solution to the conflict: 
 
In the preceding section, I have separately examined the respective interests of India and 
Bangladesh associated with the Ganges water according to the Hobbesian account of the 
particularistic consequentialism, or the maximizing version of the individual’s rationality. As 
I have pointed out here, the achievement of the individual’s rationality does not exactly 
correspond to the normative criteria of the rational behaviour. However, we have seen that the 
maximizing version of each party’s rationality is promoting a conflict of interests between the 
two countries. My main objective in this part of the discussion will be to take a closer look at 
the possibility for a stable solution to the conflict, within the given context of the individual’s 
rationality. In this account, I shall mainly focus on these issues: What will be regarded here as 
a cause for promoting the conflict? How could a stable solution to the conflict be found within 
the given consideration of rationality? Hobbes considers these issues in the purpose of 
                                                 
73 I have already explained, in the previous discussion, regarding the obstacles in acknowledging the quantitative 
figure of a cut-off point as a result of the personal account in the risk assessment. I, therefore, find it is not useful 
to repeat the discussion again. For the previous discussion, see p. 37. 
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providing a further account in response to find a stable solution to the conflict. This 
assumption then permits me to allow his view into the account. He exclusively discusses this 
in the framework of the contract theory accommodated in the same book, “Leviathan”. He 
classifies the conflict of interests in two aspects. One is the extreme version, and he identifies 
this as the main cause for promoting the conflict. He finds this in the natural condition of the 
individual’s rationality. The other is the moderate version in which he finds that each 
individual involved in the conflict estimates the rationality in a well-understood or in a 
constrained manner. Accordingly, this assumption allows for solving the conflict by stepping 
into the acknowledgement of an agreement. He explains this in view of the civil - condition of 
the individual’s rationality.74 He considers a third party in this respect, or a powerful 
independent institution, whose main objective is to determine the contract for a stable 
situation. I shall, in this respect, find that the Hobbesian views cannot determine a genuine or 
a stable solution to the conflict, as it is portrayed by the given context of rationality. In order 
to back up my own view, it is essential for me to look at how Hobbes explains the nature of 
individual rationality in the two notions.  
 
- The individual rationality and the natural condition: 
 
In an attempt to explain the individual’s rationality in the criterion of the natural condition, 
Hobbes primarily focus on the condition of individual’s self preservation, which he insists 
play a chief role in the situation. On this score, he further points out that the individual 
rationality estimates self-preservation, not merely in the sense of survival, but primarily 
calculates it in consideration of the well-being aspect of life.75 Self preservation is thus 
integrated as a key standard in formulating the nature of the individual’s rationality.  This is 
why each individual estimates rationality in the extreme sense and so attempts to promote it 
as far as possible. In this state of rationality, he does not acknowledge any barriers on the 
unlimited freedom he enjoys, and so he neither considers agreement nor even respects norms. 
According to the Hobbesian characterization, each individual presumes they have a natural 
right or Jus naturale to estimate rationality in such direction. As Hobbes remarks:  
The Right of Nature, . . .  is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power,  
as he will himselfe, for the pre-servation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his  
own Life; and consequently, of doing anything, which is his own Judgement, and  
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.76
                                                 
74 Thommessen & Wetlesen, 1996, p. 165 
 
75 See, Gauthier, 1986, p. 158-159 
 
76 Tuck (ed.), 1991, chap. 14, p. 91 
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The above view indicates that each individual exercises this unlimited natural right or liberty 
as per their own power, in order to attain whatever is necessary to serve their self-preservation 
version of rationality. Right is estimated here as nothing but acting only for enhancing the 
given feature of self- preservation in the strongest sense. Therefore, it has nothing to do with 
the moral or judicial sense of right. This uncontrolled usage of their own natural right indeed 
leads to a conflict of interests or rationality between the individuals. In this way, hostility 
takes place between them in the purpose of increasing their self-preservation. This is how 
Hobbes explains the individual’s rationality in the natural condition, where he finds that the 
outcome of the extreme version of rationality is the cause behind the conflict between the 
individuals. 
 
- The civil condition of the individual’s rationality and solving the conflict of interests: 
 
Hobbes primarily regards the notion of the civil condition in the sense that the extreme 
maximizer subsequently agrees on solving the conflict in a peaceful way. The main purpose 
of considering this is that peace is regarded as significantly relevant for maintaining the 
prospect of their self-preservation. He points out in this regard: 
. . . a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away  
the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it  
may be best preserved.77
As we notice from the above lines, the perception of self-preservation equally plays a vital 
role in estimating the individual’s rationality in the civil condition. What will happen if the 
parties agree to solve the conflict on the basis of a set of mutual commitments? Hobbes 
estimates the mutual commitments in the sense that no one will harm, but rather help each-
other for the sake of their common good, or for the well-being of all parties. He gathers 
common norms or general rules in the framework of natural law or Lex naturalis.78 The law is 
designed to bring the parties into an agreement regulated by the principle of mutual benefit. It 
is primarily highlighted by the perception that each party respectively must admit to draw 
certain constraint on their maximizing version of rationality or their unlimited natural right. 
By considering the given event, each party tends to promote the self preservation in a well-
understanding manner, provided other or others would do the same. The renunciation of each 
party’s interests in the considered sense can be characterised as a moderate version of 
individual’s rationality. On the basis of such concession, the parties admit to reach at an 
agreement. Hence they finally manage to solve the conflict in a peaceful manner. This is how 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
 
78 Thommessen & Wetlesen, 1996, p. 165 
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Hobbes outlines his own notion of agreement or contract theory by stressing that the conflict 
of interests between individuals can be solved according to the norms of the civil condition. 
  
- Is it a stable agreement? 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, the parties emerge out of the conflict by 
acknowledging to the agreement. Nevertheless, the most crucial issue regarding the 
Hobbesian contract theory is: How would the parties comply with this? This is a practical 
problem which Hobbes himself recognises in a further assessment of the agreement. He 
accordingly remarks: It is one thing to make an agreement or covenant, but quite another to keep it.79 In 
other words, the parties have managed to make the agreement, but this does not confirm that 
they must be abided by it. Thus a considerable problem remains in the justification of why 
rational individuals should comply with the agreement. For instance, each party involved in 
the agreement considers that it is rational for them to acknowledge it if others do the same. 
They prefer to accept the agreement because each party receives benefit from the mutual 
renunciation of their self-interests, and thus they remain in a non-violent situation. But 
nonetheless, how will each party keep or follow the agreement, even though they estimate it 
according to the moderate version of the rationality? In response to this issue, each party 
emphasize that the final criterion for keeping the agreement largely depend on whether it 
provides benefit for maintaining self-preservation or not. In other words, each party examines 
it in view of the risk-cost-benefit analysis, which can be exposed in the following two 
senses:80
1. According to the rationality of each party it is found that if keeping the agreement emerges 
as a costly event in respect of determining self-preservation, he then considers that holding the 
agreement is a risk because of paying the cost. Accordingly, he prefers to violate the 
agreement, as he will be benefited by doing so. 
 2. If a moderate maximizer is somehow confirmed in the assessment of the situation, which 
tells him that the other party (or parties) adheres to the agreement, but finds that if he breaches 
the agreement it will ultimately provide him with the opportunity for a greater benefit in 
response to self-preservation, then he will do so. Or, if he finds that he has no risk or 
obligation to compensate to anybody for violating the agreement, he will rather be benefited 
by doing so. It is therefore more advantageous for him to breach the covenant on the basis of 
the given ground. 
 
                                                 
79 Gauthier, 1986, p. 160 
 
80 I formulate the views after considering the following authors: Gauthier, 1986, p. 166 – 168. And, 
Thommessen & Wetlessen, 1996, p. 166-167. 
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The central essence appearing from the two views is that if a moderate maximizer notices that 
to hold the contract turns into a risky or costly issue in the calculation of self-preservation in 
any form then it is beneficial for him to violate it. In another sense, self-preservation becomes 
the measurement by which the moderate maximizer determines whether to keep the 
agreement or not. Hobbes, however, examines carefully this event and he does not propose 
any argument in favour of holding the agreement. In stead, he surprisingly states that it is a 
matter which is subject to the individual’s rationality whether one will keep the agreement or 
not.81 In other words, the view simply suggests that a rational individual can violate the 
covenant if it is relevant for maintaining self-preservation.  
 
The problem of keeping the agreement in a stable situation eventually turns into a big 
challenge for Hobbes, too. In finding a solution to it, he allows a framework of the natural law 
based on the common norms, which will finally ensure that each party or individual will obey 
to the agreement made. He accordingly introduces the notion of a sovereign power, or a deus 
ex machina´ who can enforce the natural law between the parties.82 The sovereign ensures that 
each party will comply with the covenant made. Hobbes presumes that individuals will obey 
the sovereign, since it possesses superior power or more authoritative power than any of the 
individuals who live within the framework of the civil condition. In addition, the individuals 
acknowledge the essentiality of such a power because its function is somehow sufficient to 
maintain the civil condition effectively. Accordingly, the sovereign have capacity to take care 
of the self-preservation or the self-interests of each individual in the course of the situation. 
Thus Hobbes insists that the sovereign has valid power to enforce the natural law, which 
virtually binds the actors in common norms, and so the rational individuals will ultimately not 
breach the agreement once it is made.83 The sovereign is identified here as a political 
institution or anything else, who/which at least holds substantial power and is able to enforce 
the agreement.  
 
However, the Hobbesian pleads for the sovereign power raises immediately a powerful 
question: Could we agree to apply such power in order to solve the problem? His political 
power is based on natural law, and this kind of law is vulnerable, as it has no legal or moral 
force. Hobbes, by virtue of the political power, proposes a political, and not a moral or legal 
solution to the conflict. In contrast, the significant advantage lying in a moral solution to the 
problem is that it includes all parties into a moral obligation, whereby each individual must 
follow the agreement. Thus it provides a stable foundation for solving the conflict. This is 
                                                 
81 Gauthier, 1986, p. 161 
 
82 Ibid. p.10 
 
83 Gauthier, 1986, p. 162-163, and Thommessen & Wetlesen, 1996, p. 166-167 
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what we miss with respect to the Hobbesian concept of agreement. Lacking of such quality, 
we cannot make sure that the parties, following the maximizing version of rationality, will 
always adhere to the agreement made for them. This is why I am really reluctant to admit that 
the agreement based on the Hobbesian natural law can provide a stable solution to the conflict 
between the two parties.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, I have at first investigated the interests or rationality of India and Bangladesh 
with regard to the Ganges water from their respective point of view, and I have examined this 
issue according to the Hobbesian version of particularistic consequentialism. My main 
objective has been to justify their rationality from the viewpoint of normative assessment. 
According to the normative justification, each party must rightly meet essential conditions of 
rationality in every step of conducting their own behaviour in order to pursue the goal or 
rationality. Accordingly, my judgement is as follows: 1. I have found that the Indian choice of 
preferring the Farakka dam does not meet exactly the condition of consistency with regard to 
the other option, nor even does he manage quantitatively to identify the environmental risk 
following from the functioning of the dam. His own quantitative assessment does not address 
to the correct characterization of risk, but is only for the purpose of implementing the decision 
of running the dam, which is not consistent with the normative standpoint of the R.C.B.A. 
Thus we have found that India has actually ignored the criteria of rationality in order to 
achieve his own goal, and therefore I insist that his attainment of such rationality cannot be 
accepted from the normative qualification. 2. In response to the Indian choice, Bangladesh 
considers an equilibrium choice which appears as a quantitative version of strategic choice. 
We have found that this choice neglects the condition of choosing freely for a better 
preference, as well as not being able to insure accurately the achievement of the preferable 
quantity of water in every situation (from one situation to another). Moreover, we have found 
that he cannot, on the basis of past risk, characterize the acceptable risk for the present and 
future period in order to define a safe decision for implementing the choice. His own 
assessment of the past risk does not represent a correct estimation in order to characterize risk 
following from events of the river’s water, but only serves his purpose for implementing the 
decision, which cannot be regarded as a basis for satisfying the rational or normative criterion 
of R.C.B.A. Thus, we have found that Bangladesh has failed to satisfy the normative criteria 
of rationality, and therefore we are doubtful whether he can really reach his goal or the 
equilibrium point as result of his initial strategic choice. 3. I have lastly examined whether it 
is really possible to find a stable solution to the conflict of interests between the parties 
according to the Hobbesian version of contract theory, as it appears in the discussion of 
particularistic consequentialism. I have found that it is not possible to find a solution, as it is 
 57
viewed in the maximization version of individual’s rationality which does not guarantee this. I 
therefore find that the Hobbesian contract theory is actually not a promising view in this 
respect.  
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 Chapter 3: Who are all parties concerned? 
 
 
       “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise”.84  
(p.224-25) 
       - Aldo Leopold 
 
“. . . the best good appears to be something 
complete. So, if there is only one that is complete,  
that would be what we are searching for ; . . . .”.85
       - Aristotle  
 
 
Introduction: 
 
As we have seen in the case study, the dam does not only effect on the human state of affairs, 
but also brings adversarial and dramatic alteration in features of non-human natural entities, 
species and/or collectively the entire natural environment in the region. These features may 
essentially reflect serious problems in the given elements. This chapter will then, from a 
moral point of view, study closely not only this problem, but will also attempt to find a 
solution to it. Eventually the perception will give a complete moral view of the environmental 
situation. From a moral philosophical point of view, the following fundamental questions 
arise from the event: What, if any, should be the normative philosophical objection against the 
dam? How can this be justified? What would be a morally defined alternative policy or 
solution to the problem? And, which way can this be addressed to justify such environmental 
situation or to justify a general preservation policy for the environment? In finding answers to 
these questions I shall focus on the discussion of environmental ethics in moral philosophy 
which involves relevant facts, values and norms as criteria for systematic judgement of an 
environmental situation. In this regard I shall consider the non-anthropocentric version of 
environmental ethics. The objective is not to defend non-anthropocentrism. I shall, however, 
find that the non-anthropocentric version of environmental ethics supplies necessary and 
sufficient prospects for finding answers to the said issues. In the following, my main objective 
                                                 
84 From his book, “A Sand County Almanac”, published 1968. Each of his statements quoted from this book, 
will be identified by page number in parentheses. I shall follow this style in the following discussion of the 
chapter when the matter is considered. 
 
85  Annas, 1993, p. 39 – 40. 
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will be to examine the findings in consideration with the non-anthropocentric account of 
utilitarian moral theory. The basic moral norm of this theory is traditionally defined as 
promoting the general happiness or interests of all parties involved in a situation. In the 
Bentham account of classical utilitarianism, the sentient characteristic is regarded as the basic 
moral unit of measuring the interests of human and nonhumans who possesses the 
characteristic. I shall, however, use the sentient approach of classical utilitarianism for 
estimating the interests of non-human sentient animals. Singer defines an extensive account of 
this view where he establishes the interest of non-human sentient individual animals in equal 
moral status value as well as protecting it, in relation to fellow humans. I shall consider this 
assumption in examining the interests of the non-human sentient animals in the given 
situation. I shall find that the decision of making the dam ignores the moral status by pointing 
out significant reduction in the normal functioning of a certain individual animal as a 
representative of the non-human sentient animals in the region. Given its credibility, the 
conceptual framework of the approach nevertheless limits itself only to the non-human 
sentient animals, and does not consider other natural entities in the environmental situation. I 
shall characterize this criterion as the individualistic account of non-anthropocentric 
utilitarianism.   
  
Having accepted the credibility of the individualistic approach despite its limitations, I shall 
further casts light on Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold’s holistic account of ecological 
facts as well as its ethical aspects, illustrated in The Land Ethic. I consider this discussion to 
be significantly relevant for estimating the environmental crisis or the ecological impact of the 
dam in a complete sense. At first I shall address Callicott’s scientific account of ecology. I 
shall show how the dam produces an unhealthy functional state of the whole ecosystem in the 
region. In considering this assumption for ethical accounts, Callicott primarily concentrates 
on the value aspect of the ecological facts connected to The Land Ethic, or environmental 
ethic. He traces the value aspect in Hume’s feeling based ethical value criteria, or moral 
psychology. Callicott further explains Darwin’s evolutionary-ecological discussion of the 
whole natural environment or ecosystem in a moral account. Darwin attributes moral status to 
the feeling based values by finding that this value is the main leading force in the survival 
states, or the functioning of the whole ecosystem. I consider here that the moral status of 
Leopold’s environmental ethic is fundamentally based on Hume’s feeling based value 
perceptions. Accordingly, I shall find that the said moral status value is simply disregarded in 
the decision making of the dam. Callicott’s non-anthropocentric and non-individualistic moral 
account of the land ethic is only confined to finding the value status, and he takes no further 
attempt to set this value in norm of a particular moral theory. I shall find in this regard, that 
Aristotle’s teleological ethic of the holistic kind offers an opportunity to look upon this issue. 
Norton has a reflection of this moral theory in account for a general preservation policy. He 
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draws this holistic ethic in view with human values or well-being, whereof he considers that 
its moral norm has a promising aspect in protecting and promoting the functioning value 
rather than the feeling based moral value of the holistic ecosystem. I shall find that this policy 
is consistent with weak anthropocentrism in which an action or a dam is morally permissible 
in so far as it does not have negative affect of the functioning value of the ecosystem. I shall 
accordingly find that this functioning value account of the weak anthropocentric policy in this 
holistic ethic cannot firmly protect all parties’ interests, or the total value of the whole 
ecosystem. I consider that this is not a proper protection policy for such environmental 
situation. I shall then consider the feeling based value account of Aristotle’s holistic ethic. I 
shall find that the moral norm of this holistic ethic firmly protects and promotes the total 
value of the holistic ecosystem, where all parties’ interests are equally involved. I shall 
characterize this assumption as the non-anthropocentric version of a wider or total 
utilitarianism in environmental ethics. I consider that this ethic is properly consistent with 
such environmental situation, or with a general preservation policy for the natural 
environment. This policy will then be characterized as an alternative model or solution to the 
environmental situation in the region. 
 
These are the main elements which I shall illustrate throughout the discussion of the chapter. I 
shall arrange them in the following sense.1. As a part of this chapter I shall discuss some basic 
elements of environmental ethics. 2. I shall focus on Singer’s sentient account of 
utilitarianism. 3. I shall concentrate on Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold’s informal 
ecological and ethical discussion, which follows from the Leopold’s discussion of The Land 
Ethic.4. I shall illustrate Norton’s views of Callicott’s non-anthropocentric value account of 
ecological ethic in consideration with the moral norm of Aristotle’s holistic ethic. 5. Finally, I 
shall consider Aristotle’s holistic ethic as a wider sense of utilitarianism which moral norm is 
to be viewed as a general preservation policy for the value of the whole ecosystem.  
 
A. What is environmental ethics?  
 
As it is clearly pointed out in this perception, the dam contributes to serious problems or 
crisis, in everything from non-human natural entities to the entire natural environment in the 
region. The justification of such technologically oriented human action raises serious 
questions in the discussion of normative philosophy. Hence, this sort of environmental 
problem (or problems) turns into an ethical discussion, which emerges as a subject called 
environmental ethics. Thus environmental ethics occupy a specific place in normative 
philosophy. Environmental ethics focus on finding the values of the said natural objects in 
order to better understand the norms that offer protection for them. In this reading, the subject 
concentrates on the values of the objects not only in characterizing the quality of such action, 
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but also allows proper norms in a sense of determining the given task. Hence, I find that the 
environmental effects of the Farakka dam are greatly consistent with the discussion of 
environmental ethics. Therefore, I shall at first draw attention to the notion of values 
according to features of the environmental ethics pertaining to the said environmental 
situation. 
 
One of the first and most serious challenges in any ethical study involves identifying which 
object is to be regarded as a morally accountable value and which object is to be excluded in 
such judgement. This is a challenging issue for environmental ethics too. Moral philosophers 
or environmental ethicists allow the two following considerations in evaluating the concept of 
value. One is intrinsic or inherent value and the other is instrumental value. An object has 
intrinsic value when it holds essential characteristic or it is qualified independently for its own 
worth.86. This assumption satisfies the basic requirement in order to identify the object as a 
moral subject and so being morally considerable. Moral subjects are therefore characterized in 
terms of intrinsic value, and moral considerability is dependent on being identified by 
intrinsic value. Once an object possesses this criterion moral status value or moral status is 
attributed to it. In the view of environmental ethics, the assumption further implicates that 
when moral status value is ascribed to an object it is considered a moral subject, which in a 
way implies that the object is to be protected by moral norm. On the other hand, the notion of 
instrumental value is characterized in the sense of usefulness. This indicates that an object has 
no independent value, but depends on what it can be used for, or what it serves in fulfilling 
other’s purposes in a situation. The object then has no moral considerability or status. Thus, 
these two perceptions of value differ fundamentally from each other87. The distinction has 
significant implication in recent decades resulting in the emergence of three approaches 
within the framework of environmental ethics: 1. Strong anthropocentrism or traditional 
human centred ethics. 2. Weak anthropocentrism or pseudo anthropocentrism. 3. Non-
anthropocentrism. In the following discussion I shall briefly illustrate each of them 
respectively, whereby I shall set forth my own account. 
 
- Strong anthropocentrism: 
 
Given the value premises in the constitution of environmental ethics, anthropocentrism in its 
strongest term insists that one has to be a human being in order to have moral status value. In 
this consideration, it is necessary to be a member of the human species (Homo sapiens) in 
                                                 
86  Callicott, 1989, chap. 9, p.160.  I shall use either the term intrinsic or inherent value, according to their 
relevance in the context of the chapter.  
 
87  In some cases it might appear that the considerations of both instrumental and intrinsic value are dependent 
on humans who value. See, Des Jardins, 1993, p. 145-146.  
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order to be attributable to the said value. This implies that human beings are the only morally 
accountable member of the universe. Non-human entities, therefore, are not directly 
accounted for in this assumption. The approach further insists that non-human entities only 
have value in so far as they satisfy human values or wellbeing. In this anthropocentric 
framework humans has right to use non-human entities instrumentally as resources of one or 
another kind in order to satisfy the given goal as far as possible. In this assessment, moral 
norms are based on preserving the entities solely in terms of obtaining this instrumental goal. 
Therefore, governed by such norm, the right action is using the resources properly in 
reference to this objective. This, accordingly, recommends to humans not to abuse, overuse or 
destroy the said objects so that other or future humans can use them. This is why the approach 
is known as strong anthropocentrism, because it measures the nonhuman natural entities 
exclusively in terms of satisfying human wellbeing, in the given sense.  
 
- Weak anthropocentrism: 
 
Not all anthropocentrists agree with the viewpoint of strong anthropocentrism in that the 
natural world is to be measured only in the satisfaction of human values. Some of them 
criticize the assumption in the sense that this attitude eventually will leave the natural 
environment to the ravages of meeting the never ending satisfaction of human values. After 
referring to the problem which lies in strong anthropocentrism, they insist that it is essential to 
draw a limitation to the said calculation of human values. Hence, some environmental 
ethicists within the range of anthropocentrism appear with a softer or less radical approach 
known as weak anthropocentrism. This position lays out its argument by saying that human 
beings are intrinsically more valuable in part than non humans, because they can disclose and 
measure the worth of nonhumans.88 The assumption then qualifies humans to reform the 
notion of human values in consideration with nonhuman entities. Accordingly, weak 
anthropocentrists figure out that non humans have worth of their own, something that is 
relative to a basic or intrinsic value judgement.89 By virtue of this perception, they emphasize 
that nonhumans are not to be treated merely in an instrumental sense. They insist that this 
matter must be countenanced in the calculation of human values. Thus, weak 
anthropocentrism allows the said estimation of nonhumans in consideration of human values 
in a much broader sense than in strong anthropocentrism. Weak anthropocentrists consider 
that nonhuman entities are valuable for their contribution to compute human values in a more 
reasonable and broader sense than strong anthropocentrism. This indicates that the estimation 
of human values must correspond to the sense that it limits the damaging affect on the value 
                                                 
88 Zimmerman, (Gen.ed.), 1993, p.vii-viii. 
 
89 Norton, 1987, p. 10-14. 
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of non-human entities. On the basis of such value account, a weak anthropocentrist constitutes 
a moral norm whereby human can protect or limit the exploitation of nonhuman entities as 
well as satisfy their own values. Having considered the purpose of the norm in this way, a 
weak anthropocentrist then, finds no reason for attributing intrinsic value to nonhuman 
entities. This is why weak anthropocentrism is regarded as a form of anthropocentrism, as it 
does not ascribe moral status value to the said object. 
 
- Non-anthropocentrism: 
 
Given the weak anthropocentrism’s consideration for the wider assessment of human values, 
scepticism nevertheless arises among a number of environmental ethicists whether the 
approach can sufficiently or conclusively prohibit injury to non-humans as long as it allows 
the said object into instrumental assessment. The concerned moral philosophers orchestrate 
their view by pointing out that the weak anthropocentrism is conceptually inadequate to 
ensure firm safeguard for the said object as strictly as any ethical argument require. They 
assume that progress can only be made in ending this scepticism, and so such sort of 
environment crisis, once we bring a complete change in our anthropocentric ethical attitudes 
toward the object. Hence, a room for non-anthropocentric assumption comes up forefront in 
the work of the said environmental ethicists. Contrary to the anthropocentric views, non-
anthropocentrism places its key argument in the form that nonhuman natural entities and/or 
nature as a whole have own quality more than instrumental value. That is; they have their own 
moral status value. Non anthropocentrism reduces the issue to the question of whether 
intrinsic value encompasses other than humans and is including non humans as well. In other 
words, the approach eliminates the gap between human and nonhumans. Thus, the approach 
allows human and nonhumans in moral consideration. Non-anthropocentrists, therefore, argue 
that the consideration has a genuine moral force in protecting the moral status of the object. 
On the basis of such value premise, they consider an environmentally-sensitive moral norm 
which appeals to morally right action in relation to protect and promote the wellbeing of both 
human and nonhumans as a whole. The approach is accordingly known as non-
anthropocentrism, as it considers value and norm in the same moral equation. 
 
In the following discussion I shall find, in view with our concerned environmental situation, 
that non-anthropocentrism is a more convincing approach than the two other approaches of 
environmental ethics. Accordingly, the main task of this approach is to establish a new stage 
of moral philosophy which goes beyond the barrier of human species, and encompasses the 
values of non-human natural entities in equal moral consideration. In this way they will be 
equally protected in an environmental situation. This explicitly gives moral awareness and so 
concern for environmental problems following from such a human action as a moral problem 
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in the first place. Non-anthropocentricism is then directly and effectively addressing the 
problem as a fundamental ethical matter and so effectively insists that it must be solved 
morally. In finding the moral protection of such environmental situation, it recommends 
moral norms ensuring protection and so prosperity to individual as well all beings involved in 
the natural environment. The assumption, therefore, gives me plausible justification for 
considering the non-anthropocentric approach when dealing with the environmental situation 
following from the dam in this region. Non-anthropocentrists examine nonhuman problems 
according to their considered moral theory, stretching it to individual living organisms, non-
living organisms, species as well as the whole nature or ecosystem. Accordingly, I shall in the 
following discussion focus on the environmental crisis resulting from the dam.   
 
B. The dam and the moral status of nonhuman animals in individualistic non-
anthropocentrism: 
  
Following from the dam in this region, how can the affected parties of nonhuman living 
entities as well as the entire natural environment be addressed in the framework of normative 
philosophy? Some moral philosophers in their non-anthropocentric approach have found that 
it is easy to trace out the components of the nonhuman living entities in the natural 
environment which exists nearby or somehow is familiar to human beings. Hence, they have 
come up with the perception that the nonhuman animals which are severely affected by such a 
human action should be considered in the front line of moral scrutiny.90 The assumption, then, 
permits me at first to shed light on the said being as one of the affected parties resulting from 
the situation. However, once they allow this, the following fundamental issues appear before 
them in respect of the moral inquiry: Do the nonhuman animals have moral status value to be 
accounted for in the moral framework? How can this be explained? And, what would be the 
philosophical justification of such perception? The Australian philosopher Peter Singer can be 
regarded as one of the prominent figures exclusively concerned with such matters in his moral 
philosophical discussion. His main argument appeals for extension of the moral horizon to 
include nonhuman living animals in equal moral consideration. In a way they will be entitled 
to proper treatment as well as protection against such human activities. He elaborately 
illustrates the view in his book called, “Animal Liberation”, first published in 1975.  
 
- Singer’s critical assessment of the human centred ethics: 
 
Singer mainly blames the mistreatment of non-human animals as an outcome of the 
traditional view of human centred ethics. He points out that in its practice no room is actually 
                                                 
90 Singer, 1975, p. vii–x, and Des Jardins, 1993, p.123. 
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left to give direct moral weight on the nonhuman animals. The perception does not even make 
any significant objection against abusing or exploiting animals in an instrumental sense of 
attaining human’s goal in a relevant situation. It does not matter what affect it makes on the 
state of the said animal, as long as the event does not turn into a factor of concern for humans. 
Singer uncovers that such prejudice actually lies behind or constitute the given type of 
human’s decision or behaviour. He therefore characterizes the behaviour as a morally 
unjustifiable attitude to the animals following from the traditional view.91 This is why he 
blames the practice of the said ethics for needlessly creating miserable states for the animals 
in such a situation. This incentive strongly influences him to point out that the main objective 
of the book is to liberate animals from such unjustifiable assessment, and so to find a way to 
allow them into equal moral consideration to humans. He is thus persuaded to entitle the book 
“Animal Liberation”.92 After considering its biasness only towards humans, Singer 
emphatically insists that we must disregard this version of anthropocentrism. Rather, we 
should expand our moral dimension, which is not to be restricted arbitrarily to humans, and 
show an unbiased assessment or a basic route in order to allow non-human animals in equal 
consideration.93 Hence, Singer assumes that the non-anthropocentric approach provides such a 
road-map in expanding the moral world involving equal estimation of the said element. We 
thus consider that his expansive moral view will be significantly consistent with regard to 
measure the condition for the given object in relation to the situation. Accordingly, I shall first 
follow his argument regarding the moral expansion of finding non-human animals in equal 
consideration. Thereafter, I shall examine the way he defends this against certain criticism 
following from the argument as a part of the justification.  
 
- Singer’s extensive account of classical utilitarianism and equal consideration of the 
non-human individual animals’ interests: 
 
As Singer allows the non-anthropocentric approach as a sensible notion for calculating 
mistreatment of the nonhuman animals in such a situation, then the most crucial question to 
ask him is: Who is to speak for them in ascribing moral status value in equal consideration to 
humans? In response to this issue, he cites a worthy sentence from the viewpoint of Bentham: 
“The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer ?”94 By using this sentence, 
                                                 
91  Singer, 1975, p. x – xii, and Singer, 1994, p. 265. The term animals I understand in the sense of non-human 
animals. This notion will be followed throughout this section of the chapter, although I shall use the term animal 
in some places in accordance with flavour of the sentence. 
 
92 See, Singer, 1975, p., xii-xiii. 
 
93 Singer, 1975, p. x., and Føllesdal (ed.), 2000, p. 66. 
 
94 Singer, 1975, p.8.  
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Singer argues that the capacity to suffer or feel pain is an essential characteristic for the 
consideration of interests into the moral world. This accordingly implies sentience, or the 
capability of consciousness, to be regarded as a vital criterion in order to ascribe moral status 
value, and so for estimating the interests of its possessor in an equal moral consideration. 
Accordingly, Singer finds an essential analogy from human's interests in feeling pleasure and 
avoiding pain, to similar interests in other sentient beings of non-human living animals. He 
then emphasizes the view that this analogical characteristic is straightforwardly relevant for 
measuring the interests of the nonhuman individual animals in equal moral consideration. 
Singer thus takes the sentient characteristic as a reference point in extending the moral world, 
which allows him to measure equally both the interests of humans and non-human animals 
within the given circle of morality.95 Hence, he assumes that the sentient version of classical 
utilitarianism is essentially able to expand the moral world and measures equally the interests 
of human and non-human animals in a non-anthropocentric sense. 
 
Singer considers the term “sentience” in order to refer to the capacity of feeling pain or 
pleasure. Accordingly, sentience appears as an essential criterion which is intrinsically 
valuable for estimating the essential state of the said being. A sentient animal then, has the 
strong claim that it has at least a minimal interest; i.e., the relevant interests of a life without 
suffering. This is a central condition which must be satisfied in a meaningful explanation of 
the interests of animals. Without the quality of sentience - a rock, for example, cannot be said 
to have interests at all, because it has not such capacity. But, if a sentient animal suffers, there 
can be no moral justification for refusing to take the event into account. Armed with this 
consideration, Singer explicitly demonstrates that the capacity to feel pain or pleasure is all 
which is needed for an individual animal in determining equal consideration of interests. 
Therefore, this characteristic has itself the essential and sufficient normative force to attribute 
moral status value on the said being. The status similarly leads to consideration for the moral 
protection of the said animal’s interests. The characteristic then allows for moral status value 
as well as the equal protection of the said being, in a relevant situation. This is how the 
interests of an individual animal are to be adequately regarded as the right one. In other 
words, Singer actually regards the right of animals in consideration with the interests 
identified by the sentient characteristic.96 Accordingly, he insists that the moral status of any 
particular act or decision must be dependent on the satisfaction of the said requirement of the 
                                                 
95  By virtue of “the principle of equality”, Singer is not claiming that all sentient animals have the same 
interests, or non-human animals deserve identical treatment as humans, but the principle actually appeals for 
equal consideration of the fundamental interests to all conscious beings. See, Singer, 1975, p. 2-6. 
 
96 A parallel argument is followed by Tom Regan, in his discussion of animal ethic. He straightforwardly 
considers right based ethics whereby he asserts that subject - of - a - life is to be regarded a vital criterion in 
attributing the moral status value, and so protects the right of non-human individual animals, in a relevant 
situation. He discusses comprehensively the event in his book called “The Case For Animal Rights” published in 
1983. I consider the notion from the following source: Des Jardins, 1993, p. 128 – 135. 
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animal's interests. Thus he sets up the corner stone in constituting the animal ethic. 
Discounting this requirement in any rate, the action will be regarded as morally unjustifiable. 
Therefore, the central piece of Singer’s animal ethic, or the said version of classical 
utilitarianism, argues that an action is morally right if it minimizes the pain (or the bad) and 
maximizes the pleasure (or the good) of the non-human sentient animals involved in a 
situation.  
  
- The assessment of animal interests: 
 
As we have seen in the preceding discussion, Singer's extensive account of the sentient 
characteristic upgrades the said animals as an actual party involved directly in a situation of 
decision making. And so, this gives them a moral ground in the equal consideration of 
interests as well. In other words, the moral justification of the decision lies in the assumption 
that the suffering of animals should be calculated in equal consideration with the like 
suffering of humans, in a relevant situation. But nonetheless, how can the interests of the said 
animals exactly be defined against the pain according to the given version of classical 
utilitarianism? In other words, how should the pleasure of the said animals be measured 
against the pain? The interests of the animals are regarded here in terms of avoiding 
experiences of pain. The assumption insists that they must exist without experiences of pain.   
This can (for example) appear in the sense that they have a normal functioning in terms of 
taking in nutrition, growth, reproduction as well as attaining and fulfilling their appetites as 
far as possible.97 This, in another sense, simply implies that the animals have the interests of 
existing with the normal physiological activities of life as long as there is no experience of 
pain. If the individual animals experience that the given interests cease, they feel pain. The 
questions, however, highlighted in dealing with the pain or the interests of the animals, are: 
Do animals feel pain? And, how can one know this? In an effort of finding a justifiable 
answer to the questions, Singer precisely points out that pain is a state of consciousness, 
which is part of a "mental event". And so, this event can never be observed. One can only 
infer that animals feel pain by looking at external objects of behaviours, or the physiological 
states of animals, in various forms. With such indications, the individual animals make 
attention either in a purpose of avoiding sources of pain or exposing feelings of pain.98  This 
indicates that animals have “consciousness” that feels pain, and they exposes it through 
various senses of external or physiological activities. Singer thus brings on the view that 
animals feel pain which is revealed in various forms of external events, in the same way as 
humans do in similar situations. This is how he defines that the notion of pain or pleasure 
                                                 
97 Des Jardins, 1993, p. 27, and Føllesdal ( ed.), 2000, p. 85 - 86. 
 
98 Singer, 1975, p. 12. 
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appears as an essential criterion for measuring sufficiently the interests of the said beings in 
the equal moral consideration. He finds that this assumption fundamentally allow for 
ascribing equal moral status value to the non-human sentient animals. He accordingly 
considers that the sentient characteristic expands the moral dimension beyond humans to 
include the said non-humans in the non-anthropocentric sense. We therefore find that the 
sentient version of classical utilitarianism is essentially compatible with non-
anthropocentrism.  
 
- The assessment of fish interests: 
 
Given the moral status value of the sentient animals, it is then useful for us to follow an 
example from the concerning situation in order to get a clear picture regarding the suffering of 
morally accountable animal interests.  My main objective will be to use Singer’s extensive 
account of the said utilitarianism in this regard. By calculating the sentient characteristic, I 
shall find that the dam ignores the moral status value in the considered situation. I shall finally 
show that the said version of utilitarianism stands firmly against damming the river. 
Accordingly, I take the suffering of fish in which we shall find that fish experiences various 
forms of unpleasant situation analogous to pain resulting from the dam. This suffering 
involves abnormality and declination of physiological activities or functioning, which leads to 
reduction in the normal birth rate of fish and so on. How then can the interests or suffering of 
fish be exactly known? I suppose in this regard it will be worthwhile to concentrate on a 
particular type of fish in consideration with the case study. The assumption might help us to 
estimate the pain of other fish as well. Accordingly, I shall consider a popular fish in the 
region known as “Hilsa”. Traditionally it used to be known that the delta of the river Padma is 
a habitat for a huge number of Hilsa fish”.99 As a result of the dam this is no longer a fact. It is 
therefore sensible to take the suffering of this fish into account.  
 
It is a normal conception that each individual member of animals adapts itself to a certain set 
of climatic conditions in which it lives and evolves further. This perception is similarly 
relevant to the Hilsa fish which essentially used to live under a certain set of climatic 
conditions of water. The quality of the water is one of them. The quality largely depends on a 
specific type of water stream, something which is directly connected with the natural tide of 
the river in the said region. This criterion is inevitably needed in maintaining not only the 
prospects of survival, but provides suitable ground for the breeding of the said fish as well. 
This is how this condition is directly attached with the interests of the fish in the sense of 
present and future accounts. The dam severely affects on this criterion by reducing the normal 
                                                 
99 It is not necessary, but useful to repeat again that in Bangladesh Padma is another name for the river Ganges. 
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tide, and subsequently leads to an increasing level of salinity in the river's water. The fish 
experiences completely different and unusual circumstances as a consequence of the event, 
which has never happened before the building of the dam. Thus, in various ways the incident 
produces severe negative impacts on the relevant interests of the fish's life in terms of its 
physiological activities. This has ultimately emerged as a gradual reduction in the number of 
the existing population as well as a reduction in the normal birth rate of the fish. On the other 
hand, the reduction of fish favours significantly an increase in the population of other aquatic 
organisms (for instance insects, plants and so on) which fish would eat them. The increase of 
these elements adversely affects on the population equilibrium or the aquatic ecosystem in 
which the Hilsa fish belong. In the way this becomes a further unsustainable cause for fish 
functioning in the river.100 The result of a deteriorating state in the normal activities clearly 
implies that fish is suffering gravely. This feeling of a displeasure state is directly relevant 
matter in the normative calculation of pleasure or pain, and so for the given account of 
classical utilitarianism. The said estimation therefore allows the interests of fish in the moral 
consideration. The estimation accordingly produces the perception that the decision of 
building the dam simply underestimates and so ignores the moral status value of the fish. This 
equally means that the protection of fish’s interests is not considered in making this decision. 
By the same token one can examine the suffering of other fish, or other sentient animals, 
familiar to human beings in the region. Apart from the concerned case, Singer’s animal ethic 
can for instance measure the interests of the sentient animals who belong to the vertebrate and 
who easily can be intercepted in the range of human observation.101 In other words, Singer 
eventually establishes the fact that the sentient characteristic essentially bring about an 
effective normative standard in composing the requirement of animal ethics, whereby he 
adequately estimates the interests of the said beings in equal consideration, or right direction. 
He therefore regards that the consideration of the said characteristic allows a justifiable 
ground for adopting classical utilitarianism in framing the given ethic. This is how Singer's 
animal ethic corresponds directly to the given form of utilitarianism. 
 
- The justification for the equal consideration of animal interests: 
 
Although one can examine the pain or the interests of animals by observing external signs of 
behaviour, nevertheless a crucial issue makes great attention in the discussion of Singer's 
animal ethics: How can the pain of animals be known equivalent to that of humans? A 
persuasive answer to this issue is genuinely important, because this will give the ultimate 
                                                 
100 I am not interested in following a further discussion regarding the aquatic or marine ecosystem, as it is not 
the objective of this part of the discussion. 
 
101 Singer, 1975, p. 12 – 13. 
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justification for allowing the interests of non-human sentient animals in an equal moral 
consideration or a non-anthropocentric account. The gravity of the matter emerges as a crucial 
factor for Singer too. He then assumes that to a certain extent, it is essential for him to find 
something common to human and non-human animals. What is this element? And, how is it 
significant to the concerning matter? In this regard he casts light on a particular section in the 
brain of human and non-human sentient beings. He points out that the non human animals 
have a nervous system which is very similar to the human one.102 The main function of it is to 
respond physiologically as human beings do when the animal is in equal circumstances as to 
which humans also feel pain. However, in this course of the discussion he acknowledges the 
fact that humans have a more developed part of the brain concerned with thinking functions, 
rather than with basic impulses, emotions, and feelings. These impulses, emotions, and 
feelings are located in diencephalon, which is well developed in many other species of 
animals, especially mammals and birds.103 They respond in much of an identical way in 
similar situations in which they feel pain or experience suffering. Accordingly, the nervous 
system has capacity to feel pain and exhibits it in similar ways of physiological or external 
behavioural signs. Thus Singer justifies the argument that animals have the same nervous 
system to feel pain or suffering analogous to pain, and that it appears in the same manner as 
humans do. Therefore, the suffering of pain or the interests of the said animals must be 
viewed in equal consideration.  
 
Singer’s justification for the equal consideration of the said animal’s interests does not 
necessarily imply that he did not receive any criticism regarding the matter. One of the 
relevant criticisms can be followed in conformity with the current flavour of the discussion. 
Accordingly, human beings can express existence of pain by speaking out in language, while 
animals cannot. Why then should the suffering of an animal’s pain be equally measured? In 
response to this criticism, Singer figures out that every human being do not have equal 
capacity to express pain in language. He particularly points out that human infants and young 
children are unable to use language in a situation where they feel pain. Should it then be 
denied that a year old child feel pain? No one will do so. The child normally displays pain by 
external behaviour in various ways. An adult person can sufficiently understand it, in the light 
of his own behaviour. Equally the person can also understand the behavioural signs of animal 
pain in a similar manner. This is therefore not an issue of what ability human and non-human 
animals might possess. The main thing is here that they have the characteristic of equal 
consciousness of feeling pain and exposing it in the same behavioural signs, in the same 
situation. Accordingly, Singer comes up with the strong claim suggesting that one should not 
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explain the feelings of an individual animal’s pain in a different way. He therefore infers that 
there is no reason to deny the assumption that non-human animals feel pain equivalent to that 
of humans. The behavioural signs are accordingly an important element in estimating the 
pain. This is how Singer finds that the equal consideration of the sentient characteristic 
provides a firm ground to measure the interests of human and nonhuman in the non-
anthropocentric sense. He thus cements the view that the equal consideration of pain or 
pleasure is an essential element which can sufficiently measure the interests of the animals in 
a situation where it is of direct concern for them.104 The massage which stems from the said 
argument actually emphasizes that the signs of physiological or external activities of fish or 
other sentient animals imply that they experience pain as result of damming a river. 
According to the given version of utilitarianism then, the decision to build the dam is not to be 
regarded as the right one at all. The dam simply produces total suffering or pain rather than 
pleasure to non-human sentient animals in the region. This is how we find that Singer’s 
animal ethic, or the classical utilitarianism of Bentham, is a powerful argument against 
building a dam on a river. This is equally true for the Farakka dam as well. 
 
- The limitation of Singer’s animal ethic: 
 
As we have found, Singer’s extensive account of the sentient criterion allows the interests of 
the individual members of many animal species for moral consideration, and so for protection 
as well, in the ethical decision making. Accordingly, the assumption lays out an initially 
promising account for extending the moral concern to some important individual animals 
which in the situation are threatened with the result of such human action. But nevertheless, 
his individualistic account of the animal ethic is not capable of measuring the situation of 
others who are not entitled with this criterion. Moreover, the approach is mostly concerned 
with the animals that are easily intercepted in human’s observation. Therefore, the assumption 
cannot provide the basis for a comprehensive guideline for evaluating the situation for many 
other environmental elements which are seriously affected by the dam. They are, for instance; 
various types of living organisms, wild species, endangered animal species, wild forest as 
well as collectively the whole ecosystem or ecological community in the region. We thus find 
that the sentient approach fails in providing a satisfactorily complete or comprehensive theory 
which can allow the said issues into moral consideration. This is why Singer’s extensive 
account of classical utilitarianism is not regarded as a full-fledged non-anthropocentric 
version of environmental ethic. It is in other words known as the individualistic account of 
anthropocentrism. Although Singer’s animal ethic has such limitations, nevertheless he 
persuasively argues that the interests of the said individual animals must not be ignored 
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resulting from such an environmental crisis. Thus the sentient approach sets out the initial 
stage, or at least put finger on the further route for discussing other problems in the 
environment following from the dam. Therefore I have found that the individualistic account 
of the sentient approach, at least have an important place in calculating the said situation in 
the light of non-anthropocentrism. Within such a positive account, we shall in the following 
discussion, however, look for a broader view which precisely considers the various aspects of 
the said environmental or ecological problem, according to the said version of environmental 
ethic. 
 
C. The dam and the eco-centric view as the complete aspect of non-anthropocentrism: 
 
Once we are concerned with various facts of the ecological implication of the dam in a 
complete sense, it is then essential for us to allow such a broader assumption which 
sufficiently includes all aspects of the natural environment into the framework. That is an eco-
centric view of the natural world. This assumption indicates that ecology must play a primary 
role in understanding the facts as well as finding the value of the natural world. This attempt 
will not only figure out the ecological facts, but in a complete sense also provides a genuine 
ground for accounting the moral concern following from the adversarial environmental affect 
of the dam. In a way the assumption will eventually facilitate a moral ground for making an 
alternative decision model, which will equally protect the morally accountable value or 
interests of the entire natural environment in relation to such a situation. Extending the stand-
point of our discussion from the individual organisms to the eco-centric approach requires us 
to find answers to the following leading questions: How can we know the ecological facts of 
the said region? What would be the accountable element of which to allow into moral 
consideration? And finally, what should be an alternative decision model or action in 
accordance with the morally acceptable term following from the given sense? The sensible 
answers to these questions will, in the following discussion, be regarded as significantly 
relevant in order to know the environmental impact of the dam on its various objects as well 
as knowing the total account of it. The assumption will further lead to estimate the object into 
moral consideration. This will, in another sense, eventually help us to find out the reason why 
the dam is not to be morally acceptable and so for finding a moral protection for the said 
environment. 
 
- The eco-centric view of Aldo Leopold: 
 
In an attempt to examine and find suitable answers to the issues considered in the above 
paragraph, it is useful for us to allow an eco-centric view which is concerned with various 
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matters of the ecological situation in a comprehensive and complete sense. This view then 
will be relevant in dealing with our considered case. Accordingly, I find that the holistic or 
eco-centric approach of Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), will be the most sensible one and the one 
most consistent with reference to the situation. The following reasons can be addressed in this 
regard:  
a. He considers the ecological events of the natural environment from a total point of view.  
b. He puts major emphasis on explaining facts of the environment according to the said 
standpoint. 
c. His eco-centric discussion shows a way of finding the moral value of the ecological facts or 
the relevant environmental situation, and so further urges for a moral protection of this value. 
d. He mainly examines the facts from a non-individualistic and non-anthropocentric point of 
view. 
e. His moral account of the eco-centric approach appears as not precisely adhering to a 
particular normative philosophical theory, but this remains an open discussion in moral 
philosophy so far.  
 
On basis of the given factors mentioned in the above, I consider that Leopold's holistic 
version of the ecological discussion will significantly be compatible in dealing with the said 
environmental situation. The interesting matter is that he is not a philosopher, but a forester 
and wild life ecologist by profession. This background does not sufficiently support him to 
address various ecological affairs purely in a philosophical manner. But nevertheless, the 
profession has supported him enormously in order to obtain substantial knowledge concerning 
the ecological world. This knowledge he subsequently puts in the shape of essays. The essays 
finally appear in form of a book called, “A Sand County Almanac” published in 1949. The 
book is composed of three sections. In part one and two, he portrays the ecological ideas, 
something which appears in a poetic and abstract sense. The last section contains a summary 
of the arguments conveyed in the previous sections. We notice here a relatively more 
systematic and concrete discussion compared to the previous parts regarding the ecological 
ideas as well as its principles. A famous essay called, The Land Ethic is situated in this 
section. The essay explicitly focuses on description of ecology as well as finding a moral 
direction.105 This is why it is regarded as a pivotal section of the whole book. In containing 
such valuable information of the natural environment, the book receives great recognition in 
the discussion of environmental philosophy. The contemporary environmental philosopher J. 
Baird Callicott can be regarded as a leading interpreter of Leopold’s book. His main task is to 
interpret the informal discussion of ecology and moral aspects of the book in a systematic 
way. In this consideration, he gives a major focuses on such areas of The Land Ethic in great 
detail. This discussion has recently been published in several books. In understanding the 
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given aspects of The Land Ethic I shall primarily focus on his discussion, but I shall also 
consider other philosophers’ views in accordance with the requirement of the discussion. In 
the following step I shall at first concentrate on the relevant facts of ecology as part of 
accounting for the environmental impact of the dam. Afterwards, I shall focus on the ethical 
aspect of The Land Ethic which follows from the discussion of ecology. 
 
- What is ecology?  
 
Once we are concerned with evaluating a total account of the ecological effects of the dam, 
then the most crucial question follows: How can we effectively know such effects? In finding 
answer to this issue, Leopold states: “That task has fallen to the new science of ecology”.106 Hence, 
Callicott considers that the scientific account of ecology will form a persuadable ground for 
explaining the ecological ideas of The Land Ethic. Ecology has been considered a basic tool 
for investigating adequately the various issues of the natural environment. Ecology actually 
represents a formal discussion of knowing scientifically the events of the whole natural 
environment in a relevant situation. Ecology, in this sense, does not differ conceptually from 
the natural environment. Their discussion materials lie in the same matrix. I shall therefore 
use the term ecology or natural environment in the same manner, depending largely on the 
context of the discussion. Thus I find that Callicott’s sense of ecological discussion will be 
consistent with the purpose of knowing the ecological effects of the dam. What then is 
ecology in the said account? How can it be explained in connection with the said situation? 
And, what would be a suitable direction in doing so?  I shall primarily search for answers to 
these issues in the ecological aspect of the following discussion.  
 
Let me first focus then on some basic and relevant facts following from ecology. Ecology is 
the study of relationships between living organisms and non-living organisms in a region. The 
relationships bind both organisms - plants, animals, air, soil and water - into a constant 
interaction.107 In this way, the arrangement of the organisms and their relations to one-another 
is constituted by a coherent whole, or a complete natural process generally known as an 
ecosystem. Thus the organisms or members are related to the ecosystem. According to this, 
living organisms cannot survive as an isolated entity without being supported by the physical 
organisms to which they are related in the system. The interdependencies and 
interconnectedness between the organisms make the way for considering the ecological 
discussion as holistic or holism. This is why the eco-centric approach is a holistic rather than 
an individualistic one. However, the ecological relationships define nature or the 
                                                 
106 Callicott in Zimmerman (Gen.ed.), 1993, p.110. 
 
107 I am here concerned with the terrestrial view of the ecological relationship between the given elements. 
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characteristic of the holistic ecosystem. Accordingly, the section which studies closely this 
event, or the evolutionary-ecological relationships of the whole ecosystem, or simply the 
ecological community, is known as the evolutionary aspect of ecology. Thus the notion of 
evolution is inevitably associated with the framework of ecology.108 Struggle and death lie at 
the very heart of evolution. However, the evolutionary account of ecological relationships in a 
way formulates a social picture, or reveals a functional feature of the whole community. 
Leopold identifies this functional feature of the ecosystem as a “Land” or “The Land 
Community”. He states: “That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, - - - (viii)”.109 
Accordingly, all individuals including humans are regarded as normal members of the land 
community. In other words, human beings represent an equal member of the community. 
Humans therefore have no privileged status in the said account. Hence, the ecological 
discussion actually puts a non-anthropocentric essence in characterizing the ecological 
community. 
 
The presence of the evolutionary-ecological mechanism or the functional characteristic 
virtually attributes a living entity to the whole land community. The land is then no longer 
being viewed as a passive, or something like a dead community, but endowed with a living 
soul in a way. Hence, the land community is identified as a living whole, or in Leopold's term: 
One humming community.110 Flavoured with this qualification, Leopold interprets the land 
community in the sense of a biotic community. Each member has so far a specific or social 
role in maintaining the overall functioning of the community. By virtue of the functional 
characteristic, the environmentalists or ecologists can closely study the healthy and unhealthy, 
or the good and bad states of the whole biotic community. This is how Leopold finds that this 
functional account will be significantly relevant in order to calculate the various facts of the 
community concerning an environmental situation. I therefore, find in this regard that it will 
be helpful for me to concentrate on the functional account of the biotic community, as the 
assumption not only will provide me with adequate knowledge regarding the existence of the 
members, but also the various activities which take place between them, which has great 
impact on maintaining the functional criterion of the said community.111 In other words, this 
will allow me to know how the dam jeopardizes the fulfilment of the said activities between 
members of the community in an unexpected sense, which actually destabilizes the 
functioning criterion of the biotic community of the Sundarbans in terms of integrity, 
stability, and beauty, or the healthy functional state of the whole ecosystem in the region. As 
                                                 
108 I have considered the notion of ecology from the following books: Callicott in Zimmerman (Gen. ed.), 1993, 
p. 116-121, and Des Jardins, 1993, p. 207. 
 
110 Callicott, summer 1982, vol. 4. nr. 2., p. 173. 
 
111 I have considered certain aspects regarding the functional account of the biotic community from the 
following source:  Des Jardins, 1993, p. 181-82. 
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described in the case study, the members of the community are the Royal Bengal tiger, plants, 
trees, birds as well as other living and non-living elements. The functional model of the 
community defines that the importance of the Bengal tigers, or any other natural objects, lies 
in its role or its activities in maintaining the stability and integrity of the whole ecosystem. 
The perception further insists that the destruction or exploitation of such an organ must be 
investigated according to the given scale of the community. 
 
-  A functional structural view of the entire ecological community: 
 
Given the role of the ecological relationships between the natural elements, this assumption 
accordingly has raised the following questions in relation to the functioning of the entire 
biotic community in the region. How can the role of the individual organs or the ecological 
relationships be exactly known according to the functional model of the said community? 
And, what actually happens to the relationships in the normal functional state of the object as 
a result of the dam? Leopold points out in this regard that it will be useful at first to focus on a 
complete functional structural picture of a land community in view with the ecological 
activities between the members of the said object. In this reading, he precisely notices that 
two basic ecological factors, in the sense of food chain and energy flow, have an enormous 
role in maintaining a continuous and smooth functioning of the biotic community. In 
consideration of their importance, they are known as the economy of nature or the life 
supporting element of the said community. On basis of the given considerations, he assumes 
that we in fact can make a way of examining and so eventually finding the impact of such 
human action on the fellow members as well as collectively the whole community in a 
relevant situation. Accordingly, I shall look at the next step of Leopold’s accounts regarding 
the functional structural view of a land community in conformity with the said two factors. I 
shall in this regard consider certain facts which follow from the given situation. In a way, this 
will further help me to look at how the dam seriously degrades the stable function of the 
whole ecosystem in the region. 
 
- The land pyramid and the food chain: 
 
In an account of estimating the ecological relationships of a functioning biotic community, 
Leopold draws a complex image of a land pyramid or biotic pyramid in the sense of a highly 
organized structure composed of biotic and abiotic elements through which solar energy 
flows.112 He represents the structure by drawing a pyramid consisting of layers, where the 
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bottom is soil; a plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent 
layer on the insects, and so on up through various animal species including humans to the 
apex layer, which consists of the larger carnivores. Leopold figures out that each successive 
layer depends on those below it for food and often for other services to those above. Thus 
species are arranged in layers by reference to what it eats and by what eats it. In this account, 
there must be numerically more members of a prey species than its predators (tigers and lions 
are for instance regarded as predators). Otherwise the predators would simply starve. 
Similarly, there is plenty supply of plants to feed to the countable number of herbivores (deer, 
rabbits, wild cows are for example herbivores). This is why, proceeding from the lower layer 
and upwards, each successive layer of species decreases in numerical abundance. 
Accordingly, the population of species is arranged by the availability of their supply of food. 
The arrangement of species in the system thus forms a pyramidal shape.113 The lines of 
dependency for food and other relevant services are called food chains:  
  Each species, including ourselves, is a link in many chains. The deer eats a hundred  
plants other than oak, and the cow a hundred plants other than corn. Both, then, are  
links in a hundred chains. The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem  
disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to be a highly organized  
structure. Its functioning depends on the co-operation and competition of its  
diverse parts (215). 
         
In accordance with the above facts of the food chains, I shall now consider a food chain with 
reference to members of the ecological community of the Sundarban forest. The assumption 
will support me to know the role the individual organism play in activities of the food chain 
as a part of maintaining the healthy functioning of the entire ecosystem. The food chain, for 
instance, can be followed with the given composition: Soil - plant - deer - Bengal tiger. Let 
me assume that the arrangement of the relative populations of tigers, deer (or grazer animals) 
and plants are figured out by the habitat's capacity, or according to the structural notion of the 
land pyramid of the region. The viability of the arrangement further indicates that the number 
of deer and tigers are accounted proportionate to the availability of their supply of food linked 
within the food chain. In a way, they constitute a stable population in the forest. But 
nevertheless, this is always not the case. In many situations it appears that unchecked 
population or overpopulation itself, in fact threatens the stability of the deer population or the 
                                                                                                                                                        
112 I understand the term “land pyramid” in the sense that it does not differ conceptually from the following 
terms: land community, ecological community, ecosystem, biotic community and so on. Each term will be 
understood in the perspective of a “whole”. For example in the sense: ecosystem as a whole or the whole 
ecosystem. In some cases, it might appear that I refer only to “the ecosystem” in stead of telling “the whole 
ecosystem”. This will be considered for the sake of maintaining the contextual feature of a sentence, but is to be 
regarded as the “whole” aspect of the said term.  
 
113. Leopold, 1968, p. 214-220. In the considered pages Leopold describes various aspects of the land 
community which compose a section called “The Land Pyramid”. 
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integrity of entire ecosystem within which they live. For example; sometimes over-abundance 
of deer can make it impossible for their food plants to survive or reproduce, something which 
might create a considerable problem in the integration of the said ecosystem. But 
nevertheless, the ecological relationships of the functional ecosystem have its own 
contribution in solving the problem. When the deer population increases, plentiful of food is 
then available in the food chain for the tiger, and this makes it relatively easier for the tigers to 
obtain food. In this chain, deer are herbivores and prey of the tigers known as carnivores or 
predators. This is their social role in the given space. Thus the tigers stabilize the 
overpopulation of the grazing animals.114 Similarly, we find that the Bengal tiger’s role is not 
to be characterized simply as relating to catching the prey, but also being identified as 
insuring a stable number of the deer population in the ecosystem. In other words, the tiger's 
role in the food chain contributes significantly to the integrity and the stability of the 
ecosystem of the forest. Thus, the food chain evolves as one of the main ecological factors in 
maintaining the stable functioning of the ecosystem in the region. 
 
- The energy model: 
 
In the above discussion, Leopold clearly figures out who the species are, and how the 
interaction between two different species, or the symbiotic relationships in the food chains, 
contributes to a smooth functioning of the land pyramid. Moreover, we perceive from the 
assumption ensuing from the example that the importance of an individual organism lies in its 
role of insuring the stability and integrity of the living organisms in the food chain. However, 
Leopold perceives the fact that ecological relationships precede from one event to another. 
Accordingly, he points out the next event of the relationship, which follows immediately after 
organisms receive food in the eco-systemic process. The event is identified as energy flow. 
Hence, energy flow emerges as another basic factor characterizing the stable functioning of 
the land pyramid, or the ecosystem. A description of the ecosystem, accordingly, begins with 
the involvement of solar energy. Solar energy enters into the system through the green plants, 
which drives water and other liquid nutrition throughout the plants. The plants then, enriched 
with such energy rich material, pass through plant-eating animals to omnivores and 
carnivores. Thus the ecological relationships between abiotic and biotic elements occur 
directly in the energy flow. Accordingly, the abiotic or physical elements become equally 
important entities in the said route. In this consideration, ecologists are capable of reading the 
functional state of the whole ecosystem solely by virtue of the energy flow, as it follows 
throughout the organic and inorganic organisms of the said object. According to this process, 
most of the solar energy, however, disappears in the atmosphere as a result of passing through 
                                                 
 114 I consider certain aspects regarding the relevant ecological relationship in the food chain, following from 
what is called: ‘Predator – Pray Relationship’. For details regarding this, see: Des Jardins, 1993, p.186-189. 
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each trophic level in the food chain. Only a tiny fraction of the solar energy finally converts to 
biomass by green plants remaining in the corpse of predators, animal feces, plants detritus, or 
the dead organic material that is garnered by decomposers as worms, fungus, and bacteria.115 
They recycle the participating elements and degrade into entropic equilibrium any remaining 
energy. Thus the process again begins to activate the various components of the eco-
system.116 According to this interpretation of the energy model, Leopold reads: 
  Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit  
of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct  
energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. The circuit is not closed; some  
energy is dissipated in decay, some is added by absorption from the air, some is stored  
in soils, peats, and long lived forests; but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly  
augmented revolving fund of life (216) 
The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on the complex structure of 
plant and animal organisms, much as the upward flow of sap in a plant depends on its 
complex cellular organization. Without this complexity, normal circulation would presumably 
not occur. Thus plants are able to trap the sun’s energy and letting the energy pass through 
animals. Then this complex structure means:  
  …the characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic kinds and functions,  
of the component species. This interdependence between the complex structure of  
the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes. (216) 
Even though the arrangement of the various species appears in a complex composition, the 
flow of energy makes it possible to bring them into a highly organized relationship in 
maintaining the smooth and stable functional structure of the whole land pyramid. This is how 
Leopold finds that the role of the energy flow in the ecological relationships is another 
essential factor in identifying the smooth functioning of the whole ecosystem. 
 
Given the role of the energy circuit in the ecological relationships, Leopold further looks 
briefly at normal evolutionary changes or developments and its impact on the said circuit of 
the biotic pyramid. He finds that the trend of evolutionary changes tends to strengthen and 
diversify the smooth functioning of the ecosystem.117 Accordingly, he explains that the 
evolutionary changes are a self initiated organizing course of the ecosystem which occurs 
overtime. The changes occur slowly and are being regarded as a local event in an ecosystem 
                                                 
115 By the view of biomass, I understand here the total mass of organic matters present at one time in an 
ecosystem. 
 
116 In order to attain the perception regarding the energy model, I consider the following books; Callicott in 
Zimmerman (ed.), 1993, p. 123, and Des Jardins, 1993, p.179-180. 
 
117 It is useful here to mention that the trend of evolutionary ecological relationships do not have as its objective 
to attain the normal functioning of the ecosystem, since the evolutionary relationships is ateleological. 
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of a region. When a change accordingly occurs in one part of the energy circuit, many other 
parts naturally adjust themselves to it. Natural species extinction, for instance, occurs as a part 
of such evolutionary changes. In this event a species is replaced by virtue of natural exclusion 
or evolves into another form. These losses or changes have no affect on the normal 
functioning of the ecosystem, as it is a natural outcome of such course.  Therefore, the 
extinction of a species is natural, according to the evolutionary ecological development or 
functional feature of the ecosystem. This change then will not necessarily obstruct or divert 
the flow of energy. The event is rather viewed as part of the further growth or development in 
the evolutionary ecological relationships of the ecosystem. As Leopold accordingly says, “. . . 
evolution is a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which has been to elaborate the flow 
mechanism and to lengthen the circuit” (216-17). In this way the process of evolutionary changes are 
being referred to as strengthening and elaborating the energy route and so is itself viewed as 
part of the ecological relationships in sustaining the function of the biotic pyramid. Therefore, 
the energy route has a vital role, not only in composing the smooth relationships between the 
organisms, but also in accounting for further development in the said ecosystem. Thus 
Leopold concludes this part of the discussion by stressing that the constant stable situation in 
relationships between objects of the food chain and the energy cycle, ultimately represent the 
essential ground for maintaining a smooth functioning in the complex structure of the entire 
land pyramid. This is why in the said discussion the food chain and the energy cycle are 
economy of nature. 
 
- The dam and its effect on the functional feature of the entire eco-system: 
 
After estimating the role of the food chain and the energy circuit in the stable functional 
structure of the entire ecosystem, Leopold finally addresses the effect of human actions on the 
said object. He points out that human actions, particularly those engineered by technology, 
brings unexpected and tremendous changes in the total functional picture of the ecosystem. 
Accordingly he cites this: “Man’s invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented 
violence, rapidity, and scope” (217). Hence, by this he provides a room for looking closely at the 
adversarial effects of the Farakka dam, which brings about unprecedented and considerable 
changes in the functional state of the entire ecosystem in the region. Leopold evaluates the 
gravity of this matter by focusing first on the state of the trophic relationships in the food 
chains. He argues that the result of such type of human action severely reduces the living 
activities in the food chain, and so is blamed for bringing on irreparable changes in the 
function of the land pyramid. How can then this assumption be explained in consideration 
with the said situation? Finding the answer requires us to recall once again the example of the 
food chain (soil - plant - deer - Bengal tiger) in accordance with the current context of the 
discussion. The assumption suggests that as a result of the dam, the soil is no longer 
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adequately fertilized for an abundant growth of plants in the forest, because of the lack in the 
normal flow of  water needed for soil nutrients, and so for plants too. This causes rapid 
deforestation in the habitat of the region. Subsequently, food becomes scarce for the deer 
population or the grazing animals. Accordingly, some of them die, and some move from the 
original habitat towards other places.  
 
This has obvious impact on the predators or the tiger population as well. Consequently they 
encounter unexpected problems in hunting animals needed for food, as well as resulting in a 
considerable reduction of the ecological niche, following from inadequate amount of wild 
plants in the said habitat. The event is completely contrary to the social or symbiotic 
relationships normally taking place in the chain between plants and deer in one way, and deer 
and tigers in the other. The continuity of such problems virtually leads to a dramatic reduction 
in the tiger population, and the incident can even create the possibility of extinction of the 
entire population. The reason for this to occur is that the tiger population normally consists of 
a small number of animals, as it is situated at the top layer in the food chain of the land 
pyramid. Moreover, the tiger is regarded as one of the endangered species in the region. 
Therefore, there is genuine ground for a possibility of complete extinction of the Bengal tiger 
as a result of this situation. We can thus perceive the fact that the impact of the dam not only 
has the possibility of causing the removal of the tiger population, but also produces a 
significant reduction in the population of the other living organisms in the food chain as well. 
The dam is therefore to be blamed for significantly worsening the ecological activities in the 
food chain. Leopold measures such matter in this manner:  
  The larger predators are lopped off the apex of the pyramid; food chains, for the  
first time in history, become shorter rather than longer. Domesticated species from  
other lands are substituted for wild ones, and wild ones are moved to new habitats. (217) 
According to the above statement, this precisely maps out the effect of such human action 
which brings unpredictable changes in the arrangement of the normal trophic relationships in 
the food chain. The event consequently develops a new and completely unprecedented or 
unfamiliar change, other than one happening in normal evolutionary ecological relationships 
in the food chain. This new development is then in fact to be identified as “devolutionary” or 
unhealthy, according to the normal standard of the given relationships. The new situation 
indicates that in the said ecological community the overall integrity and diversity of the wild 
species in the activities of the food chain are unexpectedly and significantly crippled by the 
dam. Integrity is understood here as the historical mix of the total number of living species 
including exotics capable of existing across time, while diversity is composed of the variety 
of species in the said habitat or the ecological community. Accordingly, the new situation is 
so unexpected, the ravages of its effect cascades throughout the trophic relationships between 
the biological organisms which are adapted to the given set of characteristics of the 
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functioning ecosystem. In other words, the event badly damages the integration, genetic 
diversity and the speciation of the organisms in the habitat. The ecosystem has no means by 
which to damp out the effect. Thus the dam produces a devolutionary effect on the 
evolutionary ecological relationships in the food chain of the biotic community. 
 
As we have seen in the above paragraph, the dam significantly degrades and so impoverishes 
the normal interaction of the food chain. The event then directly spill over from the food chain 
to the energy circuit, according to the nature of the ecological relationships in the ecosystem. 
On this account, Leopold examines another unexpected change which inflict on the energy 
route following from such human action. He insists that the lack of water depletes the storage 
of nutritional energy in the soil which effectively deranges the energy circuit, and so 
eventually deteriorate the capacity of the ecosystem for self renewal. In this consideration, the 
following explanation can be given in conformity with the ecological relationships of the 
energy circuit. Dry or nutrition less soil is no longer considered to maintain an adequate fertile 
state, since fertility is normally regarded as an essential condition in order to provide the 
ability for soil to receive and store energy from the biomass, which the biomass then recycles 
again through the organic elements in the entire ecosystem. This normal process of the energy 
route is seriously disturbed following from the drought of the soil, and further produces 
radical reduction in the organic population of the food chain. Accordingly, the reduction of 
the organic materials or the animal population simultaneously contributes to reducing 
activities in the biomass, while sufficient amount of organic materials or biomass is normally 
regarded as an essential element in order to store energy in the soil. In this way, the soil is 
ultimately deprived of the capacity to receive adequate energy from the organic materials 
which normally support to build as well as maintain the fertile state of the soil. Moreover, dry 
soil is not supportive to form the ecological interactions in the biomass. Thus drought and 
insufficient organic materials together, indeed contribute to create an infertile state in relation 
to receive and store the energy in the soil. Leopold characterizes this as erosion118. The soil is 
then not able to recycle sufficient energy in order to support the living channels in the eco 
system. This is how the dam contributes to a depletion of the energy in the soil and so 
generates derangement in the entire energy flow throughout the living and non-living 
channels in the ecosystem of the region. This event is normally regarded as an essential 
criterion for constituting self–renewal or the sustainable functioning of the land pyramid. 
Thus the dam, by exploiting the normal water course, severely downgrades the smooth 
functioning of the entire ecosystem. In a way this creates unexpectedly bad effects on the 
overall landscape of the biotic community.  This is why the dam is identified as creating an 
unhealthy functional state in the natural environment of the region. I, therefore, have found 
that Callicott’s scientific interpretation of Leopold’s holistic ecological discussion is 
                                                 
118 Leopold, 1968, p.217. 
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genuinely consistent with regard to evaluating the said environmental crisis following from 
the dam in its total form.119
 
D. The moral status of the entire ecosystem: 
 
In the foregoing section of the discussion, we have seen that the scientific explanation of the 
functional state of the entire ecological community, sufficiently inform us regarding the 
unexpected environmental changes or the crisis resulting from the dam. Hence, in this 
situation the dam is regarded as an object of ethical concern.  In which way then, can the 
unhealthy state of this ecosystem be accommodated into moral discussion? In response to 
such crucial question, the moral philosophers face a big challenge regarding how to map out, 
or enlarge the ethical base allowing this factor to be set out in the moral framework. The 
assumption will permit us to bring exactly into line whether the dam is morally blameable or 
unacceptable as a result of producing such crisis in the region. As a part of facilitating the 
discussion in this dimension, the threshold issue is: Who or what in the ecosystem has 
anything to complain against the dam which can provide a justifiable ground for concerning 
the moral world? For the sake of finding a precise and persuadable answer, the question can 
further be classified in the following senses: Who or what has moral status in the said 
community? And, how can moral status or considerability be justified? Leopold can be 
regarded as the first person who describes not only the functional structure of the ecological 
community, but also considers the facts following from such human action on the said object 
in a broader perspective of moral finding. He discusses the matter informally in the moral 
aspects of The Land Ethic, but it does not lead to a compelling philosophical argument. 
Hence, Callicott, as the first environmental ethicist, takes this abstract ethical material of The 
Land Ethic into account in order to explain them in a proper philosophical sense. 
 
In examining the philosophical foundation of Leopold’s land ethic, Callicott notices that it is 
traceable through the moral philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723 -
1790). They share, in this regard, a common view as being members to the school of Scottish 
philosophy of the eighteenth century. The bottom line of this view implicitly insists that the 
subjective feelings of human beings are itself a fundamental and sufficient criterion in order to 
judge and value a situation from a moral point of view.120 According to Callicott, Charles 
                                                 
119 It is useful to mention here that although Leopold or Callicott successfully explains the effect of such human 
action which brings severe unexpected change in the entire functional structure of the land community, none of 
them provide any specific information on what exact consequence would further follow from happening the 
change on the whole eco-system, in the ecological descriptive section of The Land Ethic. 
 
120 The notion of feelings can equally be interpreted in the senses of affection, sympathy, benevolence, 
sentiment and the like. I shall use any of these terms according to the context of the following discussion. 
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Darwin (1809-1882) explains that such feelings are essentially associated with the survival or 
the functional account of the whole ecological community. Given the Darwinian explanation 
of the Humean account, I shall show that the feeling based considerations normatively 
attribute moral status value or intrinsic value to the whole ecological community in the said 
situation. The assumption will further permit me to argue that in the decision to construct the 
dam, the moral status of the said community is simply discounted, and so the dam is not 
morally acceptable. Moreover, I shall also find that the considered ethics provides a vital 
foundation for considering the community in the non-anthropocentric and non-individualistic 
sense of the environmental ethic. I shall in the following discussion first look at Hume’s 
consideration of the feeling based ethical notion, as the assumption has prime role in 
constituting the moral status of the entire community in the given sense.121   
 
- The feeling based ethics of David Hume: 
 
Hume is primarily not concerned with pleasure, pain, reason or interests as basis for intrinsic 
value judgement of an object. He rather considers that human reactions towards a given object 
affect the value judgement. Such disposition, according to him, serves a wider accessibility to 
judge an object in a moral account. This assumption then provides the fundamental aspect 
which accommodates the value judgement of an object into wider sense of moral 
consideration.122 Hence, I consider Hume’s wider account of the value judgement to be 
essentially consistent with the given environmental situation or ecosystem, in finding the 
moral status of the object. In a point of departure, the fundamental issue following from 
Hume’s enquiry concerning value judgement in morality is: How should the image of an 
action or object be evaluated as a moral phenomenon? In finding a persuadable answer to this 
issue, he considers a series of arguments in his famous book called “A Treatise of Human 
Nature”, published in 1739-40. He discusses these arguments in book 111, part 1, section 1 
and 11 of the treatise.123 The central piece of his argument indicates that the moral judgement 
of an object rest fundamentally on a subjective account of feeling based value, and is not in 
the first place resulting from the exercise of reason. The moral approval of such feelings lies 
in a disposition of the social context in a situation. Armed with this view, I shall first look at 
                                                 
121 It is useful to notice that although Callicott regards the discussion of the feeling based ethics as a part of the 
common view of Hume and Smith, nevertheless we notice in many of his relevant writings that he explains the 
assumption by mentioning only Hume’s name or from the Humean point of view, in stead of referring to both. 
Similarly I shall follow the same style in explaining the said ethic, but this should be regarded as their common 
view.   
 
122 See, Norton, 1987, p. 172-173, and Ellis, 1992, in Nardin and Mapel (ed.), p. 158-159. 
 
123 Regarding the said section of Hume’s moral philosophy, I have followed the book: Mossner (ed.),1969, p. 
507-527. 
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how he considers the said feeling in respect of the moral judgement pertaining to the image of 
an action. Thereafter, I shall closely look at the way he values such feeling in moral form. 
Accordingly, let me start by regarding the way Hume accounts how an individual forms moral 
judgement on the basis of a subjective account regarding the image of an action. He points out 
that the individual distinguishes between good and evil, or what is right and what is wrong, in 
the assessment of the action. According to him, the judgement that an action is good or bad 
primarily lies in the analysis of the subjective feelings which are projected onto the action. 
Actually the feelings of approbation or disapprobation affectively “color” or shape the 
judgement. In other words, the goodness and badness does not lie in objective qualities of the 
action, in the way red is a quality of spilled blood. It is the feelings, and not reason, which 
spontaneously arise in the original fabric of an individual’s nature upon the contemplation of 
the action. Therefore, the subjective feeling is the ultimate criterion for judging morally about 
the action. 
 
In a purpose to further clarify the prime role of feelings rather than reason in moral 
judgement, Hume takes an example of wilful murder into account. The image of such action 
is supposed to be vicious. In allowing such moral judgement on the action, he states: 
  You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a  
sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter  
of fact; `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.  
So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing,  
but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame  
from the contemplation of it.124
According to Hume, the alleged evil of the action is, as it were, a projection of the quality of 
that subjective feeling or reaction which originates within us when we witness or imagine the 
murder. The very “feeling” then constitutes the said judgement regarding the action. This is 
how he finally concludes that subjective feeling, not reason, is the ultimate standard of 
defining goodness and badness, or the moral judgement of the action. In similar way, one can 
reach at the moral judgements regarding other actions too, for example, that charity is good; 
that injustice is bad, and so on. 
 
The bottom line of Hume’s argument indicates that the subjective feelings are the ultimate 
criterion for judging the rightness or wrongness of an object. Consequently, the assumption is 
immediately caught up in accusation of radical relativism, and so cannot be regarded as a 
universal or absolute view. Hume did not agree with the accusation. Rather, he claims that the 
feeling based ethical view stems from both a natural and universally accountable element of 
human nature. He accordingly insists that the notion itself has essential and sufficient 
                                                 
124 . Ibid., p.520. 
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normative force to persuadably judge and value the image of an action or situation in moral 
sense. Given such claim from the viewpoint of Hume, this urges us to take the following 
relevant factors into account: In which way can the said feeling be addressed in the moral 
space? What is needed for allowing the assumption into the moral space? And, how can the 
morally accountable value of the feelings be defined? Let me try to find the answer to these 
questions. Indeed, Hume’s notion of the subjective feeling evolves from the consideration of a 
psychological section which is common to every normal human being.125 This implies that the 
feeling, like a physical organ, is an essential part of the psychological structure of a person. 
However, the nature of the psychological feeling is slightly variable from one person to 
another, but common to all people. However, we can sometimes notice that there are some 
exceptional cases. Some people, for instance, are physically freakish or maimed. Similarly 
there may be people who are lacking one, several or even all psychological features to one 
degree or another. Despite the exceptional cases, we can still speak about the normal 
psychological feelings in human nature, just as we can speak of the normal, correct physical 
constructions and conditions of a person. In other words, these feelings are so naturally rooted 
in the constitution of normal human nature that it is completely impossible to ignore or 
extirpate them. Hume, accordingly, figures out that the subjective feeling is essentially both 
natural and universally distributed among human beings. The feelings then have in itself the 
necessary and sufficient normative force. The assumption therefore permits him to ascribe 
intrinsic value to the subjective feelings of humans. This is how the notion of the subjective 
feelings is accommodated into the discussion of the moral world. Hume’s ethical 
subjectivism, therefore, does not necessarily imply that right and wrong, good and evil, virtue 
and vice are viewed as arbitrary, nor does his theory collapse into an emotive relativism. 
 
According to the above discussion, following from the ethical or axiological subjectivism, it 
appears that the ascription of all value virtually lies in the subjective provenance. Hume is 
well aware that such unfavourable assessment may arise, as the intrinsic value is not being 
construed objectively. It therefore turns into a central task for him to find how the subjective 
moral sentiment can serve as the basis for a universal account of morality. A crucial 
requirement must be satisfied in order to allow the said value into the domain of moral 
philosophy. With this consideration, Hume classifies the proper object of the sentiment in two 
senses for the purpose of moral analysis. In one way, sentiment is concerned with one’s self-
love or self interest. Apart from this, once several sentiments are gathered under the head of 
self love it is called the social sentiments in relation to an object. On the other hand, the 
sentiment of morality is directed towards another being, or beings other than one self, as the 
direct object. He thus classifies and so defines the point that all value may evolve from the 
                                                 
125 My consideration of Hume’s discussion regarding moral value account of the subjective feeling, follows 
from the following sources: .Mossner, (ed.), 1969, p.525-526 and Callicott, summer 1982, , vol.4, no.2.,  p.167-
168 
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subjective provenance, but it does not necessarily follow from this that only valuers are 
valuable or that the feeling of valuing subjects are valuable. According to Hume, the 
individual values self feelings or interests, but for his own sake the individual equally values 
other things too, or in some cases he may value other things even more highly than self 
interests. To value other things more than self interest, he characterizes as unselfish or 
altruistic feelings. These feelings does not contain instrumental characteristic, but adheres to 
the intrinsic characteristic. The reason for attributing value to altruistic feelings is that the 
subjective feelings value the other object for its own quality. What then would be a more 
proper object of moral feelings to ascribe value to other than self interest? In response to this 
question, Hume precisely notes that the inborn moral sentiments are common to all humans, 
something which allows at once the community’s interests as such as its natural object to 
value intrinsically, since human beings are by born inherited of a society.126 Thus the 
subjective moral sentiment gives intrinsic value to the interests of the society, something 
which is being regarded as entirely indifferent to self interest. In this direction, Hume finds 
that altruism is also as fundamental and autochthonous or primitive in human nature as is 
egoism. In other words, this assumption finally brings essential and sufficient justifiable 
ground for Hume to consider that ethical subjectivism lies at the foundation of morality in 
terms of both moral judgement and value. In addition to this, ethical subjectivism also values 
the interests of the society, or altruism. Holding this universal sense of moral quality, he then 
regards ethical subjectivism as something functionally equivalent to the objective sense of 
morality. Hume, therefore, firmly establishes the view that subjective feelings can alone be 
the foundation of morality. 
 
- Darwin’s evolutionary-ecological account of the moral sentiment in view with the 
Humean sense: 
 
Given the universal appeal of the sentiment based ethics, the most relevant and pressing issue 
follows from the main context of our discussion: How can the said ethic be extended to the 
evolutionary-ecological account of the biotic community? Or, how can this ethic be 
compatible with the functional account of the said object in relation to the given region?  
Charles Darwin, as a naturalist and natural historian, pays exclusive attention to this matter, as 
a part of attaining systematic knowledge regarding the natural environment. On this account, 
he regards the natural environment as a vital source of finding morality. He illustrates the 
assumption in his famous work called “The Origin of Species” and “The Descent of Man,” 
published respectively in 1859 and 1871. The books reveal information about a new way of 
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looking at the natural world.127 The implication of this knowledge becomes significant in 
apprehending philosophical thought about ethics in a new dimension. In fact Aldo Leopold 
conveys informally the essence of this assumption in the ethical section of The Land Ethic. 
Hence, Callicott advocates that the philosophical or moral background of the said section of 
Leopold’s Land Ethic is traceable in the Darwinian ethical account of the natural 
environment. In laying out the cornerstone of the discussion, Leopold appears with his own 
reflection in an estimation of Darwin’s new information on the natural world with its new 
moral implication: 
  It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the Origin of Species.  
We know now what was unknown to all the previous caravan of generations: that man  
are only fellow voyages with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution. This new  
knowledge should have given us by this time, a sense of kinship with other creatures :  
a sense of wonder over the magnitude and duration of the biotic enterprise.128
   
In the above paragraph, Leopold draws out some basic information regarding the moral world 
emerging from Darwin’s revelation of the socio-biological or socio-ecological account of the 
entire biotic community. This indicates that Darwin considers the knowledge in view with the 
evolutionary–ecological account of ethics, or the natural history of ethics. This portrait of 
ethical contents, Leopold primarily refers to as the ethical sequences or evolutionary 
development of ethics. Hence, he conveys the Darwinian ethical notion in the ethical section 
of The Land Ethic. In studying the socio-ecological account of the evolutionary ethic, Darwin 
notices that the psychological characteristics or feeling based ethics maintain a vital role in 
ensuring the survivability or functional sustainability of the entire biotic community. Hence, 
Darwin insists that the psychological profile serves a moral force, or that the feeling based 
ethics is a fundamental driving force in the biotic community. In the following discussion I 
shall examine closely his explanation of the given ethic, which is in view with the Humean 
account in relation to the functional space of the community. 
 
- Darwin’s biological account of the moral sentiment: 
 
Once Darwin takes into consideration the psychological characteristics as a vital element for 
the biotic community, some tough issues appears before him. What is the mechanism of this 
psychological element in the moral sense? And, how does this element fundamentally operate 
in the said community? Or, what actually does this amount to in the said community? In 
                                                 
127 Burrow (ed.), Penguin Classics, 1987, p. 11-17 and Callicott in Regan (ed.), 1986, p. 387-388. 
 
128 Callicott in Regan (ed.), 1986, p. 389. It seems that Leopold in the quoted remark sees human relationship 
with natural world in a radical sense by saying: “that man are only fellow voyages with other creatures in the 
odyssey of evolution”. I am not defending such radical relationship in discussion of the non-anthropocentism. 
 89
finding sensible answers to these questions, he closely studies the constitutional and 
existential nature of the various biological species in the ecological community. In this 
direction, he primarily focuses on the struggle for existence or natural selection in the 
organisms. In this study, I shall find that the moral feelings play a prime role in favouring the 
struggle for survival states or functioning state of the said organisms. Without this human and 
all other animal behaviour would become ever more competitive, hostile, rapacious, and 
violent instead of ever more cooperative, deferential, genteel, and caring.129 In the study he 
exclusively considers the history of the natural world. He then substantially illustrates this 
with an ethical consideration in the book, “The Descent of Man”. The relevant aspects of this 
study will be explained in the following. 
  
As being presented in the discussion of the above paragraph, Darwin’s studies begin with the 
observable nature of many species, particularly mammals, in the biological world. The nature 
of prolonged parental care of these animals comes under his close scrutiny. Here he 
emphasizes on the distinct feature that the parental care in an essential manner ensures the 
reproductive success of these animals, or the continuous survivability of future generations. 
On the basis of this notion, as well as by taking our own experience into consideration, he 
precisely sorts out that the key essence which lies in such care is induced and facilitated by a 
certain strong emotion or feeling. The emotion adult mammals (in some species perhaps only 
the females) experience toward their offspring is parental love (or perhaps, motherly love). 
Darwin notices here that this feeling of the adult mammals is oriented towards their offspring, 
something other than concerning the self. The said parental–filial affection is then to be 
regarded as altruistic feelings rather than otherwise. He accordingly insists that the capacity 
for such altruistic feeling is naturally selected or genetically fixed as part of a species’ 
psychological profile, since the event strongly contributes to the continuous survivability of 
the organisms. Hence, Darwin finds that the said mechanism in the naturally selected feelings 
indispensably evolves into a moral sense of feelings, or conscience, in an evolutionary 
account of the biological organism. In a phrase at beginning of “The Land Ethic”, Leopold 
alludes this sort of moral essence from the evolutionary biological point of view by saying 
that an ethic is: “…a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence (202)”.130 In other 
words, the phrase “struggle for existence” conceptually conforms to the Darwinian view of 
moral feelings which is highlighted through natural selection for estimating the continuous 
survivability of the biological organisms. In this way, Leopold conveys a Darwinian 
                                                 
129 I borrow the notion from Callicott’s account. See, Callicott in Rescher (ed.), October 1984, vol.21, no.4, 
p.304. 
 
130 Callicott considers the phrase according to the bio-psychological conceptual context in the following 
literature. Callicott in Zimmerman (Gen.ed.),1993, p.112. 
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biological account of evolutionary ethic as a conceptual context in the said location of The 
Land Ethic. 
 
As Darwin reveals the fact that altruistic feelings is generally attached with the animal 
kingdom, he then regards it as useful to take their view-point as a basic starting point in the 
consideration of the evolutionary ecological ethic. As a part of the design, Darwin’s account 
precisely begins with the “Parental and filial affection” among the primate ancestors of 
Homo-sapiens. He figures out in this regard, that the bonds of affection and sympathy, or the 
altruistic feelings between parents and offspring permits the formation of small-families, clans 
or social groups, perhaps originally consisting only of parents and offspring. Accordingly, 
these families, and similar affections in terms of “social sentiments” or “social instincts” such 
as “the all important emotion of sympathy”, Darwin reasons, “will have been increased through natural 
selection; for those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would 
flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring”.131 In the formation of the social groups, he 
notices the fact that this social instinct is not enjoined to every individual, as a member will be 
antipathetic towards strangers to a social group. As he accordingly points out: “A savage will risk 
his life to save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger”.132 
The said sympathy is thus limited or extended only to members of their own groups. 
 
In examining the survival (or reproductive) advantages of newly extended families or social 
groups, Darwin perceives the fact that as a family group would compete with other groups, 
ironically, the said instincts or the same principle that at first would seem to lead so directly 
and inevitably toward greater and greater mutual aggression and rapacity, lead instead to 
increase in affection, kindness and sympathy towards them. The event, in a way, evolves as 
modes of cooperation between the different groups. Accordingly, the social sentiments have 
led to the struggle for limited resources in the understanding of pursuing it collectively. This 
way of obtaining the resource reflects significantly that moral essence lies in social 
sentiments. Thus the social sentiments dispose to a moral sense of feeling in considering the 
survival advantages of the said groups. The groups that include “the greatest number of the 
most sympathetic members” are supposed to have out-competed others whose members have 
been regarded as quarrelsome and disagreeable. “No tribe”, Darwin remarks here, “could hold 
together if murder, robbery, treachery, etc., were common; consequently, such crimes within the limits of the 
same tribe ‘are branded with everlasting infamy’; but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits”.133 Darwin 
explicitly points out here that the moral attitudes of tribe people is intensely stressing on 
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codes of social sentiment (for example; loyalty, defence, obedience to elders, differences and 
so on) which contributes significantly to the survival advantages of the small groups within 
the tribe. In other words, the moral feelings emerge to the point that individuals would 
articulate or correspond to the codes of conduct conforming to their social sentiments 
sufficient for social structure of a group or society to be maintained. Accordingly, the codes of 
the social sentiments are codified into contents of moral feeling. Thus the said moral feelings 
are aboriginally derived from the social instincts; both are mainly related to the society. 
Therefore, social instincts or moral feelings operate essentially with respect to the survival 
prospects of the given society, and is not being counted for the sake of the individual member. 
 
According to Callicott, not only do the moral feelings, or competition for survival advantages, 
select more intense sympathy and affection within the limits or boundaries of small groups, 
but the following social sentiments even extend further.134 The perception accelerates this 
extension, in the sense that larger social groups would advance the survival advantages, or 
“the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish better”. Hence, there 
arises a tendency for diffusing the more familial affections throughout the wider population or 
society. Such affection effectively facilitates social integration with individuals who are less 
closely related, or even unknown to each-other. Darwin, accordingly, perceives the fact that 
the moral feelings are the key in expanding such sentiments further. This is how the social 
sentiments expand out of the boundary of a small group to the wider population. He, then, 
comes up to establish firmly the view that the origin of ethics is far more rooted in the feeling 
based considerations than any other matter that can be accounted for.  
 
When expansion of the small groups is eventually merged into tribal societies, there occurs a 
corresponding growth of morality within the perceived boundary of a community. Ethics and 
society then expands correlatively. In other words, the moral sentiments coextensively evolve 
with the boundary of a society. The society itself, in this sense, cannot be viewed as existing 
in absences of the moral feelings. In the survival advantages of this wider moral community, 
the corresponding social sentiments become complex and so are required to the extent that 
one is to behave morally towards members of one’s tribe as well as member of one’s family 
or clan. Thus the evolution of the moral sentiments corresponds correlatively to the survival 
advantages of a society.135 As proto humans or tribes and eventually human societies grow 
larger and so are more complex than the tribal one, the correlative moral sentiments grow 
more widely and are more delicately provisioned for the survival advantages of such society. 
In a way the moral sentiments or behaviour becomes more generally directed and refined to 
the requirements of the survival advantages of the complex society. Darwin, accordingly, 
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finds that the moral sentiments are essentially and pervasively associated with survival 
advantages of the human mammals, or the biological organism, in the ecological community. 
Darwin is essentially convinced by finding that the moral feelings or natural selection is the 
main factor in the evolutionary account of the biological organisms in the ecological 
community. The assumption, therefore, permits him to assert that the feeling based 
considerations are to be regarded as a basic normative standard for evaluating the socio-
biological perspective of the evolutionary ecological ethics. 
 
Darwin realizes that the psychological characteristics are fundamental, and a general factor 
which brings the vast and overwhelming variety of biological organisms into moral space. 
Enlightened by this reading, he comes up forward to identify and so make the ground for 
arguing that human beings simply represent an equal member of the socio-biological world. 
Accordingly, the inherent psychological characteristics basically serve the mechanism of 
natural selection which ultimately amounts to the continuous survival advantages of the 
biological organism or community. In a way, the psychological characteristics govern the 
fundamental condition for the survival prospects of the animal organisms throughout the 
generations from one to the next. In other words, human and non-human living organisms are 
fundamentally a product of the same bio-psychological process of the organic evolution. 
According to this account, no significant gap lies between human and non-human living 
entities. Mankind, like the other beings, is thus a plain member of the wide and diverse socio- 
biological community. Therefore, the psychological capacity is to be regarded a basic element 
which directly brings human and non-human living organism into equal moral consideration. 
Judging by this fundamental notion, Darwin insists that human being then, is to be identified 
as a non-privileged member in the socio-biological account of the evolutionary ecological 
ethic. This is how the said psychological characteristics essentially and effectively 
characterize the biological universe in the non-anthropocentric version of the evolutionary 
ecological ethics. The said characteristics, accordingly, underlines the relationships between 
human and non-human living organisms in equal sense, and so construe the identity of a 
member of the biological community in the given account, as they simply are a product of the 
same kind of genotypic fixity, or a product of the same type of bio-psychological ancestral 
social primates. In this characterization, human and non-human organic species are neither 
psychologically nor physically isolated from each other, because of this relationship.136 All 
living species are then viewed as kin to each other and fellow members of the bio-
psychological community. In the socio-biological natural history of ethic, Darwin thus finds 
that the psychological profile is the key element in accounting for the non-anthropocentric 
version of the evolutionary-biological ethics. The psychological characteristics, therefore, is 
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to be characterized as an intrinsically valuable element in which the non-anthropocentric 
feature of the said ethics is flowed. 
 
- Darwin’s bio-moral sentimentalism and the Humean sense of morality: 
 
Given the Darwinian view following from the feeling based non-anthropocentric version of 
the socio-biological and the evolutionary ethical phenomena, does this assumption equally 
correspond to the value accounts of Hume’s morality? In finding answer to the question, I 
shall show that Darwin’s given form of the moral sentiment conceptually and essentially lies 
in the value conception of Hume’s morality.  In exposing the given version of the Humean 
moral legitimacy, Callicott set out the notion schematically in the following sense: 
1. We (i.e., all psychologically normal people) are endowed with certain moral sentiments 
(feeling, sympathy and so on) for our fellows, especially for our kin;  
2. Modern biology treats Homo sapiens (a) like all other living species, a product of the 
process of organic evolution; and hence, (b) people are literally kin (because of common 
ancestry) to all other contemporary forms of life.  
3. Therefore, if so enlightened, we should feel and thus value other living things in ways 
similar to the way we feel toward our human kin.137  
In the given argument, Hume precisely points out that the moral sentiments are fundamentally 
psychological facts, shared by all forms of life in the biological account of the evolutionary 
ethics. Accordingly, they are fellow members following from the same organic evolution, and 
so mankind is a non-privileged member of the biological community. He, then, insists firmly 
that the human and nonhuman living organisms are to be valued in equal moral consideration. 
Hume thus considers the biological world in the non-anthropocentric sense of the 
evolutionary ethic. Accordingly, Hume’s feeling based ethical considerations essentially 
contain the non-anthropocentric feature of the socio-biological and evolutionary ethics in its 
conceptual framework. Darwin simply uncovers the same fact in the analysis of the socio-
biological account of the evolutionary ecological ethics. Therefore, in the said account 
Darwin’s non-anthropocentric version of the moral sentimentalism basically lies in the value 
perception of Hume’s morality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 I have primarily considered this argument in the light of Hume’s theory of value. I borrow its framework 
from the viewpoint of Callicott, but according to the context of Hume’s value theory. Callicott discusses this in: 
Callicott in Environmental Ethics, summer 1982, vol. 4, no, 2, p. 172.  
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- Darwin’s eco-centric feeling based ethical phenomena: 
 
We have seen in the preceding discussion, that the Humean-Darwinian feeling based moral 
values allows directly the living organisms as well as their non-anthropocentric identity in the 
framework. However, the consideration of “soil and water,” or inorganic elements, as part of 
the ecological community, is yet to be regarded into the moral composition. Ecology, as we 
already know, is viewed as the representation of a functional society composed of living and 
non-living organs. The functional characteristic, which follows from the relationships 
between the organisms, fundamentally constitutes the living social whole, known as biotic 
community.138  Hence, Darwin, according to Callicott, insists that this living feature provides 
further scope to allow the whole ecological community into a wider consideration of the said 
morality.139  
 
This psychological profile is then to be specified as the most basic and essentially most 
relevant factor for sufficiently holding the functional sustainability in terms of the complexity, 
diversity and integrity of the said object. Emphasis is put upon the said factor being regarded 
as a distinguished and cardinal characteristic of measuring precisely the functional status of 
the biotic community. In this direction, the characteristic essentially and sufficiently insures 
the healthy functioning of the whole community. This significantly implies that the 
psychological characteristics is to be characterized as the ultimate criterion for defining the 
good and the bad, or the right and the wrong, in terms of the functional state of the said 
community. Thus, in view of the given fact, Darwin explicitly finds that the said characteristic 
or feelings, as it were, is itself endowed with inherent worth. Otherwise, the whole 
community is simply not able to sustain its normal functioning. He therefore considers this 
essential and sufficient ground for ascribing inherent value to the said feelings. The 
qualification then brings the entire biotic community into moral status value. However, 
extinct or dead species are not accountable in the value status of the functioning community, 
as they can no longer contribute to the object. This is how the Darwinian feeling based ethical 
accounts develops separately from the consideration of biological organisms, in order to 
follow up collectively the biotic community, in the non-anthropocentric disposition of the 
evolutionary ecological ethic. He, therefore, establishes solidly the view that the said ethics is 
directly associated with the functioning of the biotic community. 
 
As following from the above discussion, Darwin provides an extensive and complete 
portrayal of the feeling based non-anthropocentric account of the evolutionary ecological 
                                                 
138 I consider once again the relevant aspects of the ecological discussion of Leopold’s Land Ethic in the 
consideration of finding the moral content of the discussion. 
 
139 See, Callicott in Zimmerman (Gen. ed.), 1993, p.122. 
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ethics, or the biotic ethic. In other words, he finally has found that the natural environment is 
indeed the vital source for accounting morality, as its inherent psychological profile 
essentially gives him the detailed knowledge required for estimating the most fundamental 
issue regarding the survival states of humans as well as non-human beings, collectively the 
whole biotic community. Leopold is exactly concerned with this sort of ethical conception, 
and so conveys this ethical massage in the evolutionary development of ethics or “in the 
odyssey of evolution” of the said biotic enterprise. Thus, he explicitly invokes Darwin’s non-
anthropocentric version of the feeling based ethical considerations in defining the moral 
aspect of the said location of The Land Ethic. Leopold, accordingly, reckons the ethical 
consideration of the object in the following phrase: “…an ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on 
freedom of action in the struggle for existence”.140 It, now, appears clearly from the phrase that he 
exactly follows Darwin’s evolutionary ecological account of the moral feelings in estimation 
of the survival states or the functioning of the whole biotic community. The moral strength or 
the survivability of the functioning biotic community accordingly evolves from the 
explanation of the feeling based ethical values of Darwin, from which the ethical framework 
of Leopold’s Land Ethic is directly built on. Through Darwin he essentially invokes the 
Humean value account which inescapably provides the moral considerability for the entire 
functional biotic community.  This assumption we shall consider in the following step. 
 
- Darwin’s eco-centric moral sentimentalism reflects the Humean account: 
 
Given the Darwinian or Leopold’s non-anthropocentric account of the moral sentiments, 
characterizing the moral status value of the whole biotic community in consideration of the 
evolutionary ecological ethic, how can the assumption be evaluated in the value conception of 
Hume’s morality? I shall, in response to this issue, find that the ethical background of 
Leopold’s land ethic basically is founded in the value accounts of Hume’s morality. I shall 
justify the argument from the viewpoint of Callicott141. He discusses this in the following 
sense. Accordingly, Hume observes the non-anthropocentric moral considerability of the 
given community, in the sense that we have not only sympathy for our fellow living 
organisms, but we are also naturally endowed with this sentiment. The sentiment which is 
actuated essentially values other important things too. Accordingly, the proper object of such 
sentiment is society itself. In this direction, Hume now takes the facts of the ecological 
science into account. This informs him about the existence of a proper object of value, being 
one of the most fundamental moral passions. The biotic community is an appropriate object of 
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141 . Callicott discusses with Hume’s feeling based ethical account in consideration with evolutionary ecological 
community in the following text. See: Callicott in Rescher, (ed.), October 1984, vol. 21, no.4, p. 305. 
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that passion, which is composed of the function of the complexity, diversity, integrity and 
stability of the social whole (together with its fellow members or component parts) to which 
human beings belong. In other words, he actually perceives the fact that we humans are part 
of the natural environment and so have certain feelings towards the social whole of the biotic 
community. Thus, Hume’s moral psychology itself accommodates the view of evolutionary 
ecology in its conceptual framework. He, accordingly, asserts that moral feelings have 
endowed human beings with effective natural or inherited intentional feelings towards bonds 
of kinship, community membership, community of human beings and nonliving objects. 
Whatever might be the object of those moral feelings.  The biotic community, then, owns 
itself as an object of such feeling. Therefore, moral feelings simply have the whole biotic 
community as the most familiar or fundamental natural object of attributing the value to. 
Accordingly, Hume’s moral sentiments itself value the ecological information or bring the 
whole ecosystem into object of moral consideration. Ecology, thus, contributes to making him 
value intrinsically the whole ecosystem, just as he separately values evolutionary biology as a 
component of the given object. 
 
As it is found that Hume’s feeling based ethical account is directly consistent with the moral 
consideration of the holistic biotic community, the crucial question arises: Is this assumption 
to be rated as the non-anthropocentric criterion of the evolutionary ecological ethic? One can, 
for instance, claim that his ethically accountable value consideration, or moral 
sentimentalism, is not sufficiently concordant with the given sense of the holistic ecological 
ethic, as the value attribution to the said object is largely following from the sentiments of 
human beings or human valuers. As we have already seen in the preceding discussion of the 
chapter, this view is granted by Hume in the following sense; “you never can find it, till you turn 
your reflection into your own breast . . . .”142 Hence, the ambiguity arises out of human’s account of 
the non-anthropocentric moral sentimentalism in relation to the given eco-systemic ethic. In 
respond to the problem, I shall show that the conceptual framework of Hume’s moral 
sentimentalism is itself firmly decorated with the non-anthropocentric and evolutionary 
ecological account of the biotic ethic. On this account, I suppose it is necessary to point out a 
crucial distinction which lies in the estimation of Hume’s view on human’s feeling based 
moral values. This accordingly indicates that the value may be grounded in human feelings, 
however, neither the feelings nor necessarily the breast or self in which they reside, are their 
natural objects. Thus, his moral feelings are conceptually decorated in such a way that the 
assumption can itself absorb the given objects as such as subject of the value accounts. 
Therefore, Hume’s feeling based classical axiological theory in view with the biological and 
ecological thought, is genuinely and straightforwardly non-anthropocentric, since it 
                                                 
142 I have considered this notion of Hume’s non-anthropocentric and evolutionary ecological account of the 
moral sentimentalism from the following article: Callicott in Rescher, 1984, October, vol. 21, no. 4, P. 305-306. 
 
 97
conceptually provides essential space for the intrinsic value of the given natural entities in its 
framework. Darwin simply reveals such moral psychological facts through the study of the 
survival prospects of the biological organisms, as well as collectively the whole ecosystem, in 
the perspective of the evolutionary ecological ethic. Darwin, in another sense, actually echoes 
the Humean feeling based ethics in reflection of the evolutionary ecological ethic. On the 
other hand, Leopold clearly conveys the Darwinian moral sentiment in drawing the 
conceptual foundation of the environmental ethic, or land ethic. By doing this, Leopold, 
through Darwin, conceptually grasps the value accounts of Hume’s morality. I am, therefore, 
not wrong to argue that the conceptual foundation of Leopold’s environmental ethic is 
fundamentally based on Hume’s moral psychology.  
 
- Moral sentiment values the functional ecosystem as the whole: 
 
It nevertheless might appear from the preceding discussion that the Humean-Darwinan non-
anthropocentric and non-individualistic version of the feeling based ethical considerations, or 
Leopold’s land ethic, values only the biotic community and ignores the moral status value of 
the individual fellow members, or the components of the said object. The background of such 
perception follows from the fact that the feeling based ethical values basically evolves from 
the functioning social whole of the ecosystem itself. In other words, the moral force of the 
given feelings is naturally selected for the holistic paradigm, and is not focusing equally on 
the individual members of the community. Despite this fact, they have a considerable role in 
maintaining the stable functioning of the whole community. Hence, the concern arises from 
the fact that the moral appeal of such value account pertains only to the holistic community as 
subject of moral consideration, and not for the individual members. In spite of this, I shall 
show that such concern is simply baseless according to the given value accounts of the biotic 
community. We have explicitly seen in the Humean-Darwinian feeling based ethical 
axiological accounts that individual members, both human and non-humans of the biotic 
community as well as collectively the whole biotic community per se, are the objects of the 
moral sentimentalism. This precisely maps out that moral sentiments equally value the 
individual members as well as collectively the whole community itself. No one’s dignity is 
denied or worsened in such moral consideration. Every individual member is equally valued 
in the complete notion of the functional ecosystem. Based on this account, the ethical 
consideration of individual members, however, is pre-empted by concern only for the healthy 
functioning, in terms of the integrity, stability, and beauty, of the biotic community. The 
ethical foundations of the land ethic itself, accordingly, provide basis for including both 
fellow members of the biotic community and the entire biotic community itself in the space of 
moral consideration. Thus, the value accounts of the moral sentiment provide not only moral 
considerability for the whole ecosystem per se, but it regards the holistic value in the fullest 
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sense, where every one is equally accounted for. This precisely implies that the normative 
force of the psychological profile ascribes the moral status value to the functional holistic 
biotic community in itself, while the assumption must be viewed on the basis of the Humean- 
Darwinian ethical perception. Therefore, such concern has no place in the given moral status 
value of the biotic community.  
 
In the way, the holistic value of the community, or the biotic ethic, provides the functional 
state as the determining factor for estimating the rightness or wrongness of the said object. 
According to this normative scale, in the decision of constructing the dam, the said moral 
status value has simply been ignored in relation to the functional state of the whole biotic 
community in the region. This is why the dam is not acceptable from the given value status of 
the non-anthropocentric version of environmental ethic. In a way, the value further provides a 
moral ground for the protection or preservation of the said biotic community, in such an 
environmental situation. We have thus found, in accordance with the discussion of Callicott’s, 
that the feeling based ethical aspects of The Land Ethic values only the entire functioning 
ecosystem and so appeals for the moral protection of it, in the given situation. Therefore, we 
have authentic ground to say that such value account of the Leopold’s Land Ethic is exactly 
consistent with finding the moral consideration of the whole functional ecosystem in the 
given situation.  
 
E. A morally accountable preservation policy for the entire ecosystem and non-
anthropocentrism: 
 
We have seen in the previous section, Callicott shows that the inherent psychological 
characteristics provide a general criterion for attributing moral status value to the overall 
functioning of the ecosystem, or the ecological community. In a way, the community is itself 
entitled to moral consideration, and so for allowing its own good or interests to be protected 
morally in the given sense. This affirms, in other words, that the given complex ecosystem of 
the region has right in continuance of survival or normal functioning.143 The dam is 
accordingly blamed for jeopardizing the moral status or the right of the functioning 
ecosystem. Although Callicott’s account of bio-sentimentalism points out that the decision of 
constructing the dam severely ignores the moral status of the holistic ecosystem, he did not 
precisely explain what practical implication would generally follow from attributing such 
status value to the community. Having not addressed this crucial issue, the assumption 
accordingly poses a number of relevant questions regarding his value based holistic account 
                                                 
143 It is useful to mention here that moral weight of the following terms such as right, good, interest, wellbeing 
and the like, is derived from the moral status value of the entire ecosystem. This therefore implies that each of 
them maintains equal sense of moral strength in relation to the said situation. I shall accordingly consider each of 
them in conformity with the context of the following discussion. 
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of the land, or environmental ethic. How can these moral sentiments be applied? What should 
be done when it is revealed that the survival of some species, as well as the survival of an 
endangered species, are so threatened that it inflicts severely on the total functioning of the 
ecosystem? In other words, what should be morally done for protecting the said value or 
interests of the community in such a situation? Which reason should be given for drawing 
such moral action, or policy? How should then the value of the whole community be 
associated with composing such policy? And, which way then should the policy be explained 
in the realization of protecting the moral status of the community in the discussion of non-
anthropocentric environmental ethic? The given matters then produce the view that we should 
not be limited to barely allowing moral status value, but we equally must find a morally 
obligatory argument in favour of a policy which generally protects the value of the ecosystem 
in such situation. This accordingly highlights the fact that a complete ethical system is not 
only concerned with valuing an object, but equally stresses a vital issue: What practically 
ought to be done in the relevant situation? Lacking this normative guideline, we therefore find 
that Callicott’s account of non-anthropocentricism remains an incomplete approach in the 
normative discussion of environmental ethic. 
 
Callicott is aware of the fact that this conclusion might follow by concentrating only on the 
moral value status of the ecosystem, and not accommodating it within a complete ethical 
framework. The assumption, however, inspires him to make some efforts so that one can at 
least find a way of protecting the said value in the realization of a complete ethical system.144 
In this effort he focuses on whether the value can be part of a self consistent and complete 
theoretical basis of conventional moral philosophical terms, in the sense of a deontological or 
consequential view. He accordingly figures out some useful indications whereof one can find 
the way to set the holistic value status of the functioning ecosystem in consistence with the 
given terms. This is how we notice that Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold’s functional 
holistic land ethic indeed remains a matter of open discussion in view of the given normative 
philosophical senses. My attempts therefore will be here to find out a plausible moral theory 
which essentially and sufficiently protects the said value, or the functional characteristic of 
the ecosystem, in its framework. The attempt will eventually lead to an ethically accountable 
alternative decision model, following the answers to the questions pertaining to the situation 
which I have raised in the above paragraph. For this purpose, I shall focus on an assumption 
embodied in the consequentialist tradition in view of properly dealing with the given matters 
of the ecosystem. In this direction I shall find that the arguments of Bryan G. Norton are 
persuasive and consistent with the given matters in a consequentialist account. He discusses 
them substantially in his book, called “Why Preserve Natural Variety?” published in 1987. 
                                                 
144 Callicott in Zimmerman (Gen.ed.), 1993, p.130-132.  
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Recently he has also published several essays in this respect. I shall, however, consider 
chapter eight and nine of the book, as they are significantly relevant to the objective. Still, 
when required I shall also look into other areas of the book and the other sources as well. In 
the given chapters Norton closely examines the said issues in relation to protecting the value 
of the ecosystem in view with non-anthropocentrism, as well as portraying his own account in 
this regard. He precisely stresses here that we must find a moral argument which essentially 
protects not only the value, but also takes sufficiently into account the welfare of the said 
community in searching for practical consistency with regard to an environmental situation. I 
shall find here that the holistic account of Aristotle’s teleological ethic, or a wider approach of 
consequentialist ethic, corresponds exactly to finding the mentioned requirement according to 
the view of non-anthropocentrism. The assumption will be referred to as an alternative 
general preservation policy in respect to such environmental situation. I assume that the 
consideration of the Aristotelian teleological ethic as a consequentialist argument will 
significantly serve my objective in view with the given matters of the discussion. In order to 
attain the object as well as getting clear knowledge of those matters, it is worthwhile to be 
acquainted with the basic essences of Norton’s discussion on general preservation policy 
regarding the ecosystem.  
  
- An evaluation of the moral status value of the ecosystem: 
 
Let me first focus briefly on the moral status value of the non-individualistic and non-
anthropocentric version of the said ecosystem in accordance with the current context of the 
discussion. The assumption might pave the way for finding sensible answers to the issues we 
have mentioned earlier. Accordingly, this suggests how Norton actually evaluates the said 
value in relation to a general preservation policy. He insists that the moral status value of the 
functional ecosystem must satisfy the two following basic requirements in order to be part of 
the given policy:145
1. The moral status value of the object or the ecosystem must be capable of explanation and 
justification under a moral theory. 
2. The proposed value must have adequacy and justifiable consistency with the characteristic 
of the object. This condition indicates that the value has sufficient qualification in order to be 
part of a general normative theory. 
The proposed requirements can be followed the other way around. However, according to 
these requirements, Norton as a preservationist, has no fundamental disagreement in relation 
to consider the moral status value of the functional holistic ecosystem, but he nevertheless 
regards that the matter need to be set in a careful evaluation in order to be considered for a 
                                                 
145 Norton,1987, chapter 8, p. 155-156. 
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general preservation policy, or a complete moral rationale for such policy. As such, he 
concentrates on two different approaches of Callicott’s view regarding the value assessment 
of the said object. One of them considers that the functional criterion itself qualifies moral 
status value to the entire ecosystem, while accusing the feeling based value criterion to be a 
controversial or insufficient notion. According to the main essence of this approach, the whole 
ecosystem and the species have moral status value, but non-human individuals do not have 
the equivalent status.  The other, which is viewed on basis of the feeling based ethical values, 
is suggesting that the whole functioning ecosystem itself has moral status value, assuming 
non-human individuals and species’ as inevitable parts of the said moral object. This 
perception conceptually follows the value notion of Hume and Darwin. Given the value 
assessment of both approaches, Norton argues that the former approach has a promising or 
positive account of the policy in regard to finding moral protection for the functioning value 
of the ecosystem and species, consistent precisely with sustainable survivability of humans or 
the relevant values of humans, in the given sense of the ecosystem. In opposing this claim, I 
shall in view of refuting the accusation firstly show that the functioning account of the policy 
cannot solidly protect the value of the holistic ecosystem. Thereafter I shall find that 
Callicott’s latter, or feeling based value approach of the policy, protects equally and firmly all 
parties involved in the value of the whole ecosystem. I argue that the policy based on the 
latter approach is an appropriate one in relation to such environmental situation, or a morally 
accountable general environmental policy of a relevant situation. With these features of the 
protection policy, I shall first look at Norton’s view on the feeling based ethical values, in 
finding justification for the accusation. Thereafter, I shall accordingly consider the other 
relevant issues. 
 
- A critical assessment of the feeling based ethical values: 
 
In finding a critical account of Callicott’s sentiment based moral status of the non-
individualistic and non-anthropocentric functioning ecosystem, Norton’s estimation can be 
followed in two ways.146
Firstly, he looks at Callicott’s view on the Humean sentiment account of moral values in 
consideration with the Darwinian evolutionary-ecological explanation of the entire ecosystem. 
Secondly, he examines Callicott’s justification of moral sentimentalism as a conception 
itself.147
                                                 
146 See, Ibid., p. 172-175. 
 
147 I have previously explained both aspects in accordance with the viewpoints of Callicott. I currently repeat the 
relevant parts of them as being exposed from the viewpoints of Norton. 
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I shall follow the criticism in conformity with the given shape. Accordingly, Norton focuses 
on certain relevant aspects of Callicott’s discussion which follows from the evolutionary 
account of the moral sentiment. He assumes that the discussion has not sufficient ground for 
promoting it to a general preservation policy. On this perception, he looks at first at the way 
Callicott illustrates the main lines of Hume’s moral sentiment, and thereafter he considers the 
critical account of it following from the evolutionary explanation. Accordingly, Callicott 
points out that the Humean moral argument is primarily based on human’s altruism, like 
egoism, a primitive affection which constitutes fundamentally the sentiment account of moral 
values. In finding an original and evolutionary ecological context of such value, Callicott 
figures out that Darwin’s conception of natural selection fundamentally replicates such 
altruistic or moral feelings. According to Darwin this feeling essentially favours the 
continuous survival of human beings, from the primitive period of small groups, to the 
development of wider tribal society, and to the modern human society as well. Equally he 
enunciates that the same feelings have an essential role in favour of the continuous 
survivability or evolutionary development of non-human entities as well as the sustainable 
functioning of the ecosystem. According to Darwin or Callicott, these sentiments then, have a 
natural, evolutionary origin and so are intrinsically valuable. This moral qualification, 
therefore, applies to individuals as well as species, being regarded as essential parts of the 
intrinsically valuable whole functioning biotic community. Callicott, then, finds no reason for 
a precise or specific justification concerning elements of non-human individual members in 
connection with the value of the ecosystem, as the fact is essentially involved in the non-
individualistic and non-anthropocentric total value perception of the object. 
 
Norton claims that this attempt of Callicott’s virtually leads to a shortcoming in the feelings 
based value approach. Norton regards that factors of the individuals needs further explanation 
in connection with the value assumption of the ecosystem. According to his estimation of the 
approach, the attempt not to allow such things of the individuals raises the question regarding 
how a concern for ecosystem so derived can avoid conflict with the more basic concern for 
individuals in a relevant situation. Not focusing on such an issue, Callicott’s feeling based 
value approach produces less credibility in consideration of a general preservation policy. 
Therefore, Norton characterizes the feeling based value approach as not sufficiently equipped 
for the purpose of the given policy.  
 
Besides finding the given insufficiency in the value perception of Callicott’s evolutionary-
ecological account of the biotic community, Norton’s critical evaluation further concentrates 
on the concept of moral sentiment per se. For this part, he considers some main lines of   
Callicott’s discussion following from the viewpoints of Hume and Darwin. Norton 
emphasizes that the conception of moral sentiment is itself not based on sufficient 
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justification in a relevant situation. According to his criticism, the Humean ethics or the moral 
sentiment contains a subjective or relativistic account. As such the ethics does not provide a 
basis for objective argument when disagreement arises in a relevant situation. Norton 
acknowledges though that Callicott provides an answer in response to the charge, but not a 
sufficient one. In his answer Callicott states that a “consensus of feeling” emerges on 
important issues which are functionally equivalent to objective moral truths. In order to justify 
that moral subjectivism equally represents the objective or universal truth, he brings as an 
example two incidents to which people has consensus of feeling. Accordingly, there is a 
standardized “psychological profile” or consensus of feeling on matters such as ‘murder’ and 
‘theft’ which transcends the cultural differences of people. The two events are generally 
accepted by most people in all cultures as ‘freakish’ and so beyond moral acceptability. No 
different sentiments characterize the matters. Callicott thus justifies that such psychological 
profile following from common subjective feelings is equivalent to the universal account of 
moral truth. Subsequently, Darwin reveals that such psychological characteristics are 
naturally selected in terms of social codes of conduct or altruistic behaviour which essentially 
favours the continuous survival of human beings in a social perspective. In response to this 
justification, Norton is not denying that human sentiments have a role in terms of how we 
come to have and share the sentiments we do. He nevertheless points out that they go only 
this far. They do not explain the role of human’s cognitive condition in the given occasions. 
Because of the deficiency in this explanation, Norton considers that Callicott provides an 
justification for attributing feeling based ethical values to the functioning ecosystem, but the 
justification is nevertheless a partial one. Accordingly he is not completely convinced that the 
assumption have adequate moral force for constituting the preservation policy. He therefore 
insists that it is useful to avoid such controversial value assumption concerning the matter. 
 
- Functioning based moral status value and Aristotle’s holistic teleological ethic: 
 
In a purpose of finding a suitable value approach, Norton comes up with an alternative 
account on the assumption. Accordingly, he sorts out that the functional characteristic is an 
essential element and straightforwardly associated with defining the stable account of the 
ecosystem. In this characterization he points out that the functioning characteristic itself 
determines a definite standard for constituting the intrinsic value of the said object. He 
therefore considers that the functioning criterion confers moral status value on the ecosystem. 
Before turning in detail to the discussion of the functioning account of moral value for the 
protection policy, let me first look briefly at the relationship between the functional 
characteristic and the proposed value, as this criterion have an important place in the policy. 
Accordingly, the functional characteristic is, as we have precisely pointed out in the earlier 
discussion, is essentially attached to the dynamic state of the entire ecosystem of the region.  
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The characteristic, according to Norton, has both essential and sufficient qualification to be 
part of the said value. The proposed value then corresponds directly to this functional 
characteristic, which represents the definitive mark of that type of value. This therefore 
implies that the justification of such value fundamentally evolves from the functional 
characteristic of the ecosystem. The proposed object, then, has this relevant characteristic 
which qualifies it for moral status value. Thus the characteristic and the value conceptually lie 
in the same equation. Norton assumes that the relationship accordingly provides a wider 
adequacy for taking the proposed value into the space of a general preservation policy. He 
thus employs the functioning value in defining the preservation policy for the whole 
ecosystem. 
 
Given the relationship between the functional characteristic and the value assumption of the 
ecosystem in a consideration of the preservation policy, Norton illustrates the former 
approach of Callicott’s in the way that species are seen as a collection of continuous activity 
of individual members, and they are at all times parts of the ecosystem. The fact that the 
species are viewed in this manner, is suggesting that they are essential components of the 
entire functionally valued ecosystem. According to this feature, species occupy a logical 
relationship between the individuals and the ecosystem. In this form of the relationship, the 
value of the species derives directly from the functioning ecosystem, and not from the 
individual members of it. Thus Norton shows that the individuals have an instrumental role in 
maintaining the continuous stable or dynamic functioning of the object. Accordingly, he 
portrays the functional value model of the ecosystem from the viewpoint of Callicott, in a 
purpose of protecting the species and the said value in view of a complete ethical system. He 
explains it in the following way: 
 
  A society is constituted by its members, an organic body by its cells, and the ecosystem  
  by the plants, animals, minerals, fluids, and gases which compose it. One cannot affect 
  a system as a whole without affecting at least some of its components. An environmental 
  ethic which takes as its summum bonum the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
  community is not conferring moral standing on something else besides plants, animals, 
  soils and waters. Rather, the former, the good of the community as a whole, serves as a 
  standard for the assessment of the relative value and relative ordering of its constitutive 
  parts and therefore provides a means of adjudicating the often mutually contradictory 
demands of the parts considered separately for equal consideration. If diversity does  
indeed contribute to stability (a classical “law” of ecology), then specimens of rare and 
endangered species, for example, have a prima facie claim to preferential consideration 
 from the perspective of the land ethic. Animals of those species, which, like the honey 
bee, function in ways critically important to the economy of nature, moreover, would be 
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granted a greater claim to moral attention than psychologically more complex and sensitive 
ones, say, rabbits and moles, which seem to plentiful, globally distributed, reproductively 
efficient, and only routinely integrated into the natural economy. 148
 
The quoted statement in the above, following from the functional model, clearly shows that 
the concept, ‘the good of the community as a whole’ serves as a basic norm for ethical holism. 
Hence, Norton advocates Aristotle’s teleological ethic of the holistic kind as an inevitable part 
of this ethical system in consideration of the preservation policy. Accordingly, this holistic 
ethic ascribes relative or instrumental value to individuals, because they are essential in order 
to maintain the continue functioning of the entire ecosystem. Once it is regarded that the 
entire ecosystem has moral status value, this would then be a powerful reason for such ethic to 
protect species, deriving from their instrumental value in promoting the ultimate good for the 
community. According to this approach, species have no intrinsic value, but is instrumental to 
a source of value, i.e., the ecosystem. In the perspective of this ethic, its value system protects 
the value of the ecosystem, which is described as non-anthropocentric, and species have value 
independent of their value to humans. In other words, this holistic ethic finds that the species 
have a critically important role in relation to protect and promote the functioning value or 
wellbeing of the ecosystem, and so they are also accountable for the intrinsic value status. 
Species then have moral status, or they have their own value independent of human’s 
instrumental values, but nonhuman individuals are not equated with this status. Concern for 
individual members is however to be treated as a relative factor in accordance with the 
particular relation of each species to the collective entity, i.e. the ecosystem. In this 
characterization, this ethic provides justification for dealing with matters or interests of the 
individuals who are members of endangered species. This is how Norton portrays the 
functioning based value account of this holistic ethic in the sense that its basic norm not only 
protects and promotes the value of the ecosystem in the non-anthropocentric and non-
individualistic sense, but also the value of the species in the account. 
 
In so far as it is understood in this sense, the functioning based value of this holistic ethic 
makes up a policy in which moral protection is primarily concerned with the ecosystem and 
its species, but not with the individuals. In this direction of formulating a policy, the 
assumption also provides room looking for a human relation to the morally considerable 
holistic ecosystem. It considers that the sustainable human settlement essentially depends on 
the moral protection of the functionally valuable holistic ecosystem. Accordingly, this ethic is 
essentially concerned with and so protects this value.  In an account for the sustainable human 
settlement, the considered policy then allows the fact that the human being is morally 
permitted to use a natural entity or ecosystem as long as it does not reduce or jeopardize the 
                                                 
148 Norton, 1987, p.176. 
 106
functioning value of the object. This holistic ethic, accordingly, maps out the policy in the 
sense that the moral accountability of such human act essentially lies in concurrence with the 
functioning value status of the whole ecosystem.149 In other words, this holistic ethic 
formulates a protection policy in which the sustainable continuity of human species should be 
placed in proportion to the functioning moral status of the holistic ecosystem. Given human’s 
such relation to the ecosystem, Norton eventually figures out that the functioning based value 
of this holistic ethic not only protects the value of the ecosystem and its species in the 
framework of  the policy, but it equally permits human beings to use the natural environment 
without destroying or harming its moral status. He therefore considers that the policy has a 
significantly promising rationale in the sense that its norm morally protects and promotes the 
functioning status of the holistic ecosystem, nonhuman species as well as the sustainable 
survivability of the human species in the object. 
 
- Can the functioning value account of the holistic teleological ethic be accepted? 
 
Although Norton’s functioning based environmental protection policy in this holistic ethic 
provides moral protection and is promoting the functioning value of the ecosystem, species 
and sustainable survival of the humans as well, the assumption does not equally address the 
nonhuman individual members of the object. The main cause being, as it follows from the 
discussion, that the individuals are not being regarded as an object of moral status in the 
proposed value approach. Norton justifies this by claiming that such assumption will 
eventually not emphasize protection for the species.  He specifies this in the following 
manner. “. . . species preservationists gain no advantage, indeed, damage their cause in some respects, by 
establishing that non-human individuals have intrinsic value”. 150 The problem with such justification, I 
shall find, is that this perception is not only less persuasive or more controversial regarding 
his charge against the feeling based value status, there will follow further arguments as well. 
Accordingly, his functioning based holistic ethical preservation policy does not morally 
protect all parties involved in the ecosystem. Moreover, I shall find that his account of using 
the natural environment does not even correspond to non-anthropocentrism, but corresponds 
to weak anthropocentrism. In order to reach these objectives, I shall follow the discussion in 
conformity with the given menu. Accordingly, one of his main accusations against the feeling 
based value approach is that the assumption does not provide specific or sufficient space for 
discussing essential matters of the individual organisms in connection to the ecosystem. In 
finding a solution, he emphasizes that the functioning based value approach provides a 
                                                 
 
149 In finding more information regarding human usage of the natural entity or ecosystem in moral content, see, 
Norton, Summer 1992, vol. 1, no. 2. p. 97-111. 
 
150 Norton, 1987, P. 168. 
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persuasive account in response to this problem. In the account he figures out that the 
concerning matters of individuals is to be treated as a relative fact of the morally valued 
species. Accordingly, he considers that the concerning problem of individuals would find a 
justifiable solution to the matter, rather than putting them into equal moral status to the 
species. Given this justification, we nevertheless perceive the fact that this underplays the 
justification by keeping them out of the moral space. Even though one of his main intentions 
is to treat the concerning states of the individuals in a precise and considerable sense, in 
response to a critical assessment of the feeling based value approach. This implicates that the 
attempt has no moral force from which the justification could find a moral or firm basis for 
solving the concerning matters of the individuals. Contrary to this, his justification for the 
individuals is not viewed in equal moral consideration. Accordingly, the assumption has 
contributed to a controversy over his emphasis on finding a justifiable solution to the 
problems or interests of the individuals. In this direction, his rationale for individuals 
eventually produces similar result in the constitution of the policy, as it is suggesting that it 
morally protects the value of the species, but not the individuals. The most relevant and 
fundamental question then arises: How can the functioning based moral value genuinely 
concern and protect the individual organisms as long as they are being denied moral 
consideration in the conception? Given this scepticism, I therefore find that Norton’s charge 
against the given sense of the feeling based ethical values has no credible ground.151 More 
importantly, this produces the view that his interpretation of the functioning based value 
approach in the given holistic ethic does not necessarily protect all parties involved in the 
ecosystem. 
 
In addition to the above justification, in the said preservation policy Norton see the human 
relationship to the ecosystem in the context of human values. He favours human’s sustainable 
or moral way of using the natural environment as consistent with the holistic functioning 
value. In other words, a dam, according to this policy, can be morally acceptable as long as it 
does not reduce the functioning value of the holistic ecosystem. In this characterization, the 
assumption has at least two relevant manifestations of the policy. One of them is suggesting 
that the functioning based preservation policy is not precisely able to provide a firm basis for 
protection and promoting the value of a natural entity, or the total value of the holistic 
ecosystem. The other is viewed in the sense that once the policy values the functioning 
holistic ecosystem specified in the context of humans’ values, the assumption no longer is to 
be viewed in a non-anthropocentric sense, but at best adheres to the weak 
anthropocentrism152. As being judged from the given findings, I therefore have found genuine 
                                                 
151 In addition to this, Norton has another accusation against the feeling based moral values which is that it does 
not focus on human’s faculty of reason. I shall address this issue in the appropriate context of the following 
discussion. 
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ground to justify my assumption that the policy constituted by this functioning based holistic 
ethic is not an appropriate approach for protecting the object in such environmental situation. 
With this consideration, I shall in the following look at Callicott’s latter approach. 
 
- The feeling based value of the ecosystem and Aristotle’s wider version of holistic 
utilitarianism: 
 
As it is precisely found in the preceding discussion, the functioning based holistic ethic is not 
a suitable policy for protection and so promoting the total value of the ecosystem in the 
situation. The assumption then permits me to take the feeling based value approach of 
Callicott into this holistic ethic, in a sense of finding a genuine protection policy for the given 
object. In this direction, I shall firstly look briefly at the relationship between the feeling 
based moral status value and the functional characteristic of the entire ecosystem, as it is 
already acknowledged that the criterion has an important role in the value evaluation of the 
said object in the policy. In this term, the proposed value is regarded as essentially attached to 
the functioning characteristic of the ecosystem. This implies that the value is being 
proportional to its functional characteristic and so there is an equal corresponding relationship 
between them. Therefore, the relationship justifies a wider adequacy for taking the proposed 
value into account for a general preservation policy. We shall accordingly find in the 
following discussion that the same holistic ethic firmly protects the total value of the 
functioning ecosystem itself in the said policy. In this case, this holistic ethic will not be an 
alternative to the former, but a modification of it.153 Hence, I shall consider that the feeling 
based value approach of Callicott is essentially consistent with this holistic ethic. On this 
account, Norton assumes that the species must have instrumental value, but on the basis of 
Aristotle’s holism they are also in a way intrinsically accountable. In concern with this 
judgement, it is useful to be acquainted with certain key and relevant aspects of Aristotle’s 
teleological account of the holistic ethic, as this ethical system has a prime role in framing the 
preservation policy. Aristotle exclusively believes that every object has a good of its own. He 
accordingly insists that the teleos or the final purpose of every action is directly aimed at 
attaining the total good of the object, in the highest form.154 This is why his ethical system is 
generally known as teleological ethics of the holistic kind, or simply Aristotle’s holism. In 
other words, Aristotle’s holistic ethic judges the good or the bad of an object on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                        
152 I am not concerned with further discussion on the weak anthropocentric account of the preservation policy, as 
it is not main objective of this part of the discussion.  
 
153 One can apply this holistic ethic in finding a suitable account consistent with the assumption of an object. For 
more information regarding this perception, see: Ibid, p. 9-11. 
 
154 The Greek word ‘telos’ is translated as `purpose’, or ‘goal’, or `end’.  See, Des Jardins, 1993, p. 26- 27 and p. 
154-155.  
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its total aspect, not from an individualistic perspective155. Therefore, the main purpose or 
moral norm of the action is to be defined as attaining the total good of the object in the 
optimal sense pertaining to a relevant situation. We shall find in the following discussion that 
this perception conceptually does not differ significantly from main the argument of the 
consequentialist ethics.  
 
In consequentialist ethics, the perception of obtaining the value or the good of an object in its 
highest form is the determining factor in defining the moral aspect of the action. This basic 
conception, therefore, appears the same in both ethical theories, in so far as they are 
concerned with attaining the value of the object in a moral term. On account of such generic 
view, Aristotle’s holism shares some features with utilitarianism. There is, however, certain 
difference in reference to measure the value of the object in both senses of utilitarianism. 
Accordingly, Singer, as we have already pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, uses the 
sentient account of utilitarianism for measuring the value. This account has only the scope to 
consider the interests of certain individual animals into moral protection, and does not seize 
the interests of all parties concerning the said situation. This is why the assumption is 
characterized as a limited or individualistic version of utilitarianism.156 On the other hand, 
Aristotle’s holism or utilitarianism takes a comprehensive account as it constitutes a scope for 
measuring the value of an object, in the sense that the interests or values of all members or 
elements involved with the object is to be measured totally. The notion of measuring the total 
value or utility in this holistic ethic overlaps any separate or comparative value assessment of 
different individuals in the total utility, as this move either might lead to assign negative value 
to an individual organism, or it might lead to an emphatic concern for particular individual’s 
value in the ecosystem. The assumption can even end up with conflict of values between 
various organs of the ecosystem. In order to avoid such problematic and complicated 
situation, this form of holistic utilitarianism rules out such separate or comparative value 
assessments of different individuals in the total utility. This assumption then permits us to 
characterize his judgement of the value as a wider or complete sense of utilitarianism. In other 
words, this Aristotelian utilitarianism provides the reflection of a complete form of the 
traditional account of utilitarianism.157 Norton assumes that such complete perception of the 
                                                 
155  Aristotle’s account of human’s behaviour and the “good of the whole community”. See, Ross, Oxford, 1998, 
p. xvi-xvii and p.11-14. 
156 I consider once again certain aspect of Singer’s hedonistic account of classical utilitarianism for the sake of 
the current context of the discussion.   
 
157 My consideration of finding a comparative relationship between Aristotle’s holistic teleological ethic and 
utilitarianism primarily follows from a discussion of Jon Wetlesen. I consider only certain aspect of the 
discussion pertaining to my objective. He considers the matter as a part of an environmental ethical discussion, 
in following place of the book: Wetlesen in Witoszek and Gulbrandsen (eds.),1993, p. 99-108. 
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value judgement provides a genuine and reliable norm for defining a general preservation 
policy in the sense of good and bad, or rightness and wrongness in relation to a holistic 
ecosystem. He thus considers that the said ethical argument holds a justifiable moral norm for 
accounting such policy. Accordingly, once we put the total version of utilitarianism in 
reference to our concerned case, then its moral norm considers the relationship between the 
individuals, the species and the holistic ecosystem, in the following sense. This norm not only 
protects the value of the whole ecosystem, but equally protects and so promotes as far as 
possible the interests of all parties involved in the morally accountable value of the 
ecosystem. According to this, the relationship between the given entities and the holistic 
ecosystem is understood as an inclusive good or internal part of the whole relationship of the 
ecosystem. This relationship then evolves as an internal cause and effect relation, in which the 
value of the entities will be instrumental, but are viewed as integral parts pertaining to the 
good for the social whole. They are therefore not to be characterized in an instrumental sense, 
but are qualified as intrinsically or morally valuable parts of the whole ecosystem. We 
accordingly find that in the said object these elements are intrinsically valuable. In this way 
the non-anthropocentric value account of the said ecosystem is conceptually accommodated 
into this holistic ethic or the Aristotelian sense of total utilitarianism. 
 
- Holistic utilitarianism defines moral protection of the total ecological community: 
 
Following from the above discussion regarding the intrinsic parts of the ecosystem, the 
assumption then suggests that non-human individual members of a species and other natural 
objects are to be regarded as morally significant parts, as they are identified as integral parts 
of the whole system. According to this evaluation, the Bengal tiger, for instance, as it is being 
regarded as an endangered individual member of a species, as well as other species whose 
declining population are caused by the said environmental situation, must be qualified for 
protection by considering the contribution of individual members to the functionally valuable 
whole of which they are being ascribed as intrinsic or inevitable parts of. The manner of their 
protection should be aimed at optimizing the environmental situation and not worsening it, for 
the sake of maintaining the total value of the whole functional ecosystem in the region. This 
accordingly indicates that the concern for individual members must be estimated according to 
the value of the entire object, not from separate consideration of their values. Therefore, this 
holistic utilitarianism is itself capable of allowing the moral significance and so the equal 
protection of all parties involved in the value of the social whole. Thus the whole ecological 
community’s interests are entitled into moral consideration and so for moral protection, 
according to the given ethic.  
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Once it is found that this holistic ethic equally protects the interests of  all parties considered 
in the value of the said ecosystem, the view then strongly insists on not to use the ecosystem 
in the satisfaction of the individual’s or human’s interests. This assumption genuinely 
corresponds to the non-anthropocentric version of environmental ethics. The assumption, 
however, allows human beings, as a part of the ecological community, to use the natural 
environment in limited scale, or in the purpose of traditional activities, which presumably 
have no affect on the value of the ecosystem. Thus the non-anthropocentric moral massage of 
Leopold’s Land Ethic and its consideration for using the land in the given sense represents 
clearly the said form of utilitarianism. How then will this complete non-anthropocentric 
version of utilitarianism deliver its recipe for a general preservation policy or a morally 
accountable environmental policy in relation to such environmental situation? This type of 
utilitarianism considers that a human being or a decision maker is an inevitable part of the 
functional ecological whole in which the decision maker is identified as the ecological self. 
He/she then regards himself as a moral person who has a clear vision regarding his 
harmonious relation to the ecosystem. Accordingly, he considers that decisions concerning 
such policy will be estimated on the basis of the whole community’s interests, and not in the 
sense that it will only affect on his own life. 
 
As this is the main standpoint of the decision maker, the policy is then to be reflected on the 
basis of such justification in which he/she measures that the good life is equally a part of the 
whole. In other words, the good life or the object turns out as a moral subject and so is viewed 
as an intrinsically valuable part of the whole community’s interest as well. This good life is 
therefore to be recommended as an object of subjective interest, in the sense that the subject 
puts it on a par with the whole community’s interests, because it is congruent with his specific 
psychological tendencies which are inherently selected in the nature of the subject. This 
psychological profile essentially tends to inspire him to estimate the object with altruistic or 
natural feelings, as the object is equally proportional to the functional advantage or wellbeing 
of the whole community.  In this consideration the decision maker estimates the good life and 
finds that it is completely identical to the community’s interest. Thereby he finds a sensible 
and very strong reason to look after the community and ensure its wellbeing rather than 
destroy or harm it. This significantly implies that the decision maker’s feeling based ethical 
consideration of evaluating the object is itself informed by the cognitive condition. In other 
words, Hume does not deny the role of human cognition in the feeling based ethical 
considerations. Thus the decision maker’s intellectual horizon blends into the natural feelings. 
The assumption then provides strong ground for defending against the charge following from 
the functioning based preservation policy, that the feeling based value perceptions have a lack 
of such criterion. Thus the Humean-Darwinian moral psychology viewed with the bio-social 
and cognitive conditions, plays a key role in the policy making process of the decision maker 
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by evaluating the object in this way158. On the basis of such measurement, the decision maker 
makes up his effort to exert a morally accountable choice by suggesting that the main 
obligation is to take the whole ecological community’s interest itself into consideration in 
composing the protection policy. In this way the decision maker sets out the obligatory norm 
of the policy which appeals for enhancing the entire community’s interest as far as possible, 
as it genuinely protects the interests of all parties involved in the community in relation to 
such environmental situation. In other words, the right environmental policy is that which 
determines only the whole community’s interest in the highest sense. This policy then 
corresponds exactly to the other approach of Callicott, in which he considers the feeling based 
ethical arguments of the said philosophers in defining the view that the total functioning 
ecosystem itself bears the said moral status value, assuming individuals and others are 
inevitable or valuable parts of it. In this way we have found that this non-anthropocentric 
account of utilitarianism truly provides the firm rationale for the general environmental policy 
accountable for protecting and promoting as far as possible the total wellbeing of the holistic 
functional ecosystem. In other words, my explanation of the holistic utilitarianism in the 
given sense provides essential and sufficient room for evaluating the moral consideration as 
well as protecting and promoting the total value of the ecological community in such 
environmental situation. Therefore, this sort of utilitarianism is practically consistent with a 
general preservation policy or environmental policy concerning the said community, in 
defining the alternative decision model following from such environmental situation.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
I have considered my main objective of this chapter in two accounts. First, I have examined 
morally the adversarial effects caused by the decision of constructing the dam beyond the 
affairs of humans, to nonhuman entities as well as the whole ecosystem in the region. Second, 
I have considered a morally definable general policy in the purpose of protecting the value or 
values of the said natural entities in relation to this environmental situation. I have examined 
both assumptions in consideration with the normative philosophical account of environmental 
ethics.1. I have found that non-anthropocentrism provides justifiable ground for accounting 
the moral status value of non-human entities as well as for the whole environment. For this 
purpose, I have considered an expansive view of utilitarian ethic in the sense of the non-
anthropocentric version of utilitarianism of the environmental ethics. 2. I have considered 
Singer’s extensive account of sentient utilitarianism. I have found that this approach is 
conceptually only capable of protecting the moral status value of individual sentient animals 
in its decision model. Accordingly, I have shown that the decision of constructing the dam 
                                                 
158 . Wetlesen in Witoszek and Gulbransen, (eds.), 1993, p. 100-105. And,  Wetlesen, 1999, Environmental 
values, vol. 8. no.3. P. 316-317. 
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significantly ignores the morally protective value status by inflicting an abnormal situation on 
the normal functioning of the individual animals in the region. I have characterized this 
sentient account of utilitarianism as a limited or individualistic account of non-
anthropocentrism. I have counted this approach as a first step in dealing with one of several 
problems lying in the given environmental situation. 
 
3. As part of considering the wider environmental problems in a total account, I have found 
that Callicott’s account of Leopold’s holistic description of ecology as well as its ethical 
assumption viewed in The Land Ethic, are significantly consistent with the said problem. 
According to the scientific account of the ecological discussion, I have found that the dam has 
seriously downgraded the functioning of the whole ecological community in the region. I 
have further brought this malfunctioning image of the community in view with the ethical 
discussion of The Land Ethic. I have found that Darwin’s evolutionary ecological account of 
Hume’s feeling based ethical values attribute moral status value to the whole functional 
ecosystem. I have accordingly shown here that the ethical aspect of Leopold’s land ethic is 
basically built on the said version of the Humean ethic. Accordingly, I have justified that the 
decision of the dam simply disregards such value status, and so I have found that the dam is 
morally blamed for the unhealthy functional state of the whole ecosystem in the situation. 4. I 
have considered Aristotle’s teleological account of the holistic ethic as a norm for a complete 
moral theory in accounting the moral protection of the value status of the whole ecological 
community. Whereas it is found that Callicott’s non-anthropocentric ethical discussion of the 
land ethic is limited only to measure the value status of the entire functioning ecological 
community. Norton considers that this holistic ethic is significantly consistent with such a 
form of preservation policy. I have found that his consideration of this holistic ethic in the 
functioning value account of the weak anthropocentric preservation policy cannot firmly 
protect the total value of the holistic ecosystem. 5. In stead of this approach, I have found that 
the feeling based ethical value account of this holistic ethic firmly protect and promote the 
total value of the holistic ecosystem in its policy. I have accordingly characterized this holistic 
ethic as the complete form of the non-anthropocentric version of utilitarianism. I have referred 
this ethical account of an environmental protection policy, or a general environmental policy, 
to the consideration of an alternative decision model in finding a moral solution to the said 
environmental situation in the region. 
  
This is how I have extended the traditional view of utilitarianism in a consideration of this 
environmental crisis, resulting from the decision of constructing the dam in the given region. 
In account of this expansive view, I have considered utilitarianism in the non-anthropocentric 
version of environmental ethics. In this form of the discussion, I have considered the 
individualistic account of utilitarianism, whose merit lies in protecting and promoting the 
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interest of sentient individual animals in its policy or decision model. In the further expansion 
of this utilitarianism, I have considered Aristotle’s holistic ethic which I have characterized as 
the non-anthropocentric account of total utilitarianism, whose merit lies in protecting and 
promoting the total value or the feeling based moral value of the entire functional ecological 
community in its model of environmental policy. Given the merits following from both forms 
of non-anthropocentrism, I have found that utilitarianism stands firmly against the decision of 
constructing the Farakka dam in the region. I have therefore found that my consideration of 
utilitarianism have successfully managed to bring rightly the interests of individual members, 
as well as the interests of all the parties involved in the whole functioning community, into 
moral consideration, and so for promoting and protecting the said interest in an alternative 
policy on this environmental situation as well as forming a general policy of the natural 
environment.  
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Chapter 4: An analysis from the viewpoint of just distribution 
 
 
       “- - - in any particular case the 
       distributional question must be 
       addressed in the context of each 
       individual’s functional needs“.159
         - Amartya Sen 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
In the previous chapter, I have clearly examined the problems of individual natural entities as 
well as the entire environment in the moral account, following from the Farakka dam and the 
water dispute. In the discussion, I have not only considered their moral status, but also their 
moral protection from a viewpoint of environmental ethic. In this chapter, I shall primarily 
concentrate on the distributive arrangement of the Ganges water between India and 
Bangladesh from a normative ethical point of view. We have seen from the case study that 
Bangladesh and India finally reach a just distributive agreement about solving the Ganges 
water conflict between them. Despite this fact, a considerable problem emerges when 
Bangladesh points out that he/she does not really receive the due share according to the 
precept of the agreement. I consider that this perception has a normative philosophical 
justification by considering the rightness of the distributive equity in this situation. When it 
appears significantly difficult to implement accurately the moral objective of the distributive 
arrangement, then the questions arise: Is it really a fair agreement? How can it be verified? 
What would be a proper consideration for doing this verification? How can it be justified? 
And finally, can the justification be genuinely trusted? On the basis of these issues, I consider 
a combined notion based on the capability approach and the functioning view. The two 
objects are essentially related to each-other in the sense that one has corresponding affect on 
the other. This can be identified as the capability version of functioning. Or, the functioning 
view of capability. The application of each of them largely depends on the context of the 
discussion. I consider that this notion will be a suitable account of determining the right state 
of distributive justice, following from the distributive agreement of the water. 
 
                                                 
159 See, Nussbaum, 1988, p. 11 
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There are only a handful of philosophers who use the capability account of functioning view 
to explicate distributive justice. Aristotle, for instance, considers a general sense of human’s 
capability to function in relation to the distributive justice. The problem with his assumption 
is that it is not designed to consider all situations precisely.  We do not consider the 
assumption as an essential requirement of determining particularly the capability of 
individual’s function in a relevant situation.160 Therefore, we find that the Aristotelian view is 
conceptually insufficient in dealing with our considered case. This requires me to consider 
other philosophers views regarding the capability version of the function view. I consider the 
view of Amartya Sen - a contemporary moral philosopher who comprehensively discusses the 
notion of evaluating the distributive justice of various occasions. Sen illustrates the capability 
account of the functioning view or the capability approach and the functioning view in a 
general account as well as illustrating it specifically when determining the state of an 
individual with regard to distributive justice.161 Both accounts have a moral and an 
instrumental sense and they are relevant to assess a particular situation following from the 
consideration of distributive justice. 
 
In consideration of the moral account, Sen considers an evaluative space for identifying 
valuable or relevant information, and this equally constitutes norm or norms in consideration 
for determining the functioning and so the capability to function. In the evaluative space of 
the functioning view, Sen examines closely utilitarianism and the pluralist value account of 
morality, or informational based moral pluralism, in finding a suitable moral approach to 
assess properly the distributive justice of some arrangement.. He finds that the functioning 
account of capability approach is consistent with the informational account of moral 
pluralism. I consider that the pluralist account of the functioning view or moral pluralism is 
relevant for evaluating the state of distributive justice in various senses. Sen’s consideration 
of moral pluralism is designed without accounting intuitionism. This challenges the credibility 
of moral pluralism in determining a complete account of distributive justice. I shall argue that 
moral pluralism is primarily concerned with moral value or values limited to defining the 
right state or judgement of distributive justice, and is not concerned with a complete 
assessment. I then consider that the informational account of moral pluralism is a right moral 
approach for examining the distributive justice of some arrangement following from the 
agreement of the Ganges water. This gives me justification to consider the pluralist account of 
the functioning view in examining the right state of distributive justice in this situation. 
 
                                                 
160 For further information regarding the Aristotelian view on capability account of functioning, see Ross, 1998, 
p. 11-15, Nussbaum and Sen, (ed.), 1996, p. 46-47, and Nussbaum, 1988, suppl. vol. p. 32-33.   
 
161 It is useful to point out that I shall use the term ‘individual’ as representative of a country in most part of the 
discussion in the chapter. However, I shall, in some cases, refer to the name of the country or countries directly, 
in accordance with the context of the discussion 
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In examination of distributive justice, the pluralist account of the functioning view 
emphasizes on the information of basic capability or individual’s capability. The functioning 
view takes poverty as a normative standard whereby it examines the state of individual’s 
capability as a part of identifying deprivation. In this account, the capability approach 
specifies two normative issues of poverty. One is relative poverty based on income centred 
view and the other is absolute poverty based on nutritional requirement or characteristic. I 
shall find that it is not relative poverty, but the nutritional characteristic of absolute poverty 
which gives moral value to the individual capability. This approach further suggests that 
water has nutritional characteristic or value which secures individual’s capability to function, 
while the characteristic assessment of water is being considered for achieving the capability. I 
consider that the moral aspect of individual’s capability lies in securing the nutritional 
characteristic of the water. The individual capability turns into a normative standard in order 
to judge rightly the implemental state of distributive justice of the Ganges water. On this 
reading, the capability approach emphasizes the freedom account of individual functioning as 
a prime notion. Sen characterizes the notion in two senses. I shall argue that the moral account 
of freedom attributes intrinsic value to individual functioning, while the instrumental version 
of freedom corresponds to the achievement sense of individual functioning. I shall further 
take both accounts of freedom into an estimation of India and Bangladesh, in a comparative 
assessment of functioning in relation to the morally accountable distributive agreement of the 
water. I shall find that Bangladesh is deprived of an equal sense of freedom in both accounts, 
which put the country in an absolute poverty situation deprived of the nutritional requirement 
of water. I consider that this significantly deprive the country’s capability of functioning in a 
right assessment of distributive justice of the Ganges water. These are the main elements I 
shall put in the discussion of this chapter. I shall arrange them in the following way: 1. I shall 
illustrate the relevant aspects of the capability approach and the functioning view as a 
combined notion in two accounts. 2. I shall consider the informational account of the 
functioning view in finding its consistency with moral pluralism and the justification of moral 
pluralism for determining the distributive justice of some arrangement, following from the 
Ganges water distribution. 3. I shall consider the moral aspect of individual capability in 
focusing on the injustice state of distributive justice, whereby I shall argue that the 
deprivation of individual capability to function is not morally acceptable. 4. I shall focus on 
the freedom account of individual functioning in finding the deprivation of the freedom of 
Bangladesh in relation to the morally accountable distributive justice of the water. I shall 
argue here that the inequality of freedom of functioning does not justify the right state of the 
considered distributive agreement.  Before finishing, I shall put a concluding remark of the 
chapter. 
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A. What is the capability approach? 
 
In order to verify the equality aspect, or other distributive standards, with regard to the 
Ganges water, we must consider several relevant questions. What should be decisive factors 
to determine this?  In which way can the role of this factor be known precisely? What counts 
as relevant in order to know its effectiveness? What should be the fundamental in determining 
the distributive equity of the water in such situation? And finally, how can these factors be 
justified? This manner of assessing the distributive justice of the solutions to the water 
conflict is not only limited to the designation of fair allotment of the item. The justification of 
such fair arrangement is substantially related to an evaluation of how it effects practically on 
the state of the individual or the individual’s life involved in the situation. Accordingly, the 
main purpose of such verification is to define the condition of individual’s life. To this extent, 
the verification calculates the state of distributive justice in the given term of individual’s life. 
The essential criterion to determine this is two closely related elements that concern whether 
individuals have the capability to carry out their functioning aspect of life as a result of the 
distributive agreement. Hence the concept of capability is one element in the assessment of 
distributive justice of a situation. The main task is to focus on the actual implementation to 
determine the distributive justice of the arrangement, by measuring its effect primarily on 
individual’s capability. So this approach can be characterized as the capability version of 
distributive justice, since it accentuates that realization of distributive justice is assessed by 
the functioning level, or the functioning aspect, of individuals. Accordingly, the capability 
approach considers the functioning aspect as an integral part of its conceptual framework. 
Thus, the functioning view and the capability approach must be combined in order to 
determine the distributive justice of a situation. 
  
It clearly appears from the above discussion, that the accurate way of defining the notion of 
capability inevitably depends on a consideration of its functioning aspect. Therefore, it is 
essential for us to look at the way the functioning notion is viewed within the space of 
capability. We find that the notion of functioning can actually be assessed in two senses. One 
aspect is connected to the distributive justice with regard to individual’s capability. 
Accordingly, the main task of the functioning view is to select and evaluates various 
information pertaining to individual’s capability. The other aspect is concerned with the 
assessment of individual’s capability of functioning. The main objective of this view is to 
examine the fairness of the distributive arrangement by measuring whether it accurately 
equalizes individual’s capability of functioning in such situation. In this account, the 
functioning aspect of individual's capability can again be assessed in two senses. One aspect 
is primarily concerned with the fundamental element or elements of an individual’s existence, 
such as being adequately nourished, being well sheltered, being in good health and so forth. In 
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other words, these functionings are essential to determine an individual’s ability to exist in a 
particular sense, i.e. without deficiency of a fundamental element. These elementary aspects 
of functioning are the basic capabilities of an individual. Other functionings are significantly 
different, and concern various elements, goals or goal pertaining to the normal or actual 
capability of an individual.162  
 
This discussion shows that the capability approach and the functioning view as a notion of 
combined elements or a combined principle, allow us to measure a person’s life in various 
situations. They are closely associated with each other in the way that one cannot be realized 
without other. So it appears that one aspect is oriented to define an individual’s basic 
capability to function in certain sense. This can simply be identified as the individual’s 
capability to function in a particular situation – or in order to function at all. The other is 
concerned with the individual’s actual capability to achieve a variety of functionings, which 
leads to a full life that may lead in various directions. Both assumptions belong to a notion 
which combines the capability approach and the functioning view. It suggests that functioning 
can be regarded as a basic component to determine the capability in relation to various aspects 
of the distributive justice. This assumption is conceptually not significantly different from 
determining the capability aspect of the functioning view, as they are essentially related to 
each other. This does not necessarily imply that they are same. Both aspects must be viewed 
as relevant to determining an individual’s capability and so to his/her functioning regarding 
the consideration of distributive justice. 
 
B. Evaluation of factual information and the functioning view: 
 
The preceding discussion has defined the relationship between the individual’s capability and 
his functioning in a way that combines the capability approach and functionings. I have 
pointed out that on various occasions the assessment of relevant information related to 
individual’s capability of functioning, plays a central role in measuring the state of 
distributive justice. Hence, this can also be characterized as the informational element of 
distributive justice. The capability account and the functioning aspect of distributive justice 
give rise to some relevant issues: How can the relevant information be assessed in the given 
account of distributive justice? Is it essential to take all sorts of information into account for 
correct determination of distributive justice? And finally, what exactly does the information 
entail in judging the moral estimation of the capability and functioning account of distributive 
                                                 
162 Sen indicates clearly in the discussion of the capability account of the functioning view, that it is possible to 
make out the relationship between the capability and the functioning in various senses. Accordingly, I examine 
the relationship between them. For further information in this regard, see Sen in Nussbaum and Sen, (ed), 1996, 
p. 32-33. 
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justice? In finding answers to these questions, functionings can take various types of 
information into account. The way informational analysis is organized can be characterized as 
an evaluative space.163 Thus a set of functionings composes an evaluative space that identifies 
valuable elements or aspects pertaining to the assessment of individual’s capability to 
function in a relevant situation. 
 
Let me now try to give a brief account of how the functioning view takes the information of 
the considered state of distributive justice into account for its purpose of evaluating the 
situation. Its main aim is to explain the relation between standards of distributive justice and 
the sort of information to be gathered in the evaluative space – i.e. which information will be 
regarded as relevant to determine the individual’s capability to function. In this criterion of 
calculation, other types of information might not have such important role, and so they are 
discounted or considered to be irrelevant. Sen, accordingly, remarks: 
  The need for selection and discrimination is neither an embarrassment, nor a unique  
difficulty, for the conceptualization of functioning and capability.164
In this process of determining the worth of the relevant information, it appears that what the 
functioning view includes in the evaluative space is to be referred to as potentially valuable, 
and what it excludes is to be regarded as negligible. Given the crucial nature of identifying the 
objects of value or information, I shall first turn to look at the information which the 
functioning view counts as ignorable. Thereafter, I shall focus on the information which it 
permits to be regarded as countable and so valuable for determining the capability account of 
distributive justice relevant to such situation. And, finally I shall give the justification for 
considering this notion of the capability account of the functioning view, or the functioning 
account of the capability approach, in determining the distributive justice of some 
arrangement following from the case of the Ganges water. 
 
- The functioning view and utilitarianism: 
 
Given the pattern of informational analysis, I shall first take into account as an example the 
view of utilitarianism, which primarily assesses the state of affairs on the basis of single value 
account or value information.165 The central reason for considering utilitarianism is to show 
why the functioning view goes beyond the single value aspect of utilitarianism, as a part of 
the selection process of the evaluative space. In this consideration, I shall give a brief account 
regarding the way the functioning view assesses the framework of utilitarianism. Accordingly, 
                                                 
163 See, Sen in Sen & Nussbaum (ed.), 1996, p. 32-33 
 
164 Ibid., p. 32 
 
165 See, Sen in Honderich (ed.), 1985, p.130-132 
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utilitarianism is, indeed, viewed as one form of consequentialism.166 The assumption of 
consequentialism is normally referred to as a doctrine suggesting that the rightness and 
wrongness of an action or choice is mainly determined by determining the consequential 
information of a situation or the state of an object. In this consideration, the functioning view 
examines closely the merit and demerit of consequentialism. In concerning the merit, the 
functioning view finds that the consequent state supplies important information as to assess 
the state of affairs in terms of the good or bad effect of the action. Accordingly, it considers 
that the consequent state is important in judging the state of a situation, and so it maintains a 
crucial role in order to define the moral aspect of the action. In this connection Sen 
specifically point outs that “consequent state of affairs may not be the only thing that matter, but it can 
nevertheless matter”.167 The functioning view therefore considers that it is essential not to ignore 
the information attached to the consequent state, as it provides information as to whether the 
moral aspect of the action is genuinely permissible or reaching to its moral objective. Thus the 
functioning view takes the consequential version of information into account, and primarily 
allows consequential aspect of information into the evaluative space. However, this does not 
necessarily implies that the functioning view actually acknowledges the way 
consequentialism defines the consequent state of affairs as a part of justifying the rightness of 
action. Rather we shall find that the functioning view considers such a view in critical sense. 
With this indication, I shall now look at the demerits of consequentialism.  
  
Given the account of how the functioning view is regarding the consequent state in its 
evaluative space, the crucial question is: What is being considered wrong with the view of 
consequentialism? In response to this question, it is worthwhile to interpret consequentialism 
as a form of utilitarianism, since the value aspect of a consequentialist approach is precisely 
regulated by the view of utilitarianism. In this sense, utilitarianism takes the main essence of 
the consequentialist approach as a corner-stone, by attributing value on the goodness of the 
consequent state in terms of utility. In this characterization, the utilitarian version of 
consequentialism emphasizes primarily on utility as being regarded the only intrinsically 
valuable information which is actual for determining the good aspect of the consequent state. 
In this spirit, it further advocates for achieving utility as much as possible, since the goodness 
of the considered state is only definable as such value, or as relevant to such value account.168 
On this account, utilitarianism claims that the rightness of the action is finally determined by 
attaining maximal utility in the consequent state. Utilitarianism is then in most cases tempted 
                                                 
166 I have already discussed the notion of utilitarianism in various contexts of the previous chapter. I will 
consider once again certain aspect of it, in the light of the current context of this chapter. 
 
167 Sen in Honderich (ed.), 1985, p.135 
 
168 It is worthwhile to point out here that utilitarianism generally interprets the utility value as pleasure and pain, 
happiness, interest and the like, relevant to measure psychological events of a situation.   
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to constitute an action in such a way that the right action is itself to be calculated by 
determining the utility type of information. It does so because it is essentially relevant in order 
to achieve the considered amount of utility as output of the action. Accordingly, utilitarianism 
insists that it is useful not to give equal value on non-utility types of information (for instance; 
justice, freedom and so on), as the assumption creates a conflict of values when determining 
the considered state. It is then sensible not to consider other information in evaluating the 
value status of the consequent state. Instead utility is to be taken as a basic standard in order to 
qualify the merit of all types of information so that the conflicting situation is not to arise.169 
In other words, the only informational aspect it regards as proper is utility, and so other types 
of information is to be regarded as irrelevant and so useless. Utilitarianism thus imposes 
informational-constraints in the form of closing the window for considering directly the usage 
of other types of valuable information regarding the state of affairs. 
 
In response to this view of utilitarianism, the functioning view gives a critical account of it on 
the basis of two aspects. First, it finds that utilitarianism remains in an indefensible state as 
long as it regards the rightness of the action to be judged only on the basis of utility 
assessment of the consequent state, as it does not consider the action itself in a moral account. 
On account of such a defect, the functioning view insists that the utilitarian action is to be 
blamed for lacking of adequate moral accountability. The other defect is connected to the way 
utilitarianism takes utility as the only value in order to judge the informational spectrum of 
the consequential state of affairs. In this regard, the functioning view points out that in this 
way utilitarianism makes a barrier to the consideration of other types of valuable information 
in relation to the considered state of affairs. Accordingly, it points out that utilitarianism 
considers the rightness of distributive justice by adding up primarily the utility type of 
information, or sum ranking in the sense that the different types of utilities are best valued by 
summing them in aggregate, and ignoring the distributive aspect itself as an important 
element in measuring the considered state of affairs. How then can utilitarianism judge the 
rightness of distributive justice without considering justice itself in the prime account? In this 
manner of scepticism, the functioning view maps out that the standing order of utilitarianism 
is limited by not giving importance to non-utility types of information, or by ignoring other 
valuable information in judging the state of affairs. Given the lack of considering other types 
of information, the functioning view then concludes that utilitarianism actually defines the 
situation in an inadequate way. Therefore, the functioning view ignores utilitarianism in the 
framework of its informational analysis concerning the distributive justice of some 
arrangement. 
 
                                                 
169 See, Sen in “The Journal Of Philosophy”, vol. LXXXII, nr. 4 April 1985, p. 176-178 
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- Functioning view and moral pluralism in evaluation of distributive justice: 
 
Once it is clearly found that the functioning view goes beyond utilitarianism in the evaluative 
space, the question then arises: What would be a non-utilitarian version of moral approach 
that can examine appropriately the consequent state of distributive justice in various valuable 
values or information? In response, the functioning view of the capability approach takes the 
notion of pluralistic value accounts of morality or moral pluralism as an alternative to the 
utilitarianism. However, confusion arises from the consideration of identifying the use of 
plurality of moral principles with intuitionism. I shall find that these two notions are not 
essentially related and the confusion has no base. In this respect, I consider a relevant view of 
John Rawls who has discussed comprehensively regarding the various aspects of justice.  He 
carefully accounts one of these perspectives in his most celebrated book “A Theory of 
justice”, first published in 1971. In focusing on the relationship between intuitionism and the 
pluralist account of the justice or distributive justice, he remarks that “a conception of justice can 
be pluralist without requiring us to weigh its principles by intuition.”170 In considering this assumption, 
let me first concentrate on the relevant features of intuitionism and moral pluralism so as to 
figure out the difference between them. In a general sense intuitionism states that if there are 
many ultimate principles of justice and they are not in a hierarchy, then according to Rawls, 
intuitionism might play a role in striking a balance between them. This not necessarily implies 
that intuitionism maintains a substantial or an absolute requirement for reaching a judgement 
between competing principles of justice.171 This defines that intuitionism - unless radically 
redefined - is a claim about how the moral structure may be derived and supported (i.e., 
whether by intuition only), whereas pluralism is a claim about the form of moral structures or 
values. The two things are different and so not related to each other. Thus it has no strong 
base to claim that intuitionism is a requirement necessary for balancing the values of 
distributive justice.172 Therefore, Rawls points out rightly that the pluralist sense of justice 
does not require weighing its principles or values by intuition. In this consideration, the 
functioning view then takes essentially the pluralist base of morality into account in the 
evaluative space. In other words, the functioning view itself (and so the capability approach) 
is embodied in moral pluralism or the pluralist account of distributive justice. Thus, the 
functioning view of the capability approach is essentially accommodated with the 
informational base of moral pluralism in evaluating the distributive justice of some 
arrangement in a relevant situation. 
 
                                                 
170  See, Rawls, 1973, p.34  
 
171 Ibid., p. 34-35 
 
172 See, Sen in “The Journal Of Philosophy”, April 1985, vol. LXXXII, p. 175-176 
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- The justification for considering a pluralist account of the functioning view and an 
assessment of distributive justice: 
 
There are at least two different ways of defining moral pluralism. One is in terms of plurality 
of principles or values, which is identified as principle pluralism. The other is in terms of 
plurality of informational variables. It is identified as information pluralism.173 In considering 
the second approach, Sen regards that information pluralism is primarily based on various 
types of information used for the justification of moral value or principle. As he puts it: “. . . 
use of an “informational” approach to moral analysis which focuses on the admissibility and use of different 
types of information in moral valuation.”174  The informational approach, in this sense, corresponds 
to the meta-ethical discussion for making a judgement of a moral value. However, this meta-
ethical discussion falls outside the framework of this chapter or thesis, as I am specifically 
concerned with normative ethical discussion. For this reason I will avoid the meta-ethical 
discussion, but will be considering that the importance of such information is itself to be 
referred to as an intrinsic value account of moral pluralism or moral information. Hence, I 
regard principal pluralism in terms of information based moral pluralism. Accordingly, this 
informational account of moral pluralism is straight forwardly compatible with the evaluative 
space of the functioning view based on various valuable information. In other words, the 
moral justification for the evaluative space of the functioning view (and so for the capability 
approach) lies in the informational account of moral pluralism. Thus, the evaluative space of 
the functioning view is itself an inevitable part of such moral pluralism.  
 
The functioning view is intrinsically attached to the pluralist account of morality without 
being weighed by intuitionism. Several moral values exist in the evaluative space or moral 
structure of the pluralist values, which is identified as non-integrated. In a way the existence 
of several non-integrated principles or values makes concern for the credibility of the 
functioning view to assess properly the distributive justice of some arrangement. This matter 
further leads to characterize the principle of combined views in the pluralist moral approach 
or the functioning view of the capability approach, as not in a correct moral position to assess 
completely the distributive justice of some arrangement. Sen takes into account this problem 
of the non-integrated values as well as the confusion with the credibility issue of the 
functioning view. Accordingly, he takes steps for considering further clarification of the role 
of the non-integrated pluralist moral structure and for finding credible ground for determining 
rightly the distributive justice of some arrangement. I shall find that the issue of non-
integrated values is not an accountable problem for moral pluralism in the moral consideration 
                                                 
173 Ibid., p. 176. My consideration of identifying moral pluralism in the given two ways is following the 
viewpoint of Sen.  
 
174 Ibid., p.169. 
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of values and norms pertaining to state of distributive justice. Thereafter I shall show that 
moral pluralism is not mainly concerned with finding a complete assessment, but emphasizes 
particularly on the role of values constructing the distributive justice of some arrangement. In 
reaching to these objectives, I shall primarily illustrate the discussion from the viewpoints of 
Sen.175 Accordingly, let me first concentrated on the non-integrated moral structure of 
pluralism. In reference to the event, Sen considers a statement following from the viewpoint 
of John Stuart Mill. The statement concerns the problem lying in moral pluralism.  
  For if there were several ultimate principles of conduct, the same conduct might  
be approved by one of those principles and condemned by another; and there would  
be need for some more general principle as umpire between them.176
Sen points out that Mill in the above statement is not disputing the case of having pluralist 
moral structure with a general or combining principle (what he calls an “umpire”), but he 
rather insist only on the need for such a principle for the pluralist structure. Mill is concerned 
to show that if this is the way pluralism is to be dealt with, then it would again be true that 
there is “but one” ultimate standard of consideration. According to Sen, one could dispute the 
role of the umpire, but this does not obliterate the continuing role of the plural principles in 
the moral consideration of actions, states, etc. This is then does not really much hang on how 
much a system of the pluralist moral structure is described. Thus, Sen denies that non-
integrated values are an intractable problem for systems of moral pluralism. Therefore, 
pluralist account of the functioning view or moral pluralism has no problem in determining 
morally the distributive justice of some arrangement.  
 
Now for the sake of the argument, I follow the quoted claim by Mill. A pluralist moral 
principle – and the functioning view in particular - must have an umpire that balances various 
values to determine the state of distributive justice, however we find that the principle has 
difficulty in balancing the different non-integrated values. Thus the functioning view has 
problems with determining the complete distributive justice in the pluralist sense. The 
important question then follows: Is this incompleteness an embarrassment for the functioning 
view? In response to this I shall argue here that a complete assessment is not the main 
objective of the functioning view. Rather, it is primarily concerned with the value or values 
which constitutes the framework of moral pluralism. I shall then argue that the functioning 
view considers relevant value or values as important. Indeed they help define the right state or 
the judgement of distributive justice. Accordingly, I will conclude that the functioning view 
of the capability approach is a sensible position to determine properly the distributive justice 
of some arrangement, in particular the case of the Ganges water. Finally, I shall consider (i.e. 
                                                 
175 I consider primarily justification of the moral pluralism from the viewpoint of Sen. He discusses this 
carefully in the following space of the same text. Ibid., p. 176-181 
 
176 Ibid., p.176-177 
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apply) this functioning view to show why the distributive justice does not reach at its 
objective in the end. 
 
When it is perceived that the functioning view assesses the distributive justice of some 
arrangement in incomplete sense, some other requirement or criterion may be considered for 
finding a complete assessment or the moral good of distributive justice. We shall find that that 
this would do nothing to the complete assessment of distributive justice, which essentially 
continue to be regarded as incomplete. Accordingly, the other requirement can be stated in the 
following sense. This requirement indicates that state ‘x’ is more just than ‘y’, and that the 
states ‘x’ and ‘z’ simply cannot be compared in terms of distributive justice (i.e., neither is ‘x’ 
more just than ‘z’ according to the consistency or criterion of these three alternative states, 
nor can they be seen as equally just; they are simply non-comparable as far as the distributive 
justice is concerned.) Accordingly, this would continue to be so even if the incompleteness 
could be removed in the over-all assessment of distributive justice, by the supplementary use 
of the other requirement. But this does not require that the chosen alternative is seen to be 
“best” in the set of feasible alternatives, since there is no room for characterizing the best 
alternative as the given continuing incompleteness lies in the pluralist state of distributive 
justice of our moral ranking. Accordingly, such completeness is not the main or prior 
requirement of the legitimacy of a moral principle in discussion of the moral pluralism with 
its full structure of values or principles. Therefore incompleteness is not an embarrassment for 
the pluralist account of the functioning view. In other words, the functioning view of the 
moral pluralism is neither concerned with non-integrated values, nor is it concerned for the 
complete assessment of the distributive justice of some arrangement. It rather considers that 
each relevant value itself is important, which constitutes the state or fabric of distributive 
justice. Moral pluralism regards this as significantly important, as the account actually paves 
the way to define the right assessment of the distributive justice of some arrangement. This 
gives me the ground to consider the relevant value or values pertaining to assess the right state 
of distributive justice. In this way I shall find  whether the importance of such value has been 
properly considered in determining the given state of distributive justice. If it is found that the 
importance of each relevant value is not viewed accordingly in determining the consequent 
state of distributive justice, this in a way will justify the claim stated by the individual (or the 
individual country) involved in the situation, that he or she is really deprived as a result of 
distributive justice of the Ganges water. In other words, distributive equity does not take place 
in the situation. Given the credible value accounts of moral pluralism, I therefore consider that 
the functioning view of the capability approach is significantly consistent with attaining the 
main objective of this chapter. I shall in the following discussion consider the relevant matters 
of the chapter according to the given principle of the moral pluralism. 
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- The functioning view and assessment of distributive justice as an objective of moral 
action: 
    
Given the justification of moral pluralism, the function view further assesses distributive 
justice in the evaluative space in order to find the reason why the distributive justice does not 
equally reach its objective in the consequent state of such moral action. The informational 
version of the functioning view takes this issue into account. Accordingly it insists that a 
moral action is not necessarily assigned to produce similar moral value in the consequent state 
of the situation. Let me try to explain the assumption more clearly. I consider here two states 
(for example: X and Y) which are associated with an identical situation. ‘X’ represents here a 
state in which ‘p’ refers to a moral action in terms of distributive justice and ‘Y’ represents 
the consequent state. The functioning view, in this regard, figures out its main argument in the 
following sense. It suggests that although the moral action ‘p’ is taken in the state of ‘X’, it 
does not necessarily indicate that ‘p’ must emerge as the equal moral value in the consequent 
state of ‘Y’. In other words, even if an action is deemed morally appropriate or just in one 
state, this does not necessarily imply that it would have the same moral value in another 
situation.177 According to this consideration, it is significantly difficult to justify two states of 
the same situation in an equal account of judgement.  This is why we find that the traditional 
account of distributive justice does not manage to achieve the same moral goal at the end, in 
this distributive arrangement of the Ganges’ water. 
 
C. Basic capability: 
 
The foregoing discussion insists that despite consideration of the moral action, or the criterion 
of distributive arrangement which is designed on the basis of moral judgement, it nevertheless 
does not orchestrate its moral objective at the end of the situation. This assumption leads to 
powerful questions, following from the normative as well as the epistemological point of 
view. What actually then determines the right action rightly? And, what is the objective of 
distributive equity in practice? How can the objective of distributive equity be known in 
practice? In consideration of these important issues, the functioning view of the capability 
approach leads us to examine the informational state of distributive justice in another way. 
This approach emphasizes that if distributive justice does not appear in its implemental stage, 
does it then indicate that injustice or deprivation has taken place instead? If it is so, how can 
this be assessed? In this consideration, the functioning view gives importance to particular 
information pertaining to a subset of information dealing exactly with the realization of such 
deprivation. So it focuses on the information relevant to identify whether one is genuinely 
deprived, in order to analyse what is permitted in the framework of just distribution. The 
                                                 
177 See, Sen in “The journal of philosophy”, April 1985, vol. LXXXII, nr. 4, p.172-173 
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functioning view thus claims that deprivation can be determined precisely by looking at the 
impact of a situation on the state of the individual or individual humans involved in the 
situation. The state of the individual is measured here in terms of the essential elements that 
define a life in calculation of vital needs and interests. On this account, if the state of the 
individual indicates that he no longer has the basic capability to secure or meet his functional 
needs, this highlights that he is significantly deprived in the consequential or the real 
assessment of distributive justice. The functioning view, accordingly, considers that the basic 
capability of the individual provides a normative standard in order to verify the distributive 
equity in view of such deprivation.178 The notion of basic capability is to be phrased here in 
the sense that an individual is being able to do certain basic things or have crucially important 
functioning as a result of the distributive equity following from the situation. This notion can 
also be interpreted in the sense that the distributive equity must secure the requirement of an 
individual’s basic capability to function in a minimally acceptable level. Otherwise the 
individual would be counted as being deprived as a result of such moral event. Such 
deprivation is not acceptable according to the capability version of distributive justice or the 
informational version of moral pluralism combined with some distributive requirement... 
Thus, the ability to move about is a fundamental factor for identifying the individual’s basic 
capability to function.179 However, I shall in the following focus on the assumption of the 
individual’s basic capability in such a way that will help me to know and so to be able to 
measured normatively whether the individual has really been deprived or whether inequality 
has taken place in the consequent state of the distributive equity of the case which we are 
concerned with here. This perception will eventually give us to the answer of the questions 
which I have raised at the beginning of this paragraph. 
 
- Individual’s basic capability and poverty in evaluating distributive justice: 
 
As a determining factor in examining the state of the distributive equity in the informational 
account of moral pluralism, the main task of the basic capability is to find the relevant or the 
particular information which can properly measure the criterion of injustice or deprivation in 
such situation. But, how can this be identified? In this respect, Sen notices that deprivation 
has connection with poverty and he asserts: “Being poor has clearly much to do with being deprived . . 
.” 180. Hence, the concept of poverty is accommodated into the framework of basic capability. 
                                                 
178 It is worthwhile to mention here that the individual’s capability can be interpreted as the individual’s basic 
capability, since it is viewed on the basis of the fundamental aspect of the individual’s functioning. Accordingly, 
there is no significant conceptual difference between the notion of the individual’s basic capability and the 
individual’s capability in consideration of the functioning account. I shall, however, use the term individual’s 
basic capability or individual’s capability according to the context of the following discussion. 
 
179 Sen, 1982a, Oxford, p. 367-368 
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It is therefore worthwhile to throw light on the discussion of poverty, as it contains the 
relevant qualification for determining precisely the standard of the minimally acceptable level 
of individual’s capability or deprivation as being followed by the given distributive 
arrangement of the Ganges water. In other words, the assumption of poverty precisely 
conveys that if an individual is not secured for meeting the given estimation of capability, this 
is used to define him as significantly deprived or below the poverty line. Holding the 
qualification, the basic capability finds that the notion of poverty is itself intrinsically 
important in the discussion of distributive justice, and so it gives essential value to the view of 
poverty. Thus, the view of poverty is integrated into the framework of basic capability or the 
plurality account of distributive justice. In the following step it is therefore necessary to focus 
on the discussion of poverty as it is being considered for identifying the deprivation of 
individual’s basic capability which relates to this moral account of the distributive 
arrangement. 
 
- Identification of poverty:   
 
The concept of poverty is perceived in different ways from one society to another or one 
country to another. Accordingly, it turns out difficult to identify specifically who should be 
counted as poor. However, we notice here that there are two approaches of identifying 
poverty which receive great attention. One of them identifies the poverty line by determining 
primarily the individual’s actual income or the economic factor in a society. The approach is 
known as relative-poverty or relative deprivation. This view is being considered as a relevant 
factor for judging the poverty level of rich or advanced countries (for instance; countries in 
the Western Europe, North America and the like). The other view considers the nutritional 
state of an individual as a basic standard in order to identify the poverty level of a society. 
This view is regarded as absolute poverty or absolute deprivation. The perception is usually 
assumed to be a relevant factor for defining the poverty level of people who live in less 
developed or poor countries (for instance; countries in the Indian-Sub continent and others in 
the Third World). Accordingly, the two approaches focus on two different elements in order 
to identify the poverty line. I shall show in this regard, that the relative approach provides a 
misleading picture in identifying the poverty line or the deprivation of individual’s capability 
in the sense of a minimally acceptable level. Instead, I shall rather find that the absolute 
approach of poverty identifies the poverty line in an indisputable sense, or is defining properly 
the deprivation of individual’s basic capability in a relevant situation. The assumption will 
actually provide me with a basic standard to justify the point that one party is really deprived 
in terms of determining the basic capability, following from the morally accountable 
                                                                                                                                                        
180 Sen, 1982b, Oxford, p. 15 
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distributive arrangement of the Ganges water. In this direction, I shall further show that the 
moral aspect of the individual’s basic capability lies in meeting the consideration of the 
nutritional requirement pertaining to the river’s water. In purpose of attaining the given 
objectives, it is necessary to look closely at both concepts of the poverty discussion.    
 
- Relative Poverty: 
 
There are some people in a rich society who find themselves living in a miserable condition. 
In calculation of life-style, they frequently claim that they are clearly deprived of securing or 
meeting what they have learned to be the requirement for a minimum acceptable level of basic 
capability as a part of their living-standard relating to others. Hence, the discussion of relative 
poverty appears in identifying the poverty level of a rich society.  The claim of characterizing 
their inadequate life style stems particularly from the consideration of the existing criterion of 
living standard in the society where they live. Accordingly, an individual finds himself living 
under the estimation of the poverty line in relation to others. Thus the notion of relative 
poverty is accommodated in the discussion of poverty. The poor individuals of such a society 
usually blame their insufficient earning on failing to reach the considered estimation of 
capability relative to the others. Hence, the relative approach takes an income-focused 
analysis or the actual income into account, as a fundamental criterion in order to identify 
poverty in the considered society. Proponents of the given approach, however, identify the 
poverty in various senses. Some of their crucial and relevant arguments I shall in the 
following examine closely in finding the justification for identifying such poverty. 
Accordingly, I shall first illustrate each argument with their point of view, and thereafter I 
shall put my own account in response to the respective argument.181
 
I. The conventional sense of living standard: 
 
One way of identifying the poverty line in the relative approach is viewed with the 
conventional or absolute sense of living standard in a rich society. The proponents of this 
notion calculate the poverty line in view of the idea of “absolute” needs. The assumption of 
such need in connection with living standard is perceived in the sense of absoluteness which 
                                                 
181 In determining the notion of relative poverty, Sen examines it in the sense that he first puts each argument 
according to the viewpoint of a proponent or proponents of the relative approach. Afterwards, he sets each view 
in critical sense whereby he places his own argument in justification for disagreement with the respective 
account of the relative approach. I shall follow the same style regarding aspects of the relative approach. In this 
connection, I shall primarily focus on the viewpoints of Sen in discussion of the relative approach. He considers 
this his book “Resources, Values and Development”, published in Oxford, 1984. He discusses comprehensively 
on arguments of the relative poverty in the chapter “Poor Relatively Speaking”. In this regard, I shall mainly 
concentrate on the following pages of the chapter, p. 327-332.   
 131
goes over time. Given this calculation of the living standard, they find that necessities of life 
are always changeable due to social mechanism in different times and places. Therefore, they 
propose that the considered notion of living standard is to be judged by looking at the average 
rise (or fall) in real income. Accordingly, they insist that the effective way to define poverty 
relates to the given sense of income or living standard in the society. We shall find that the 
way of defining the idea of need in the conventional sense of living standard, suffers from a 
general defect. Accordingly, the absolute account of needs is not the same thing as fixity over 
time. The main reason for taking this judgement is that the relativist view sees deprivation in 
terms of a person’s income or house holding matters, as being able to achieve less than what 
others in the society have in relation to necessities of life. Accordingly, this relativity is not to 
be confused with variation over time. So the fact of “the necessities of life” are not fixed, 
neither in the variation of time nor in the idea of absolute needs. It is normally admitted that 
the poverty line will be the function of some variables in terms of both time and place. 
Accordingly, there is no prior reason why these variables might not change over time in 
relation to the living standard and similarly to the idea of “absolute” need on which the 
considered living standard is granted for. Therefore, the relative approach, as based on the 
conventional sense of living standard in view with the absolute need, is not able to identify 
precisely the poverty line of an individual in the society. 
 
II. The living standard in contemporary sense: 
 
Some proponents of the relativist approach are tempted to identify poverty not by determining 
it in terms of some historic or traditional account of living-standard, but they replace it with 
an assessment of contemporary standards of living. The reason for considering living standard 
in this direction, relates partly to their estimation of human’s “wants” in new dimensions. On 
this account, they find in general that the prosperity of society is continuously increasing. 
Accordingly, this leads them to insist that living standard is essentially consistence with the 
contemporary sense of prosperity. By such a way of calculating living standard, they find that 
poverty is likely to persist. They argue for the view that there are always certain sections of 
people who are badly off relative to the average individuals in the society. The main cause for 
acknowledging this is that these people earn relatively below the average income. Therefore, 
the proponents of this approach propose that it is essential for society to assist those who are 
relatively poor. It is, however, difficult for us to agree with their fundamental view that 
increasing prosperity in living standard brings certain section of the people under the poverty 
level. Accordingly, the rising of the living standard might still imply a general decline in 
prosperity which brings a lot of people into misery due to a severe recession or depression in 
the situation. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily indicate a sharp increase of poverty, since 
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the relative situation of the society does not change. Therefore, we find that there is no 
justifiable ground for accepting the way proponents of this view attempts to identify poverty.  
 
III. The Policy Definition: 
 
In recent study of poverty in some rich societies (for instance; U.S.A. and Great Britain), the 
poverty line is conceptualized in the consideration of Policy definition of poverty. This 
suggests that it is a level of income which is seen as something relevant to define the poverty 
line. The proponents of this approach accordingly make the following comment: “the society 
feels some responsibility for providing to all persons”.182 On account of such perception, this policy 
insists that the individuals who earn relatively below the average income would be identified 
as poor and so they will be followed up. The policy then recommends for supporting them so 
that they can adjust their income along with the average income of the society. On this 
recommendation, the policy is characterized as the Official Supplementary Benefit Scale. The 
main purpose of this scale is to reduce the number of poor people in the society, by providing 
the given support in the form of supplementary benefit scale. 
 
The calculation of this supplementary benefit scale is largely based on the assessment of facts 
relating to consistent revision of the average income as well as the changing nature in the 
cost-of-living on monthly basis. Seen the purpose and manner of determining the facts as 
required for implementing the supplementary benefit support, the state or the government 
takes certain steps in order to deal effectively with the poverty in the following manner. The 
authority raises the supplementary benefit scale upwards faster than the facts for 
implementing the benefit scale mentioned in the above. Let me explain this in following an 
example. The example indicates that the state primarily defines an individual as poor, if his 
average income is below 10,000 (ten thousand) U.S. dollars at a given time. After determining 
the given facts in terms of the revision of the average income as well as the nature of the 
living cost, the state is tempted to revise the previous poverty line. It then constitutes a new 
benefit scale which states that the individuals who have an income under 20,000 (twenty 
thousand) dollars, are to be counted as poor. In other words, the considered figure (USD 20, 
000) defines the demarcation line of poverty in the current assessment. According to the 
policy definition of poverty, these poor people are qualified for receiving supplementary 
benefit from the state in order to meet the average income of the society. According to the 
purpose of the supplementary benefit, it emphasizes that their impoverishment will eventually 
be eliminated. Given the aim and nature of the policy definition of poverty, I shall find that 
this provides a misleading picture in defining the poverty line. Accordingly, a puzzling 
                                                 
182 Ibid. p.332 
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question follows: Can the application of supplementary benefit scale be able to reduce the 
number of poor people in the community? In response to the question, I shall show that it 
actually increases the number of poor people rather than reducing it. Accordingly, the policy 
definition of poverty revises the former assessment of a poverty line of ten thousand dollars 
(USD10, 000) in application of the supplementary benefit. Then, the revised poverty line 
which is standing at 20,000 dollars, includes the people who were already counted as poor 
under the poverty line of the previous figure (USD10, 000). However, the new figure of the 
poverty line actually also includes an additional number of people as poor, that is the people 
who earn more than 10,000 dollars and below 20,000 dollars. These people normally would 
not be regarded as poor under the poverty line counted for in the previous figure. We thus find 
that the policy definition of poverty or supplementary benefit scale, in fact increases the 
number of poor people in place of reducing this, even though these people receives more 
benefit than according to the previous figure of identifying the poverty level. Therefore, we 
consider that the policy definition of poverty in the sense of supplementary benefit scale is 
misleading in defining the poverty line. 
 
- Absolute Poverty: 
 
As we have already seen in the above discussion, where it is explicitly found that the various 
arguments based on the income centred view of the relative approach, do not manage 
precisely to identify the poverty line. Each argument has eventually appeared as controversial. 
Thus, the relative approach is not persuasive in identifying accurately the poverty line, and so 
for defining the minimally acceptable level of the basic capability in a rich society. How can 
then poverty be identified correctly? In an attempt to find the answer to this question, we now 
consider it as sensible to follow in the discussion of absolute poverty. The absolute approach 
touches fundamental issues of an individual’s life in the discussion of poverty. In a way it is 
not necessary to ask any further question in relation to identify who is poor in a society. The 
absolute approach puts, for instance the events of famine, starvation, malnutrition or the 
equivalent to such a visible hardship state of individual’s life, as central elements in 
consideration of poverty. Each event it regards as being a part of acute poverty and so each of 
them cannot be reduced in further assessment. In this way the approach is not concerned with 
the matter of what the relative pattern of individual’s life within a society is. Hence, 
significant difference lies in identifying the poverty line between the two approaches of the 
poverty discussion. In respect of the given consideration, absolute poverty genuinely 
overrides the relative matters of individual’s life. In the way it touches precisely the main 
theme of the poverty discussion. As Sen remarks in this consideration: 
  Indeed, there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty,  
which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship into  
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diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first the relative picture.183
According to the above statement, we perceive the fact that absolute poverty provides a 
transparent picture in relation to identify the poverty line by concentrating on the basic issues 
significantly relevant to the survival state of individual’s life. In other words, the perception 
of the absolute version of poverty itself constitutes a vital reference point to measure the fact 
whether an individual is absolutely deprived in the requirement of securing the basic 
capability in a relevant situation. Thus, the absolute sense of poverty itself qualifies as an 
essential essence in the discussion of individual’s basic capability. Therefore, the discussion 
of absolute poverty is intrinsically valued and so is accurately consistent with view of the 
basic capability.  
 
However, absolute poverty is often traceable to the people of poor countries, as famine or 
hunger haunts them repeatedly. In most cases, it is observed that famine or such apparent 
hardship in the life of poor people, is primarily being blamed for malnutrition or lacking of 
nutritional level. Then it is not the real income, but the state of nutritional requirement which 
genuinely turns out as the key factor in identifying the poverty line of an individual or 
individuals in a poor society. Accordingly, the poor people substantially urge to assure the 
required nutrition which they generally obtain from an essential good or goods attached to the 
survival state. The absolute approach, in this consideration, gives enormous importance to the 
state of nutritional needs or requirements. Thus it considers that the nutritional requirement is 
intrinsically valuable in order to assess the poverty line or the basic capability of an individual 
in a relevant situation.184  
 
- Water as nutritional requirement and individual’s capability: 
 
It is clearly figured out in the above discussion that the nutritional state is to be counted as the 
key element for identifying the poverty line. This accordingly indicates that there is a close 
relationship between the nutritional state and identifying the absolute poverty of an 
individual. However, the assumption sometimes leads to confusion about what is to be 
counted as valuable in terms of the nutritional state or the characteristic assessment of a 
relevant object. The suspicion can be addressed in the following sense: Should one give value 
to the nutritional requirement? Or; should one give value to the characteristic assessment of a 
relevant object in order to identify correctly the poverty line? The question can further be put 
in accordance to our concerning issue: Does the moral account of the individual’s basic 
capability lie in consideration of the nutritional requirement or in the characteristic assessment 
                                                 
183 Sen, 1982b, Oxford, p. 17 
 
184 Sen in Nussbaum & Sen ( ed.), 1996, Oxford, p. 41 
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of the river’s water? The answer to this question is significantly important in order to 
consolidate the individual’s basic capability in firm moral basis. In this way, the assumption 
will further facilitate the strong justification that the deprivation of individual’s basic 
capability in connection with water is to be regarded as morally blameable in accordance with 
the pluralist version of distributive justice. Accordingly, I shall argue that the moral 
accountability of the individual’s basic capability rests precisely on a consideration of the 
nutritional requirement or value, and not on the characteristic assessment of the water. Let me 
first focus on the issue of the individual’s capability with reference to the nutritional value of 
the river water. In this consideration a capability is a feature of an individual in relation to the 
water. This suggests that the water gives the individual nutritional value or characteristic - a 
fundamental requirement of his life - and so is securing the capability of functioning. Owning 
or having some water meets the nutritional requirement of securing the individual’s basic 
capability to function. This implies that without having water the individual faces nutritional 
deficiency. Thus the nutritional characteristic or requirement represents an essential element 
of securing the individual’s basic capability to function. This can also be interpreted in the 
sense that the nutritional value of water essentially correspond to the requirement of securing 
the individual’s capability of functioning, in a particular sense (i.e. without nutritional 
deficiency). In this consideration, the individual’s basic capability and the individual’s 
capability conceptually makes no difference in connection with defining the functioning 
aspect. However, the nutritional characteristic is viewed here in the sense that lacking water 
equally corresponds to the individual having nutritional deficiency of securing the capability 
to function or securing the survival state. In this direction, lacking the required nutritional 
value; the individual is for instance greatly prevented from the capability of protecting the 
natural environment, as in our case the assumption refers to this important functioning. Thus 
the nutritional requirement is to be regarded as an inevitable item in the moral estimation of 
individual basic capability in this situation.  
 
As it is already found, the nutritional requirement itself substantiates the moral qualification 
to identify properly the poverty line or the survival state of an individual. The perception 
similarly provides the ground to value the individual’s capability as a morally important 
object. Thus the view of individual’s capability in essentially accorded with the discussion of 
morality. In other words, the moral aspect of the capability approach or the individual’s 
capability is precisely specified in the consideration of the nutritional requirement. We 
therefore find that the nutritional requirement provides a vital normative scale in justifying 
rightly the deprivation of individual’s capability, which is not morally acceptable concerning 
the distributive state of the Ganges water, following from the informational account of moral 
pluralism or the capability account of distributive justice.  
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- Water as the characteristic assessment and the state of individual’s capability: 
 
In the above we have clearly figured out, that the nutritional state values the individual’s 
capability as morally accountable. In other words, the water has nutritional characteristic 
securing the individual’s capability of functioning (i.e. without nutritional deficiency) in this 
situation. Once it is found that the individual’s capability of functioning greatly depend on the 
nutritional characteristic, this further tempts an individual to emphasize primarily on the 
characteristic assessment rather than the nutritional value of water. Hence, confusion arises 
out of finding two aspects of water and the moral account of the individual’s capability. In 
finding a transparent picture of the event, it is then sensible to focus on the individual’s 
capability in connection with the characteristic assessment of the water according to the 
current context of the discussion. The most crucial issue will then follow. What happens once 
the characteristic assessment of water applies to the state of the individual’s capability? In 
response to this question, I shall find that the characteristic assessment defines the 
instrumental aspect of the individual’s capability, which has no moral basis. Accordingly, the 
characteristic is a feature which represents an abstraction from the water. It relates to the 
object rather than to an individual. On the other hand, a capability, as we already know, is a 
feature of a person in relation to the water. In line with this account, the capability to function 
implies what the individual is able to do without the deficiency of nutritional characteristic (or 
value). Given the essential relationship between the individual capability and the nutritional 
characteristic, the perception then tempts an individual into focusing greatly on the 
characteristic assessment of the water in relation to his capability. Hence, the characteristic 
assessment of the object corresponds to the view of the individual’s capability. 
 
As being followed from the relationship of the characteristic assessment to the individual’s 
capability, this accordingly indicates that the characteristic estimation of water as owned by a 
person do relate to his capability, as the person achieves his capability through the use of 
water. In another sense, the individual uses the characteristic assessment of water which 
implicates in achieving the capability. Thus the achievement version of individual’s capability 
appears in the discussion of the capability approach. However, this might apparently suggest 
that the individual capability and the achievement version of the individual’s capability are 
the same. Instead of such account, I shall show that they are not the same; rather they pertain 
to two different accounts of the capability approach or the individual’s capability. 
Accordingly, I shall first concentrate on the key element in the former account of the 
individual’s capability. On this consideration, the nutritional characteristic is viewed here in 
the fundamental sense, as being required for securing for the individual’s capability to 
function in view of the deficiency or deprivation following from this situation. This is why the 
assumption sets the individual’s capability in the moral sense. In reference to the latter sense, 
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the individual has no such deficiency. He rather possesses the characteristic aspects of the 
water which favours him for using them in the achievement of the capability. Thus, the 
individual instrumentally values the characteristic assessment of water in regard to achieving 
the capability. Therefore, the achievement version of the individual’s capability has no moral 
accountability in connection with the characteristic assessment of the river’s water. This is 
how we perceive that there is significant difference between the two versions of individual’s 
capability in relation to the given object. Sen characterizes the difference in the following 
remark: 
  Valuing one has implications on favoring the other, 
  but valuing one is not the same thing as valuing the other.185
 
In finding a precise clarification regarding the contrast between the moral aspect of 
individual’s capability and the achievement version of individual’s capability, Sen takes an 
example into account. I suppose it will be useful to follow the example in purpose of 
illustrating the discrepancy.186 Accordingly, it states that if we value an individual's capability 
(to function) without nutritional deficiency, we would tend to favour, up to a point, the 
arrangement in which the individual has more water with this assumption of nutritional 
characteristic. This arrangement with the given perception of the nutritional characteristic is 
not the same thing as valuing the possession of that water as such. If, say, due to some 
unavoidable reasons something makes the individual unable to achieve the capability of 
nutritional characteristic, even though he possesses an amount of the water that would suffice 
for others. However, the fact that he does possess that amount of the water (or has the 
capability or opportunity to possess it) and command its characteristics, would not make up 
the loss of his capability. Given the current state of his capability, the individual will then find 
no use in valuing the characteristic assessment of water. The main reason is that this has no 
effect on the individual’s capability. This assumption then implies that if we morally value a 
individual’s capability, that is what we do value, and the possession of water with the 
corresponding characteristic is instrumentally and contingently valued only to the extent that 
it supports in the achievement of the thing that we do value, i.e., the capability. This is how 
we perceive the two different views, in the discussion of the individual’s capability. In one 
aspect we find that the nutritional requirement indubitably puts the individual’s capability in 
the moral sense, while the characteristic assessment of water serves instrumentally for the 
achievement of the individual’s capability which has no moral basis. In the direction of the 
former assumption, this firmly establishes that the distributive equity must secure the 
individual’s capability to function without nutritional deficiency. Otherwise, the distributive 
equity is not morally justifiable or it will be regarded as a moral shortcoming of the situation. 
                                                 
185 Sen in Honderich (ed), 1985, p. 139 
 
186 Ibid.  
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Therefore, the individual capability is to be rated here as a fundamental moral norm in order 
to judge rightly regarding the state of the distributive equity of the Ganges water. 
 
D. The functioning aspect of individual’s capability and the notion of freedom: 
 
Up to now we have been mainly involved with the moral justification of the individual’s 
capability as a part of determining the distributive justice of some arrangement, following 
from the distributive state of the Ganges water. The assumption fairly points out that the 
deprivation of the individual’s capability is morally not acceptable, according to informational 
basis of moral pluralism or the capability version of distributive justice. Having considered 
this perception, the capability approach further tends to focus on the functioning space of the 
individual capability, as being viewed as an inevitable part of examining the distributive 
justice of some arrangement. The capability approach then evaluates and so makes out the 
essential or relevant information on which the functioning aspect of the individual capability 
directly rely on. Accordingly, the capability approach considers the relevant information 
which is itself important for driving the functioning feature of the individual’s capability in 
such situation. Hence, the capability approach identifies that the notion of freedom itself 
qualifies as essential information or value in its evaluative space, in the consideration of 
driving the individual’s functioning in regard to the state of such distributive justice. 
Accordingly, the notion of freedom is integrated or equated with the functioning state of the 
individual’s capability, or the conceptual feature of the individual’s functioning aspect of 
capability. Thus, the freedom account of individual’s functioning and the judgement of 
individual’s capability must be considered in essentially related or integrated sense187. I 
therefore find that it is significantly relevant to focus on the freedom account of individual 
functioning as an indispensable part of determining essentially and adequately his/her 
capability in a relevant situation. The gesture will eventually give me a normative standard in 
order to make an effective or a persuasive moral judgement regarding what is right and what 
is a wrong in the state of the morally accountable distributive arrangement of the Ganges 
water. However, the notion of freedom has many features in the discussion of the functioning 
account of the capability approach. We nevertheless find that there are two notions of freedom 
which are greatly attached to measure the individual’s functioning account of capability.188 
They are as follows: 
i. Freedom in terms of what the individual’s functioning can do or can be. 
ii. Freedom in terms of what the individual’s functioning achieves to do or to be. 
                                                 
187 It is worthy to notify that the individual’s functioning and the capability is closely related, but they are not 
the same thing. 
 
188 See, Sen in Nussbaum & Sen (ed.), 1996, p. 34-35 
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In reference to the given two aspects of freedom, I shall show in the following discussion that 
the former sense of freedom is inextricably consistent with the moral version of individual’s 
capability, and so is morally accountable. In this direction, the incentive will further permit to 
argue that if an individual cannot function freely, this equally justify that his capability of 
functioning is significantly deprived following from the consequent assessment of distributive 
justice of the river’s water. On the other hand, I shall find that the latter aspect of freedom is 
instrumentally related to the individual’s functioning achievement and so is not to be viewed 
in the space of morality. In this line of argument, I shall further show that this individual 
freedom, or freedom in such relevant situation, does not assure equal functioning achievement 
in consideration to others.    
 
- i. Freedom in terms of what the individual’s functioning can do with water: 
 
In the above discussion we have seen that the capability approach evaluates the freedom 
account of individual functioning in two different perspectives. In a way each aspect has a 
corresponding relation to the notion of freedom. Accordingly, the informational account of 
the capability approach makes further attention to which consideration of freedom is to be 
directly relevant to what virtually leads to an individual’s functioning to move about. This 
implies that the individual is normally or actually associated with such functioning and so it 
has implication for the capability as well. Hence the assumption permits me to focus on the 
former sense of freedom in terms of what individual functioning can do. The key issue 
following from the given perception is: How can this freedom qualify as morally important 
for the space of individual functioning? Accordingly, this sort of freedom sees individual 
functioning not in terms of what amount of water or good he posses, nor how much he gets 
out of using it. This freedom rather specifies primarily individual functioning in terms of what 
he can do with water without deficiency of nutritional characteristic. The freedom, in such 
criterion, considers individual’s functioning as a natural candidate for his capability. 
Accordingly, this freedom corresponds directly to the moral feature of individual’s capability, 
as it sees individual functioning as inclusive or as an inevitable part of his capability. In line 
with this account, this freedom then deserves to be an object of morally accountable value. 
Accordingly, this freedom is viewed as a morally important value in the discussion of the 
capability approach.  Once this freedom is morally valued, the individual functioning itself 
serves as an object of value, according to the moral perspective of the individual’s capability. 
In this consideration, the individual functioning is morally accountable. Thus, this freedom 
considers such individual functioning as essentially consistent with the moral version of 
capability or the pluralist account of the individual’s capability.189 Therefore, this freedom 
                                                 
189  See, Sen in Honderich (ed.), 1985, p. 138-139, and Sen in Nussbaum & Sen, (ed.), 1996, p. 44. 
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qualifies as a fundamental normative standard in order to measure properly the individual’s 
functioning in terms of what he can do freely in a relevant situation. 
 
- Morally accountable freedom connected to water and interpersonal functioning:  
 
Given the normative criterion of freedom to measure the individual’s functioning in terms of 
what he can do freely, driving such freedom into individual functioning largely depend on 
various factors. This, for example, includes personal characteristics, social arrangement and 
other relevant issues as well. Hence, the freedom account of the individual’s functioning can 
be brought into evaluating two different individuals or an interpersonal functioning situation 
involved in the state of the morally assessed distributive arrangement of the river’s water. 
Accordingly, it follows that one of them, for instance India who has direct access to the water, 
can do many things freely. On the other hand, the other individual, for instance Bangladesh is 
being identified as deprived of what he/she can do freely, due to natural cause. That is; he has 
no such access and so stands in a disadvantageous position in relation to owning or having 
water. This virtually identifies him as an unfortunate or disabled individual in relation to 
water.190  It seems that Bangladesh accepts easily a situation of whatever might relate to his 
survival. But the fact that this individual is in a disadvantageous situation and so has less 
freedom of functioning than the former individual’s functioning means that he cannot do 
many things in relation to water. The fact that this disadvantaged individual is simply 
adjusting to the necessity of continuing survival, does this give ground not to be given special 
help to combat that disadvantage? Does the unfortunate individual give up managing without 
the help he could otherwise claim from the society, or a third party, because of his ability to 
adjust to the situation? The fundamental matter here lies in the distributive arrangement which 
must permit his freedom account of functioning so that he can do many things in relation to 
the former individual. Otherwise, this distributive arrangement is morally not justifiable 
according to the freedom account of individual’s functioning. 
 
Following from the above discussion, the moral account of freedom then finds that it is 
essential to focus particularly on such distributive arrangement in the sense of a choice 
situation. Hence, this freedom account considers the choice situation as essentially relevant to 
assess individual functioning in regard to the distributive arrangement of water. According to 
the freedom account of individual functioning, the individual must have open possibilities as 
opposed to the particular one he happens to choose. I shall find here, that the disadvantageous 
individual’s freedom does not enjoy such opportunity of the choice situation, instead he is 
accepting this particular or the same distributive arrangement in realization of his continuing 
                                                 
190  I consider certain notion of the interpersonal functioning assessment according to the moral sense of 
freedom, from the following source: See, Sen in Honderich (ed.), 1985, p. 140-141 
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survival. Accordingly, let me now consider two incidents regarding the judgement of this 
arrangement. In one case, it might be the event that the disadvantaged individual would not 
accept the arrangement, as it would not make any difference on his functioning. In another 
case, it could be the incident that the disadvantaged individual, had he been a privileged 
individual, would still have chosen not to accept the arrangement. The reason is that it could 
certainly be the case that this arrangement would not have made any different to his 
functioning, had he been a privileged individual. The two cases appear as the same, and so the 
disadvantageous individual need not be seen as deprived. But from the view point of this 
freedom, the disadvantaged individual and the privileged individual have different functioning 
in terms of one being able to do many things that the other cannot. This fact must have 
relevance according to this freedom account of the choice situation. It is therefore not 
necessary that they have to choose to accept the same distributive arrangement. Once the 
disadvantageous individual happens to choose to accept this particular agreement, it implies 
that he enjoys less freedom to choose from the possibilities, which ultimately deprives his 
functioning in terms of what he can do in connection to the water. In other words, Bangladesh 
has not enjoyed the opportunity to choose freely from another option or options in the choice 
situation, but decides to accept this particular arrangement in realization of the continuing 
survival. Thus the decision of accepting the same distributive agreement in the feature of the 
choice situation is the cause for the deprivation of his functioning in terms of what he can do 
freely in connection to the river’s water. Therefore, deprivation result from the choice 
situation or the decision is morally not acceptable, according to this freedom account of the 
individual functioning. 
 
- ii. Freedom in terms of what individual functioning achieves from water:  
 
In the preceding section, we have mainly illustrated the moral based freedom account of 
individual functioning. According to the criterion of the considered freedom, we have 
perceived that Bangladesh does not enjoy sufficient freedom in the choice situation which is 
the reason for depriving his functioning achievement in relation to the water. However, the 
capability approach is not only concerned with such freedom of individual’s functioning, but 
it also makes room for another type of freedom in consideration of individual functioning. 
Hence, the instrumental sense of freedom takes place in terms of achieving individual’s 
functioning in the discussion of the capability approach or the capability account of 
distributive justice. In this regard, I shall first show that this instrumental sense of freedom 
has no direct or moral importance to the evaluative space of the capability approach, or the 
capability account of distributive justice. Thereafter, I shall consider other relevant matters of 
this freedom. 
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The instrumental sense of freedom in terms of individual’s functioning achievement indicates 
that an individual uses this freedom to choose an object among a set of options which is 
useful for his functioning achievement in term of doings and beings as a part of living. This 
functioning achievement can be characterized as the individual’s functioning vector which is 
normally viewed within his or her reach. The functioning achievement of an individual can be 
regarded in the following terms: states of existence, being well-nourished, being deficient of 
nourishment and so on. Accordingly, the instrumental freedom based individual functioning 
achievement does not restrict one’s life in a particular sense. In this account, with this type of 
instrumental freedom the individual actually chooses to accept a distributive agreement or 
deal as an object of achieving individual functioning, which provides him with many things to 
do or to be. Thus according to this account of freedom the individual decides to accept such 
distributive arrangement as a suitable object consistent with the achievement of individual’s 
functioning. Accordingly, an individual finds sensible reason to value this freedom as a 
purpose of attaining such objective. Thus this freedom is valued in the instrumental sense.191 
Therefore, this instrumental sense of freedom has no moral importance in the morally 
accountable evaluative space of the capability approach. 
 
- Instrumental sense of freedom to water and interpersonal functioning achievement: 
 
Given the relationship between freedom and a distributive arrangement as means to achieve 
the individual’s functioning vector, the importance of such freedom however depends on an 
assessment of various situations in which different individuals use this freedom as part of 
achieving the functioning. Hence, I consider that this instrumental sense of freedom is greatly 
consistent with the estimation of interpersonal functioning achievement related to the 
distributive arrangement of the river’s water. In this reading, I shall in the following first show 
that this freedom does not guarantee equal functioning achievement of one individual in 
relation to another. Thereafter I shall show that this instrumental account of freedom in the 
assessment of the interpersonal functioning achievement directly influence or effect on the 
morally accountable evaluative space of the capability approach. The assumption will further 
give me justification to insist that this functioning achievement or instrumental version of 
individual’s freedom deserves not to be ignored in the moral sense of the capability approach, 
or informational pluralist account of distributive justice. I shall primarily consider these 
objectives in the following discussion.  
 
                                                 
191 I consider the perception regarding the instrumental sense of freedom from the following text: See, Sen in 
“Philosophy and Public Affairs”, spring 1990, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 113-116. See also Sen in “The Journal Of 
Philosophy”, April 1985, vol. LXXX11, no. 4, p.197-198. 
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In accordance with the given objectives, let me now focus on the event that the instrumental 
sense of freedom does not guarantee equal interpersonal functioning achievement in relation 
to the river’s water. To illustrate this I consider once again the example from the poverty 
study, but according to the current flavour of the discussion.192 This states that two individuals 
have an identical and normal functioning vector.193 They can be identified as “A” and “B”. 
Accordingly, individual “A” is in possession or owns the water and so enjoys the freedom to 
command on using it. He then has adequate nutritional achievement from it and so is well-
nourished. This assumption can be characterized as India’s position with regard to the 
distributive arrangement of the Ganges water. Due to some persuadable reasons, he/she 
decides not to attain nutrition and undergoes consequently the suffering of under-
nourishment. On the other hand, individual “B” is suffering from under-nourishment because 
he/she lacks the means of freedom to command the water and so is deprived from the 
nutritional achievement of the water. This perception can be characterized as the situation of 
Bangladesh regarding the distributive arrangement of the Ganges water. In terms of the 
misery caused by the suffering, we perceive that there is no difference between A’s 
experience and B’s. Even though it is plausible to say that they have the same level of the 
functioning achievement, in terms of being under-nourished, miserable and so on, nonetheless 
there lies an important difference between the two cases. This highlights the comparison of 
freedom between the two individuals in pursuit of achieving functioning. Individual “A” has 
sufficient means of freedom to achieve the functioning vector and so he chooses straight 
forwardly an alternative life style which is not possible for individual “B”. This is a 
significant difference lying in this comparative assessment of instrumental freedom, which 
does not give equal opportunity to choose the functioning achievement between the two 
individuals, although it is not necessary a difference between the actual functioning levels 
achieved by the two. The possibility of suffering is open to both, but choosing to abstain from 
the nutritional achievement is only open to “A”. In another words, well-nourished “A” or 
India, has the opportunity to choose another life-style as a part of living, whereas poverty-
stricken or under-nourished “B” or Bangladesh, does not enjoy such opportunity. Thus, the 
instrumental based freedom does not guarantee Bangladesh to achieve equal opportunity to 
choose another life style. This assumption actually discontents with the norm of this freedom 
which states that an individual has opportunity to choose one among several options as a 
purpose of achieving the functioning vector leading his life. Moreover, the result of such 
unequal instrumental sense of freedom in the judgement of interpersonal functioning 
achievement, virtually force “B” into the state of suffering from under- nourishment. Indeed, 
                                                 
192 The example has been considered in the following space of this chapter: See, p.134-135. 
 
193 I have borrowed certain aspect regarding the assessment of the interpersonal functioning achievement in the 
light of the instrumental sense of freedom from Sen. This has been taken from the following source: See, Sen in 
“The journal Of Philosophy”, April 1985, vol. LXXXII, no. 4, p. 200-2002. 
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the notion directly corresponds to the poverty discussion or the basic capability. Thus, the 
unequal aspect of the instrumental freedom reflected in the assessment of interpersonal 
functioning achievement straightforwardly influence on the moral aspect of individual’s 
capability. Therefore, I am not wrong to insist that this instrumental sense of freedom should 
not be neglected by the morally accountable evaluative space of the capability approach or by 
the informational pluralist account of distributive justice. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine closely from a normative point of view the 
accusation that injustice appears from implementing the just distributive agreement of the 
Ganges water. In this connection I have considered a combined notion based on the capability 
and the functioning view in determining the distributive justice of some arrangement. The 
notion has been taken according the view point of Sen. Accordingly I have found the 
following: 1. Both the general discussion of the capability approach and the functioning view 
as well as its consideration from the perspective of individual’s situation, have relevance to 
assess the distributive justice of some arrangement. 2. The informational account of 
functioning and the capability approach is a combined moral principle. They are actually a 
part of the informational account of moral pluralism. The justification of moral pluralism is 
viewed in its right assessment of each relevant value which constitutes the moral structure of 
distributive justice. 3. The nutritional state of water secures individual’s capability to function 
without deficiency. The deprivation of such state is morally not acceptable. This identifies 
that the injustice lies in the distributive justice of some arrangement. 4. The freedom account 
of functioning shows that Bangladesh is deprived of an equal aspect of freedom. This further 
justifies that injustice lies in the considered distributive arrangement. In other words, 
significant scepticism lies in considering the rightness of distributive justice. I therefore 
consider that uncertainty still remains in solution of the water conflict between India and 
Bangladesh. Uncertainty is equally involved with the safety of the natural environment. 
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